{"id":22734,"date":"2026-09-26T07:32:58","date_gmt":"2026-09-26T07:32:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/?p=22734"},"modified":"2026-09-26T07:32:58","modified_gmt":"2026-09-26T07:32:58","slug":"cisco-300-220-practice-test-questions-and-exam-dumps-part10-q181-200","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/cisco-300-220-practice-test-questions-and-exam-dumps-part10-q181-200\/","title":{"rendered":"Cisco 300-220 Practice Test Questions and Exam Dumps Part10 Q181-200"},"content":{"rendered":"

View Full <\/b>Cisco 300-220 Exam Dumps<\/b><\/a> and Practice Test Dumps<\/b><\/h2>\n

 <\/p>\n

Question 181.<\/b><\/h3>\n

Which telemetry best reveals abnormal use of a legitimate administrative utility?<\/b><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Disk capacity<\/span><\/li>\n
  2. Command execution logs<\/span><\/li>\n
  3. Screen brightness<\/span><\/li>\n
  4. Printer status<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

    Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

    Command execution logs can reveal how administrative utilities are being used on an endpoint. Attackers often abuse legitimate tools because those utilities are already trusted and available within the environment. Reviewing command names, arguments, execution accounts, and parent processes can expose activity that differs from normal administrative behavior. Disk capacity, screen brightness, and printer status provide little information about command execution patterns. Analysts can compare observed utility usage against established administrative baselines to identify suspicious activity. Combining command-line telemetry with process ancestry, user identity, and timing can provide stronger evidence when investigating potential abuse of legitimate system utilities.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Question 182.<\/b><\/h3>\n

    What technique helps identify hosts communicating with an uncommon internal service?<\/b><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. File extension review<\/span><\/li>\n
    2. Password history analysis<\/span><\/li>\n
    3. Screen-lock auditing<\/span><\/li>\n
    4. Network flow analysis<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Correct Answer: 4<\/b><\/p>\n

      Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

      Network flow analysis can identify communication relationships between hosts and services across an environment. When a workstation unexpectedly communicates with an uncommon internal service, flow records can reveal the source, destination, ports, timing, and connection frequency. This information helps analysts determine whether the communication fits expected business behavior. File extensions, password history, and screen-lock events do not directly describe network relationships. Analysts can enrich flow information with asset roles and known service dependencies to reduce false positives. Unusual internal communication may indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, unauthorized administration, or an application behaving outside its established communication pattern.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Question 183.<\/b><\/h3>\n

      Which evidence most directly shows a new executable appeared on an endpoint?<\/b><\/p>\n

        \n
      1. File creation telemetry<\/span><\/li>\n
      2. DNS response codes<\/span><\/li>\n
      3. Login duration<\/span><\/li>\n
      4. Network gateway uptime<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

        Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

        File creation telemetry directly records when new files are created on an endpoint. Such records can help investigators determine when an executable first appeared, which directory received it, and potentially which process created it. This information is useful when investigating malware delivery, unauthorized software, or suspicious downloads. DNS response codes describe name-resolution behavior rather than file creation. Login duration and gateway uptime provide different operational information and do not establish that an executable was introduced. Analysts can strengthen the finding by correlating file creation with process execution, download activity, user identity, and timestamps from other endpoint sources.<\/span><\/p>\n

        Question 184.<\/b><\/h3>\n

        Why should analysts compare suspicious activity with asset role information?<\/b><\/p>\n

          \n
        1. To remove timestamps<\/span><\/li>\n
        2. To disable correlation<\/span><\/li>\n
        3. To judge expected behavior<\/span><\/li>\n
        4. To conceal host ownership<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          Correct Answer: 3<\/b><\/p>\n

          Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

          Asset role information provides important context for deciding whether observed behavior is expected. A database server, workstation, domain controller, and development system may all legitimately perform very different activities. A connection that is normal for one asset type could be suspicious on another. Comparing suspicious events with asset roles therefore helps analysts distinguish normal operational behavior from potentially anomalous activity. Removing timestamps, disabling correlation, or concealing ownership would reduce investigative context. Asset metadata can include system purpose, business function, environment, and criticality. Combining that information with telemetry helps produce more meaningful hunting hypotheses and reduces unnecessary investigation of legitimate activity.<\/span><\/p>\n

          Question 185.<\/b><\/h3>\n

          Which indicator is most useful for tracking a malicious certificate across endpoints?<\/b><\/p>\n

            \n
          1. Screen resolution<\/span><\/li>\n
          2. DHCP lease duration<\/span><\/li>\n
          3. Keyboard layout<\/span><\/li>\n
          4. Certificate fingerprint<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            Correct Answer: 4<\/b><\/p>\n

            Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

            A certificate fingerprint provides a stable representation that can help analysts identify the same certificate across multiple systems. If a suspicious certificate is associated with malicious infrastructure or unauthorized services, searching for its fingerprint can reveal additional affected endpoints. Screen resolution, DHCP lease duration, and keyboard layout do not directly identify certificates. Certificate-related indicators can be especially useful when investigating encrypted communications, unauthorized certificates, or suspicious infrastructure. Analysts should still validate the context because certificates may be legitimately reused within an organization. Combining certificate fingerprints with destination information, timestamps, and process telemetry can improve confidence in the investigation.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Question 186.<\/b><\/h3>\n

            What does process integrity checking help an analyst determine?<\/b><\/p>\n

              \n
            1. User password age<\/span><\/li>\n
            2. Whether code was altered<\/span><\/li>\n
            3. Network subnet size<\/span><\/li>\n
            4. DNS cache duration<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

              Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

              Process integrity checking can help determine whether executable code or related process components have been modified unexpectedly. Integrity mechanisms may use hashes, signatures, trusted baselines, or other validation methods to identify changes. Unexpected modification can be significant when investigating tampering, malware replacement, or unauthorized software changes. User password age, subnet size, and DNS cache duration represent unrelated security or operational properties. Analysts should compare integrity results against approved software versions and trusted baselines. A mismatch does not automatically prove malicious activity, because legitimate updates can also change executable content, so surrounding evidence and change records should be considered.<\/span><\/p>\n

              Question 187.<\/b><\/h3>\n

              Which activity most strongly suggests internal reconnaissance?<\/b><\/p>\n

                \n
              1. Printing a document<\/span><\/li>\n
              2. Updating a browser<\/span><\/li>\n
              3. Enumerating reachable hosts<\/span><\/li>\n
              4. Changing display settings<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                Correct Answer: 3<\/b><\/p>\n

                Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                Enumerating reachable hosts can indicate internal reconnaissance because an attacker may use discovery activity to understand available systems before attempting further actions. Host enumeration can include identifying active addresses, systems, services, or network relationships. Printing documents, browser updates, and display changes generally do not indicate network discovery by themselves. Analysts should examine the source host, frequency, destination range, tools involved, and timing of the activity. A single discovery event may have a legitimate administrative explanation, so context is important. Correlating reconnaissance behavior with authentication events, process execution, and subsequent connections can help determine whether the activity warrants further investigation.<\/span><\/p>\n

                Question 188.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                What should a hunter establish before expanding a suspicious search?<\/b><\/p>\n

                  \n
                1. A defined investigation boundary<\/span><\/li>\n
                2. A new password policy<\/span><\/li>\n
                3. A device replacement schedule<\/span><\/li>\n
                4. A software licensing plan<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                  Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

                  Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                  A defined investigation boundary keeps a hunting activity focused and manageable. Before expanding a suspicious search, the analyst should establish relevant assets, users, time periods, event types, and investigative objectives. This prevents the search from becoming unnecessarily broad and helps maintain a clear relationship between the hypothesis and collected evidence. Password policies, device replacement schedules, and software licensing plans may be operationally important but do not establish the scope of a threat-hunting investigation. A well-defined boundary also makes results easier to reproduce and communicate. If evidence supports expansion, the analyst can broaden the scope deliberately rather than searching without a clear investigative direction.<\/span><\/p>\n

                  Question 189.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                  Which event can reveal unauthorized creation of a scheduled persistence mechanism?<\/b><\/p>\n

                    \n
                  1. Monitor brightness changes<\/span><\/li>\n
                  2. Browser bookmark updates<\/span><\/li>\n
                  3. Speaker volume events<\/span><\/li>\n
                  4. Scheduled-task registration<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                    Correct Answer: 4<\/b><\/p>\n

                    Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                    Scheduled-task registration can reveal the creation of a persistence mechanism that executes programs according to defined triggers. Attackers may use scheduled tasks to maintain execution after logoff, reboot, or at specific times. Monitoring the creation or modification of scheduled tasks can therefore provide valuable evidence during endpoint investigations. Monitor brightness, browser bookmarks, and speaker volume do not directly expose scheduled execution mechanisms. Analysts should review the task name, command, creator, trigger, execution account, and creation timestamp. Correlating these details with process creation and user activity can help distinguish legitimate automation from unauthorized persistence.<\/span><\/p>\n

                    Question 190.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                    Why correlate a process event with its network destination?<\/b><\/p>\n

                      \n
                    1. To calculate screen size<\/span><\/li>\n
                    2. To remove process metadata<\/span><\/li>\n
                    3. To connect execution with communication<\/span><\/li>\n
                    4. To change endpoint ownership<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                      Correct Answer: 3<\/b><\/p>\n

                      Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                      Correlating process events with network destinations connects local execution activity to external or internal communication. This relationship can help analysts identify which process initiated a suspicious connection and whether the destination is consistent with expected application behavior. For example, an unfamiliar executable communicating with an unusual external address may warrant additional investigation. Screen size and endpoint ownership are unrelated to this correlation, while removing process metadata would eliminate valuable evidence. Process-network correlation becomes more useful when combined with timestamps, destination reputation, user context, and asset information. This approach can help analysts understand the complete sequence surrounding potentially suspicious activity.<\/span><\/p>\n

                      Question 191.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                      Which log source can expose unexpected privilege assignment changes?<\/b><\/p>\n

                        \n
                      1. Browser history<\/span><\/li>\n
                      2. Identity audit records<\/span><\/li>\n
                      3. Display configuration<\/span><\/li>\n
                      4. Printer queue data<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                        Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

                        Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                        Identity audit records can reveal changes involving account privileges, group memberships, role assignments, or administrative permissions. Unexpected privilege changes are important because attackers may attempt to obtain additional access after compromising an account. Browser history, display configuration, and printer queue data generally do not provide reliable visibility into authorization changes. Analysts should examine who initiated the change, which account or group was affected, when it occurred, and whether the change was authorized. Correlating privilege modifications with authentication activity and endpoint events can provide additional context. Historical administrative records can also help determine whether similar changes are normal for the environment.<\/span><\/p>\n

                        Question 192.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                        What is a useful purpose of maintaining a threat-hunting evidence timeline?<\/b><\/p>\n

                          \n
                        1. Reconstructing event sequence<\/span><\/li>\n
                        2. Increasing storage capacity<\/span><\/li>\n
                        3. Replacing authentication<\/span><\/li>\n
                        4. Removing event context<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                          Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

                          Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                          An evidence timeline helps analysts reconstruct the sequence of events surrounding suspicious activity. By organizing observations chronologically, investigators can determine what happened first, what followed, and how different activities may be related. This can reveal patterns such as initial execution followed by credential access, persistence, discovery, or network communication. Increasing storage capacity and replacing authentication are unrelated operational functions, while removing event context would weaken the investigation. A timeline should preserve relevant timestamps, event sources, affected assets, accounts, and actions. Maintaining a clear chronology also makes findings easier to validate, document, and communicate to other security personnel.<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Question 193.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                          Which observation can indicate an application is behaving outside its normal baseline?<\/b><\/p>\n

                            \n
                          1. Consistent startup timing<\/span><\/li>\n
                          2. Approved configuration use<\/span><\/li>\n
                          3. Unexpected child process creation<\/span><\/li>\n
                          4. Routine service restart<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                            Correct Answer: 3<\/b><\/p>\n

                            Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                            Unexpected child process creation can indicate that an application is behaving differently from its established baseline. For example, a document-processing application launching a command shell may deserve investigation when such behavior is not normally observed. Consistent startup timing, approved configuration use, and routine service restarts are generally examples of expected operational behavior. Analysts should compare the parent-child relationship with historical activity and known application functionality. Additional context such as command-line arguments, user identity, file access, and network connections can help determine whether the behavior is suspicious. Baseline deviations are useful hunting signals but should be validated before conclusions are reached.<\/span><\/p>\n

                            Question 194.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                            What can a sudden increase in outbound connection volume indicate?<\/b><\/p>\n

                              \n
                            1. Reduced endpoint activity<\/span><\/li>\n
                            2. Normal display behavior<\/span><\/li>\n
                            3. Printer configuration changes<\/span><\/li>\n
                            4. Potential automated communication<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                              Correct Answer: 4<\/b><\/p>\n

                              Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                              A sudden increase in outbound connection volume can indicate automated communication generated by software, scripts, or potentially malicious processes. Attackers may generate repeated connections for command-and-control, data transfer, scanning, or other automated activities. The increase alone does not prove malicious behavior because legitimate applications can also create high connection volumes during updates, synchronization, or service operations. Analysts should examine destination addresses, ports, timing, initiating processes, and historical baselines. Comparing the observed volume with normal behavior for the specific asset can help identify meaningful deviations. Network telemetry combined with endpoint process information provides stronger evidence than connection counts alone.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              Question 195.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                              Which data helps determine whether a suspicious login originated from a new device?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                \n
                              1. File compression records<\/span><\/li>\n
                              2. Authentication source metadata<\/span><\/li>\n
                              3. CPU temperature readings<\/span><\/li>\n
                              4. Application theme settings<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

                                Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                Authentication source metadata can help identify the device, address, session source, or other origin information associated with a login. Comparing that information with historical authentication behavior can reveal whether an account is being used from an unfamiliar device or location. File compression records, CPU temperature, and application theme settings do not directly establish the origin of an authentication event. Analysts should consider legitimate explanations such as remote work, VPN usage, device replacement, or administrative activity before treating a new source as suspicious. Combining authentication source information with timestamps, account roles, and endpoint telemetry can improve confidence when investigating unusual account activity.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                Question 196.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                                What should be done after a hunting hypothesis is disproven?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                  \n
                                1. Record the evidence and refine it<\/span><\/li>\n
                                2. Delete all collected telemetry<\/span><\/li>\n
                                3. Disable future investigations<\/span><\/li>\n
                                4. Ignore the search outcome<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                  Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

                                  Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                  A disproven hunting hypothesis is still useful because it provides information about what the available evidence does not support. Analysts should document the evidence, assumptions, search conditions, and conclusion, then refine the hypothesis if appropriate. Deleting collected telemetry would remove potentially valuable investigative context, while disabling future investigations would prevent continued learning. Ignoring the outcome also wastes the effort invested in the hunt. Documenting unsuccessful hypotheses helps prevent repeated work and can improve future searches. It may also reveal that additional telemetry, narrower conditions, or different behavioral assumptions are needed to investigate the underlying security question effectively.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                  Question 197.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                                  Which artifact can reveal whether a service was configured to start automatically?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                    \n
                                  1. Web cache entries<\/span><\/li>\n
                                  2. Email subject lines<\/span><\/li>\n
                                  3. Service configuration data<\/span><\/li>\n
                                  4. Clipboard contents<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                    Correct Answer: 3<\/b><\/p>\n

                                    Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                    Service configuration data can reveal how a service is configured to start and which executable or account is associated with it. Automatic service startup can be legitimate, but attackers may abuse services as a persistence mechanism. Analysts can review service creation, modification timestamps, executable paths, startup settings, and associated accounts to identify suspicious changes. Web cache entries, email subject lines, and clipboard contents do not directly establish service startup configuration. Service information becomes more valuable when correlated with process creation and change-management records. Unexpected services or modifications should be investigated in context rather than automatically classified as malicious.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                    Question 198.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                                    Which network characteristic is especially useful when investigating periodic beaconing?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                      \n
                                    1. Screen activity<\/span><\/li>\n
                                    2. File ownership<\/span><\/li>\n
                                    3. Connection intervals<\/span><\/li>\n
                                    4. Keyboard language<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                      Correct Answer: 3<\/b><\/p>\n

                                      Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                      Connection intervals are particularly useful when investigating potential beaconing because automated communications may occur at regular or near-regular time periods. Analysts can examine the timing between connections and compare it with normal application behavior. Regular intervals do not automatically prove malicious activity, since legitimate software can also communicate periodically for synchronization, updates, or monitoring. Screen activity, file ownership, and keyboard language do not directly describe network timing. Combining connection intervals with destination information, initiating process data, and historical baselines can provide stronger evidence. Statistical analysis of timing patterns may also help identify communication behavior that differs from ordinary application traffic.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                      Question 199.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                                      What should an analyst verify before treating an unfamiliar IP as malicious?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                        \n
                                      1. Supporting contextual evidence<\/span><\/li>\n
                                      2. Monitor refresh rate<\/span><\/li>\n
                                      3. Desktop wallpaper<\/span><\/li>\n
                                      4. Local printer model<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                        Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

                                        Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                        An unfamiliar IP address should be supported by contextual evidence before being treated as malicious. An address may be unfamiliar simply because it belongs to a newly introduced service, cloud provider, partner, or legitimate external application. Analysts can review destination reputation, ownership, historical connections, associated processes, communication timing, and organizational context. Monitor refresh rate, desktop wallpaper, and printer model provide no meaningful validation for an IP indicator. Indicator validation reduces false positives and helps distinguish suspicious infrastructure from previously unseen but legitimate destinations. Strong conclusions should be based on multiple relevant observations rather than unfamiliarity alone.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                        Question 200.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                                        Which approach best improves a hunt after identifying a recurring false positive?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                          \n
                                        1. Remove all telemetry<\/span><\/li>\n
                                        2. Refine the detection conditions<\/span><\/li>\n
                                        3. Stop collecting evidence<\/span><\/li>\n
                                        4. Ignore repeated occurrences<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                          Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

                                          Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                          Refining detection conditions is an effective way to improve a hunt when recurring false positives are identified. Analysts can examine why legitimate activity matches the existing logic and introduce appropriate contextual filters, asset exclusions, process relationships, thresholds, or user conditions. Removing telemetry or stopping evidence collection would reduce visibility rather than improve detection quality. Ignoring repeated false positives can also cause analysts to overlook meaningful activity later. The goal is to preserve useful detection coverage while reducing unnecessary alerts. Any refinement should be tested against both known benign activity and relevant suspicious examples to ensure that the adjustment does not create excessive blind spots.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                                          View Full Cisco 300-220 Exam Dumps and Practice Test Dumps   Question 181. Which telemetry best reveals abnormal use of a legitimate administrative utility? Disk capacity Command execution logs Screen brightness Printer status Correct Answer: 2 Explanation: Command execution logs can reveal how administrative utilities are being used on an endpoint. Attackers often abuse legitimate […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1648,1647],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22734"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22734"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22734\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":22735,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22734\/revisions\/22735"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22734"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=22734"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=22734"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}