{"id":22738,"date":"2026-09-26T07:33:30","date_gmt":"2026-09-26T07:33:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/?p=22738"},"modified":"2026-09-26T07:33:30","modified_gmt":"2026-09-26T07:33:30","slug":"cisco-300-220-practice-test-questions-and-exam-dumps-part12-q221-240","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/cisco-300-220-practice-test-questions-and-exam-dumps-part12-q221-240\/","title":{"rendered":"Cisco 300-220 Practice Test Questions and Exam Dumps Part12 Q221-240"},"content":{"rendered":"

View Full <\/b>Cisco 300-220 Exam Dumps<\/b><\/a> and Practice Test Dumps<\/b><\/h2>\n

 <\/p>\n

Question 221.<\/b><\/h3>\n

Which evidence can reveal suspicious changes to a Windows service binary path?<\/b><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. DHCP allocation data<\/span><\/li>\n
  2. Browser cache records<\/span><\/li>\n
  3. Audio device events<\/span><\/li>\n
  4. Service configuration telemetry<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Correct Answer: 4<\/b><\/p>\n

    Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

    Service configuration telemetry can reveal changes to executable paths, startup settings, service accounts, and other service properties. An unexpected modification to a service binary path may indicate persistence, tampering, or unauthorized administrative activity. Analysts should compare the observed configuration with approved baselines and change records. DHCP allocation data, browser cache records, and audio device events do not directly describe service configuration. Additional context should include the account that made the change, modification time, executable location, and subsequent process activity. Legitimate software installations can also modify services, so analysts should validate the finding against known deployment and maintenance activity.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Question 222.<\/b><\/h3>\n

    What helps identify whether a new network connection is unusual for a workstation?<\/b><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. Historical communication profile<\/span><\/li>\n
    2. Display driver version<\/span><\/li>\n
    3. File compression ratio<\/span><\/li>\n
    4. Keyboard configuration<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

      Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

      A historical communication profile establishes how a workstation normally communicates with internal and external destinations. Comparing a new connection against that profile can identify destinations, ports, protocols, or communication patterns that are unusual for the specific system. Display drivers, file compression ratios, and keyboard configuration do not provide meaningful network context. Analysts should consider the workstation’s role, installed applications, user activity, and recent changes before treating an unusual connection as suspicious. Baseline comparisons are especially useful because legitimate systems may have very different communication patterns. Combining historical behavior with process and destination information can provide stronger evidence during a network investigation.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Question 223.<\/b><\/h3>\n

      Which endpoint evidence can expose unusual use of scripting interpreters?<\/b><\/p>\n

        \n
      1. Monitor configuration<\/span><\/li>\n
      2. Process execution telemetry<\/span><\/li>\n
      3. Printer status<\/span><\/li>\n
      4. Storage temperature<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

        Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

        Process execution telemetry can reveal when scripting interpreters are launched, which accounts execute them, their parent processes, and potentially their supplied arguments. Unusual scripting activity can be relevant when investigating command execution, automation abuse, or malicious scripts. Analysts should compare interpreter usage against normal administrative and application behavior. Monitor configuration, printer status, and storage temperature do not directly provide visibility into scripting execution. A scripting interpreter is not inherently malicious because many organizations legitimately use such tools. Investigators should evaluate execution context, command content, parent process, timing, user identity, and related network activity before deciding whether the behavior warrants further investigation.<\/span><\/p>\n

        Question 224.<\/b><\/h3>\n

        Why examine the first observed timestamp of a suspicious artifact?<\/b><\/p>\n

          \n
        1. To calculate screen dimensions<\/span><\/li>\n
        2. To identify its earliest known presence<\/span><\/li>\n
        3. To modify its permissions<\/span><\/li>\n
        4. To remove duplicate records<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

          Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

          The first observed timestamp can help establish when a suspicious artifact was initially detected within available telemetry. This information can support timeline reconstruction and help analysts investigate preceding events that may explain how the artifact appeared. The timestamp does not necessarily prove when the artifact was originally created because telemetry coverage may be incomplete or collection may have started later. Screen dimensions, permission modification, and duplicate removal are unrelated to establishing the earliest observed presence. Analysts should compare file timestamps, process events, download activity, and other relevant records to build a more complete timeline around the artifact.<\/span><\/p>\n

          Question 225.<\/b><\/h3>\n

          Which activity may indicate abuse of an existing trusted application?<\/b><\/p>\n

            \n
          1. Expected application startup<\/span><\/li>\n
          2. Approved software update<\/span><\/li>\n
          3. Routine configuration loading<\/span><\/li>\n
          4. Unusual child-process launch<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            Correct Answer: 4<\/b><\/p>\n

            Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

            An unusual child-process launch can indicate that a trusted application is being used in a way that differs from its normal behavior. Attackers may abuse legitimate applications to execute commands or access resources while attempting to blend into ordinary activity. Analysts should examine the parent process, child executable, command-line arguments, user account, and timing. Expected application startup, approved software updates, and routine configuration loading generally represent normal activity, although context remains important. A suspicious parent-child relationship does not automatically prove abuse. Investigators should compare the behavior with application documentation, historical endpoint activity, and known administrative workflows before drawing conclusions.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Question 226.<\/b><\/h3>\n

            What network evidence is useful for identifying an unexpected service port?<\/b><\/p>\n

              \n
            1. Flow records<\/span><\/li>\n
            2. File metadata<\/span><\/li>\n
            3. Account expiration data<\/span><\/li>\n
            4. Application window titles<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

              Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

              Flow records can identify destination ports, source systems, destination systems, protocols, and communication timing. This makes them useful for identifying unexpected service-port usage across an environment. Analysts can compare observed ports with the services normally associated with the communicating systems. File metadata, account expiration data, and application window titles do not directly provide network-port information. A previously unseen port may have a legitimate explanation, such as a newly deployed application or temporary administrative service. Analysts should therefore correlate port activity with asset roles, process information, service configuration, and change records to determine whether the communication represents expected or suspicious behavior.<\/span><\/p>\n

              Question 227.<\/b><\/h3>\n

              Which indicator can help associate multiple files with the same binary content?<\/b><\/p>\n

                \n
              1. File path<\/span><\/li>\n
              2. File owner<\/span><\/li>\n
              3. Cryptographic hash<\/span><\/li>\n
              4. File extension<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                Correct Answer: 3<\/b><\/p>\n

                Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                A cryptographic hash can provide a compact representation of file content and help identify files with identical content across systems. Searching for the same hash can reveal additional locations where a suspicious or known file exists. File paths and ownership provide useful context but can change across systems, while file extensions do not reliably establish identical content. Analysts should understand that a modified file will generally produce a different hash. Hashes should therefore be combined with filenames, paths, signatures, timestamps, and process activity when investigating suspicious binaries. This approach helps expand investigations while maintaining appropriate contextual validation.<\/span><\/p>\n

                Question 228.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                What should be reviewed when an account accesses a system it rarely uses?<\/b><\/p>\n

                  \n
                1. Monitor settings<\/span><\/li>\n
                2. Historical access patterns<\/span><\/li>\n
                3. Printer configuration<\/span><\/li>\n
                4. Local wallpaper<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                  Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

                  Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                  Historical access patterns help determine whether an account’s use of a particular system is consistent with its established behavior. An uncommon access event may be legitimate, especially for administrators, support personnel, or users with changing responsibilities. Analysts should examine previous access, account role, source device, authentication method, timing, and the target system’s sensitivity. Monitor settings, printer configuration, and wallpaper do not provide meaningful authentication context. Reviewing historical behavior allows the analyst to distinguish genuinely unusual access from activity that simply appears uncommon in a limited observation window. Additional endpoint and identity telemetry can strengthen the investigation when the access remains unexplained.<\/span><\/p>\n

                  Question 229.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                  Which artifact can help reveal a newly registered persistence mechanism?<\/b><\/p>\n

                    \n
                  1. Startup configuration records<\/span><\/li>\n
                  2. Network cable statistics<\/span><\/li>\n
                  3. Audio driver information<\/span><\/li>\n
                  4. Screen saver settings<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                    Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

                    Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                    Startup configuration records can reveal mechanisms that cause software to execute automatically during system startup or user logon. Newly registered startup entries may be relevant when investigating persistence. Analysts should examine the executable path, registration time, associated account, publisher information, and whether the entry corresponds to approved software. Network cable statistics, audio driver information, and screen saver settings do not directly expose persistence registration. Legitimate applications frequently create startup mechanisms, so a new entry should not automatically be considered malicious. Correlating the registration with software installation events, process execution, and change-management records can help establish whether the mechanism is expected.<\/span><\/p>\n

                    Question 230.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                    Which pattern can suggest automated credential guessing against multiple accounts?<\/b><\/p>\n

                      \n
                    1. Single successful login<\/span><\/li>\n
                    2. Regular password reset<\/span><\/li>\n
                    3. Distributed authentication failures<\/span><\/li>\n
                    4. Routine account creation<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                      Correct Answer: 3<\/b><\/p>\n

                      Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                      Distributed authentication failures across multiple accounts can indicate automated credential-guessing activity, especially when attempts occur within a short period and originate from related sources. Analysts should examine the number of targeted accounts, failure frequency, source addresses, authentication protocols, and timing. A single successful login or routine account creation does not provide equivalent evidence, while normal password resets have a different administrative context. Credential-guessing patterns can also be generated by legitimate applications with outdated stored credentials, so contextual validation is necessary. Correlating authentication failures with successful logins, account sensitivity, and source-device information can help determine whether further investigation is appropriate.<\/span><\/p>\n

                      Question 231.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                      What can help determine whether an unusual process is associated with a software update?<\/b><\/p>\n

                        \n
                      1. Process color settings<\/span><\/li>\n
                      2. Update deployment records<\/span><\/li>\n
                      3. Keyboard preferences<\/span><\/li>\n
                      4. Screen orientation<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                        Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

                        Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                        Update deployment records can help determine whether an unusual process was created as part of an authorized software update. Legitimate update mechanisms may temporarily launch installers, helper processes, services, or command-line utilities that differ from ordinary application behavior. Analysts can compare process timestamps with approved deployment schedules and package information. Process color settings, keyboard preferences, and screen orientation provide no meaningful evidence about software deployment. Even when deployment records exist, investigators should validate the executable path, publisher, parent process, and network destinations. Correlating endpoint telemetry with change-management information can distinguish expected update activity from potentially unauthorized execution.<\/span><\/p>\n

                        Question 232.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                        Which network characteristic can help identify possible data staging before transfer?<\/b><\/p>\n

                          \n
                        1. Sudden local storage growth<\/span><\/li>\n
                        2. Normal authentication timing<\/span><\/li>\n
                        3. Stable DNS resolution<\/span><\/li>\n
                        4. Routine service discovery<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                          Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

                          Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                          Sudden local storage growth can provide a useful clue when investigating possible data staging. An attacker may gather files into a temporary directory or archive before transferring them elsewhere. Analysts should examine which files changed, which process created or modified them, the affected directories, and the timing relative to outbound network activity. Normal authentication timing, stable DNS resolution, and routine service discovery do not directly establish local data accumulation. Storage growth alone is not proof of staging because backups, software updates, and legitimate data processing can produce similar patterns. Correlating file activity with compression processes and subsequent network transfers provides stronger investigative evidence.<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Question 233.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                          Why compare a suspicious destination with known organizational services?<\/b><\/p>\n

                            \n
                          1. To change routing protocols<\/span><\/li>\n
                          2. To delete destination records<\/span><\/li>\n
                          3. To determine expected communication<\/span><\/li>\n
                          4. To disable network monitoring<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                            Correct Answer: 3<\/b><\/p>\n

                            Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                            Comparing a suspicious destination with known organizational services helps determine whether the communication has a legitimate business or technical purpose. Organizations may use cloud platforms, content-delivery networks, monitoring services, update repositories, and external providers that are not immediately familiar to every analyst. Destination ownership and service context can therefore prevent unnecessary escalation of benign activity. Changing routing, deleting destination records, or disabling monitoring would reduce visibility rather than improve analysis. Analysts should also consider the initiating process, asset role, timing, and historical connections. A destination that remains unexplained after contextual validation may warrant additional investigation.<\/span><\/p>\n

                            Question 234.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                            Which endpoint event can reveal modification of a protected configuration file?<\/b><\/p>\n

                              \n
                            1. Audio device activity<\/span><\/li>\n
                            2. File modification telemetry<\/span><\/li>\n
                            3. Screen resolution changes<\/span><\/li>\n
                            4. Mouse movement logs<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                              Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

                              Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                              File modification telemetry can reveal when a protected configuration file changes and may provide information about the process or account responsible. Such changes can be important when investigating unauthorized configuration modifications, persistence, or security-control tampering. Analysts should examine the file path, previous and new metadata, modifying process, account, and timestamp. Audio device activity, screen resolution, and mouse movement do not directly document configuration-file modifications. Legitimate administrators and software updates can modify protected files, so investigators should compare the event with approved maintenance activity. Correlating file changes with process execution and account activity can provide stronger evidence about the cause.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              Question 235.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                              What helps distinguish a rare event from a genuinely suspicious anomaly?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                \n
                              1. Contextual baseline comparison<\/span><\/li>\n
                              2. Random query expansion<\/span><\/li>\n
                              3. Removal of asset metadata<\/span><\/li>\n
                              4. Ignoring historical records<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

                                Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                Contextual baseline comparison helps determine whether a rare event is actually anomalous for the specific system, user, application, or environment. An event may be rare globally but completely normal for a specialized asset. Conversely, a behavior that occurs frequently across ordinary systems may be unusual on a sensitive server. Randomly expanding searches, removing asset metadata, or ignoring historical records reduces the analyst’s ability to interpret the event correctly. Baselines should consider asset role, expected software, account responsibilities, and normal communication patterns. Analysts can then focus investigation on deviations that have meaningful context instead of treating rarity alone as evidence of malicious activity.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                Question 236.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                                Which record can reveal when a network interface received a new address?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                  \n
                                1. Process ancestry logs<\/span><\/li>\n
                                2. DHCP lease records<\/span><\/li>\n
                                3. File-access events<\/span><\/li>\n
                                4. Application crash reports<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                  Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

                                  Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                  DHCP lease records can reveal when a network interface received an address and provide information about the associated device and lease period. This can be useful when reconstructing network activity or determining which endpoint used an address at a particular time. Process ancestry logs, file-access events, and application crash reports provide different types of endpoint evidence and do not directly establish DHCP address assignment. Analysts should correlate lease information with authentication records, network flows, and asset inventory when investigating activity tied to an address. Accurate time synchronization is also important because mismatched timestamps can complicate the reconstruction of historical network events.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                  Question 237.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                                  Which behavior can indicate possible abuse of a remote administration tool?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                    \n
                                  1. Expected help-desk session<\/span><\/li>\n
                                  2. Approved maintenance window<\/span><\/li>\n
                                  3. Documented administrator activity<\/span><\/li>\n
                                  4. Unscheduled privileged remote access<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                    Correct Answer: 4<\/b><\/p>\n

                                    Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                    Unscheduled privileged remote access can indicate potential abuse of a remote administration tool, particularly when the activity occurs outside expected maintenance periods or involves an unusual source system. Analysts should validate the account, originating device, target system, session timing, and administrative authorization. Help-desk sessions, approved maintenance, and documented administrator activity can all be legitimate uses of remote tools. The presence of remote administration software itself does not indicate malicious behavior. Investigators should correlate session records with authentication events, process execution, asset ownership, and change tickets. This approach helps distinguish authorized remote support from activity that requires additional investigation.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                    Question 238.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                                    Which metadata can help identify whether a file originated from an external source?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                      \n
                                    1. File-origin metadata<\/span><\/li>\n
                                    2. CPU utilization<\/span><\/li>\n
                                    3. Monitor model<\/span><\/li>\n
                                    4. Network adapter speed<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                      Correct Answer: 1<\/b><\/p>\n

                                      Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                      File-origin metadata can provide clues about how a file entered an endpoint, depending on the operating system and available telemetry. Such information may help distinguish locally generated content from files obtained through browsers, email clients, downloads, or other external channels. CPU utilization, monitor model, and network adapter speed do not directly establish file origin. Analysts should validate origin information against download events, email telemetry, browser activity, file timestamps, and network connections when available. Metadata can be altered or absent, so it should not be treated as definitive on its own. Multiple supporting sources provide a more reliable reconstruction of file provenance.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                      Question 239.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                                      What can reveal that a process repeatedly contacts the same destination at fixed intervals?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                        \n
                                      1. File ownership records<\/span><\/li>\n
                                      2. Authentication role data<\/span><\/li>\n
                                      3. Connection timing telemetry<\/span><\/li>\n
                                      4. Application theme settings<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                        Correct Answer: 3<\/b><\/p>\n

                                        Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                        Connection timing telemetry can reveal repeated communications occurring at regular intervals. Such periodic behavior may be relevant when investigating automated communications or possible beaconing. Analysts should evaluate the interval consistency, destination, port, initiating process, and duration of the connections. Regular communication is not automatically malicious because legitimate applications commonly perform scheduled synchronization, monitoring, and update checks. File ownership, authentication roles, and application themes do not directly reveal network timing. Combining timing information with process-network correlation and historical baselines can help determine whether the observed pattern represents normal application behavior or an unusual communication mechanism requiring further investigation.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                        Question 240.<\/b><\/h3>\n

                                        Which action improves a hunting query after confirming its results are too broad?<\/b><\/p>\n

                                          \n
                                        1. Remove all event sources<\/span><\/li>\n
                                        2. Narrow relevant conditions<\/span><\/li>\n
                                        3. Disable historical searches<\/span><\/li>\n
                                        4. Ignore benign matches<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                          Correct Answer: 2<\/b><\/p>\n

                                          Explanation:<\/b><\/p>\n

                                          Narrowing relevant conditions can improve a hunting query when its results are excessively broad. Analysts can refine conditions using asset roles, process relationships, account types, time windows, destination characteristics, or other contextual attributes supported by the hypothesis. Removing all event sources would eliminate visibility, while disabling historical searches could prevent useful retrospective analysis. Ignoring benign matches does not improve the query itself. Query refinement should preserve meaningful suspicious activity while reducing predictable legitimate matches. Analysts should test the revised logic against known benign and relevant suspicious examples and document the changes so the resulting hunt remains understandable, repeatable, and maintainable.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                                          View Full Cisco 300-220 Exam Dumps and Practice Test Dumps   Question 221. Which evidence can reveal suspicious changes to a Windows service binary path? DHCP allocation data Browser cache records Audio device events Service configuration telemetry Correct Answer: 4 Explanation: Service configuration telemetry can reveal changes to executable paths, startup settings, service accounts, and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1648,1647],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22738"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22738"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22738\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":22739,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22738\/revisions\/22739"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22738"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=22738"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.examlabs.com\/certification\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=22738"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}