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A hospital’s electronic records service is in maintenance. Its network security team wants to stop connections from unapproved integration servers, while retaining an audit log for later investigations. Which proposed control is specifically PREVENTIVE rather than merely detective?
The deny rule acts in the traffic path and stops the connection before the records application processes it. Its preventive function is separate from collecting a record of attempted access. The team can still retain firewall logs for investigation, but the block itself supplies the requested immediate enforcement without depending on an analyst noticing an alert. A targeted deny rule should also be tested against the permitted integration traffic so the hospital avoids blocking required clinical workflows.
Centralized SIEM collection makes connection activity searchable and can reveal suspicious patterns after the event. It does not, by itself, reject a session from an unapproved integration server. It is valuable as a detective layer, but it cannot substitute for the requested preventive enforcement at the application boundary.
An alert identifies an attempted or completed connection for operator review. Unless an independently configured response blocks traffic, the application may still receive the request. This is detective monitoring; the scenario specifically requires preventing unwanted connections during maintenance rather than merely notifying personnel that they occurred.
Weekly review may reveal unauthorized use, support investigations, and inform future rule changes. However, a session can already have reached the records service long before that report is examined. Manual periodic review is a detective operational activity and does not meet the immediate preventive goal.
A retailer has an approved MANAGEMENT policy requiring franchise accounts to be disabled within one hour of termination. Which action is an OPERATIONAL control implementing that policy, rather than another managerial decision?
The staffed runbook translates the policy into repeatable day-to-day work and creates evidence that each account was disabled on time. It specifies who performs the action, how to verify it, and what to record. Account automation could supplement this process, but the trained execution procedure is the operational control being requested. The franchise termination record and deprovisioning completion time should be compared to verify the operational team met the one-hour policy.
Exception approval can establish accountability for overdue departures, but it is a managerial risk decision after a target is missed. It does not operate the repeatable disablement workflow or give the service desk an executable trigger. An operational control must actually disable the franchise identity and record the time of completion against the approved one-hour threshold.
Quarterly assurance is useful for governance and could reveal systemic policy problems, but it does not disable accounts during the first hour after a departure. The scenario asks for a concrete day-to-day control with staff, a runbook and transaction-level evidence. Committee certification does not perform the account change or produce its completion timestamp.
A control standard can clarify targets and authority, but the approved policy already specifies the one-hour goal. Issuing another governance document without changing the actual deprovisioning actions cannot ensure the identity is disabled. The operational response is a triggered, traceable service-desk runbook whose results are verified for each terminated franchise account.
A distribution warehouse needs personnel to follow a required process before entering a restricted loading bay. Management is comparing written commands with measures intended chiefly to discourage trespass. Which TWO are most clearly DIRECTIVE controls? Select TWO answers.
The sign tells people the conduct they must follow: report to security before they enter. That prescribes an expected behavior, which is the defining function of a directive control. The sign does not actually authenticate a person or physically prevent access; those separate effects need other controls. Staff should be taught what the instruction means, because a posted procedure is not effective if visitors cannot follow it.
The shift procedure directs supervisors to take a specific authorization-check step before opening the loading bay. It governs behavior and creates a repeatable instruction that can be trained and audited. A separate access-control mechanism may enforce a decision, but the required supervisor instruction itself is directive. Retaining the check-in record gives auditors evidence that the required supervisory step occurred before the bay was opened.
Threatening prosecution and calling attention to surveillance primarily aims to discourage an intruder from attempting entry. Such signage is most naturally classified as deterrent. It does not specify the check-in and authorization steps the warehouse needs users and supervisors to follow before access is granted.
The camera records activity so incidents can be detected and investigated. Even if its visible presence also deters some people, its recording function does not instruct workers how to request and approve access. The warehouse needs the mandated process, not simply another source of video evidence.
Bollards create a physical barrier against vehicles and are chiefly preventive. They do not tell visitors or supervisors how to perform the check-in workflow for a personnel entrance. They may be important to the site design, but they are not examples of the requested directive instructions.
A SaaS company rents a locked data-center cage. The landlord operates hallway cameras, but a blind camera angle remains near the cage door. Which statement correctly describes the different purposes of the existing lock and camera coverage?
The door lock directly restricts entry to the cage; this is a preventive physical safeguard even if cameras fail. Hallway cameras record observed activity and help investigate misuse, but they cannot reliably capture the blind area. Both controls need explicit ownership and complementary placement to handle the tenant–landlord boundary. The landlord’s camera responsibility and the tenant’s lock administration should be recorded separately so the remaining blind spot has an accountable owner.
Recording footage does not itself stop an unauthorized person from entering through an unlocked or bypassed doorway. The blind angle also means some actions may escape capture altogether. Cameras are useful for detection and investigation, and visible cameras can deter, but prevention requires an actual access barrier or intervention.
A lock can generate an access event, yet its primary protective action is to prevent the door opening without an authorized key or credential. Logging is a supplementary detective feature. Classifying a control by only one incidental capability ignores its intended effect on physical access to the equipment.
The shared responsibility contract assigns ownership but does not change the technical or physical function of the installed controls. Governance of the cage and cameras is managerial, while the actual lock remains preventive and footage collection remains largely detective. Control ownership and control purpose are different dimensions.
A university research lab cannot immediately deploy its mandated privileged-access gateway because a legacy instrument cannot integrate with it. Which response best represents a COMPENSATING control rather than falsely claiming the original requirement is fulfilled?
The alternative reduces the privileged attack surface through narrow source access, short-lived identities and recorded sessions while the mandated gateway remains unavailable. A formally approved, time-bound exception acknowledges the remaining gap and tracks remediation. These measures compensate for some risk without incorrectly declaring that the original control was installed. The university should verify that session logs are reviewed and that exceptions expire rather than becoming an indefinite replacement for the gateway.
Documenting a future project does not reduce the exposure of the privileged path today. A risk entry is useful for governance, but a compensating safeguard must supply an alternate protective effect where the required primary control is unavailable. An open path with no mitigation is not equivalent to compensating control coverage.
A warning can communicate policy and may deter intentional misuse, but it neither authenticates privileged sessions nor constrains which systems can reach the legacy instrument. Because the lab needs an alternative for technical access enforcement, a standalone poster is not an adequate compensating control.
Stopping all connectivity might reduce one attack surface, but the scenario requires the instrument for legitimate ongoing testing and the change could introduce separate safety and availability risks. An unexamined blanket outage is not a targeted, approved substitute for the unavailable privileged-access gateway.
A finance team restored confidential reports after malicious encryption. It now wants to classify the restore action separately from deploying stronger anti-malware controls before the next incident. Which pairing is accurate?
Restoration repairs the harm caused by the incident and returns affected data or services to a usable state, which is corrective. Hardening or blocking malware before execution acts preventively. Both may belong to the same response program, but they address different points in the incident lifecycle and should be categorized separately. A test restore verifies the corrective measure, whereas deployment and blocking tests demonstrate the changed preventive control.
Recovering encrypted reports addresses an existing loss, not just observation of suspicious activity. It is therefore corrective rather than detective. Endpoint protection can have several functions, but a configuration that blocks malicious execution is preventive, not automatically compensating. A compensating control is an alternate measure for an unavailable primary safeguard.
An organization’s ability to recover might discourage some attackers, but restoration and endpoint blocking are not principally intended as psychological discouragement. The requested classification concerns actual effects: repairing damage and preventing new execution. Treating both as deterrent would misrepresent the mechanism and weaken the control inventory.
Documented procedures govern how people work, which can make the associated instructions directive. The operations performed under those instructions still have their own security purposes. The data restore corrects an incident outcome; stronger malware blocking seeks to prevent recurrence. A policy document does not turn each technical action into a directive control.
A regional branch cannot interrupt a customer service application, but security wants evidence of privileged employees changing account permissions without approval. Which control best meets the DETECTIVE requirement?
Capturing the identity, time, target and outcome of privilege changes provides observable events. Matching those events to change tickets distinguishes authorized activity from unexplained modification without blocking every administrative task. Monitoring can alert on deviations and preserve evidence while production access remains available. The alert should include the administrator identity and modified privilege, so reviewers can investigate unexplained changes without relying on guesswork.
A preventive approval gate may reduce unauthorized modifications, but it does not provide the requested detective evidence about actions that took place. It can also interrupt urgent authorized administration if implemented blindly. The branch needs attributable change logging and correlation with authorizations, whether or not it later adds a separate blocking control.
Local event collection is useful only when retained long enough for review and correlation with tickets. Short retention could erase traces of misuse before analysts see them and does not yield a monitored alert feed. The requested outcome is timely detective evidence rather than a transient log file.
An approval establishes intended permission, not proof of execution. An administrator could implement a different group change, or a malicious actor could act without any ticket. The requested detective control must collect actual change events and match identity, time and target to the approved records.
A manufacturing plant must protect a restricted automation cabinet without stopping production. Which TWO measures provide complementary PREVENTIVE layers against unauthorized local access? Select TWO answers.
The cabinet lock creates a physical access barrier and restricts who can open sensitive equipment in the plant. An approved maintenance list makes the lock’s use accountable to legitimate work. It limits physical tampering risk without forcing a production shutdown when properly authorized staff need entry. The plant should periodically verify lock functionality and revoke departed technicians, or a physical barrier can become a stale authorization path.
A narrow ACL limits network access to the controller from an engineering segment, adding technical prevention to the cabinet’s physical protection. It is useful even if someone gains access elsewhere on the plant network. The permitted maintenance subnet should be validated so normal authorized control remains available. The rule should be tested from approved and unapproved source networks to show that engineering work still succeeds while lateral access is constrained.
A reminder communicates rules to staff, making it a directive administrative measure, but cannot stop a person who ignores the instruction or an attacker using reachable control ports. The plant requires technical and physical enforcement to preserve production safety and access integrity.
A camera may deter misuse and can help investigate physical access, but merely recording a visit does not prevent someone from opening an unlocked cabinet. Its value is primarily detective and does not provide the second preventive layer requested in this selection.
A monthly alarm report is useful detective information about past cabinet access. It does not constrain who opens the enclosure or who can reach the controller over the network. It should complement, not replace, immediate preventive barriers for a plant where unauthorized changes could affect availability.
A municipal agency permits a time-limited exception to a legacy account-control rule. The evidence shows a technician enabled access, but the approval record does not identify who accepted the associated risk. Which action fixes the MANAGERIAL accountability gap?
A named risk owner provides the missing managerial approval and makes the exception auditable. Documenting the scope, duration and expiration prevents an unbounded deviation, while keeping the technician’s change log as separate operational evidence. This directly repairs the ambiguity between approval accountability and implementation responsibility. A separate reviewer should be able to trace each exception back to its approval record and expected termination date.
Executing a technical change does not automatically confer managerial authority to accept organizational risk. The technician may be accountable for accurate implementation, but the exception needs a designated risk owner with approval powers. Conflating these roles hides who decided that the control deviation was acceptable.
Extra scanning can help detect certain software threats, but it does not establish who authorized an exception to account-access policy. That is a governance decision, not a malware-detection gap. Technical monitoring may be a compensating control if approved, but it cannot replace a valid risk acceptance record.
Deleting an unclear record removes evidence instead of resolving the problem. It also makes it harder to demonstrate authorization and to know when privileged access should be disabled. A correction should add attributable approval and expiry information while preserving the execution history.
During a compliance review, a cloud operator describes a nightly backup restoration as a 'preventive access-control' safeguard. The reviewer wants the control inventory to reflect what the safeguard actually does. What is the most accurate classification?
Restoration is designed to recover data and service availability after an incident, so it belongs primarily to corrective or recovery safeguards. Backups can reduce consequences but do not directly decide whether a user may access a cloud resource. The inventory should not mistake resilience capability for a preventive access-control mechanism. A successful restoration test should be documented as recovery assurance rather than a false statement that unauthorized access has been blocked.
A restore test can provide valuable evidence about backup health, which is a detection or assurance benefit. The core function of restoring backup data, however, is returning a damaged or unavailable service to operation. It does not detect and reject unauthorized access in real time.
Approval of a backup policy is managerial, but the operative technical activity has a different purpose. The inventory must distinguish governance ownership from control effects. Calling every approved safeguard managerial would conceal whether the measure prevents, detects or corrects a technical failure.
Effective recoverability may influence attacker expectations, but deterrence is not the primary design mechanism of a backup restore. It does not display a warning or make an attacker stop immediately; it helps the organization repair effects when availability or integrity has already been compromised.
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