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CompTIA Security+ SY0-701 Practice Test 11

Question 100

An industrial site detects a new executable running under a vendor-looking filename. It periodically sends browser-stored credentials outward but leaves documents readable. Which malware behavior fits best?

  1. A credential-stealing Trojan masquerading as a trusted application, not a file-encrypting ransomware event.
  2. A self-propagating worm proved by one outbound connection.
  3. Cryptographic erasure of every user document.
  4. A harmless operating-system backup process because files are still readable.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A Trojan can appear legitimate while performing unauthorized credential collection and exfiltration. Readable files do not rule out serious compromise, but they weaken an encryption-ransomware conclusion. The site should isolate the process, investigate persistence and reset exposed credentials through controlled channels after understanding what data was accessed.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A worm replicates across hosts or services without each new installation needing the same direct user action. One periodic outbound connection demonstrates communication, not autonomous spread. The team would need infection propagation evidence before assigning the worm classification.

C:

Cryptographic erasure or ransomware encryption would render targeted files unavailable or useless without keys, which the scenario expressly does not show. Credential extraction is a confidentiality and identity risk of a different kind. Describing it as file destruction would lead to the wrong immediate response priorities.

D:

Backup jobs should have known owners, schedules, destinations and permissions. A disguised executable transmitting browser secrets to an unapproved endpoint is not ordinary recovery activity. File availability does not establish that the process is authorized or safe.

Question 101

A retailer finds that one compromised terminal scanned adjacent stores and copied itself to vulnerable hosts without employees opening attachments. Which evidence most strongly distinguishes a worm from a conventional Trojan installation?

  1. A single malicious executable exists on the original terminal.
  2. Matching malicious file hashes on the infected terminals, without evidence of how the copies appeared or whether exploitation caused them.
  3. A scheduled remote software deployment that installs the same malicious package on multiple devices after an administrator-approved job runs.
  4. Autonomous replication across hosts through exploited services without repeated manual installation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Worm-like behavior involves self-replication or automated spread, often by exploiting reachable services. Copying itself to new vulnerable hosts without employee installation is the decisive observation. The retailer should segment affected branches, collect propagation traces and block the exploited service while identifying all infected hosts. Host-to-host timing can establish the actual infection chain.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Malware presence on one machine says little about how it arrived or spread. Trojans, worms and other unwanted software can all exist as executables. Distinguishing the propagation mechanism requires observations of new infections and corresponding network or process events.

B:

The same payload on several hosts establishes similarity of installed malware but not the replication mechanism. A Trojan can be distributed widely by management software, shared installers or manual execution. The distinctive worm evidence in the case is autonomous host-to-host propagation through vulnerable services, which requires a demonstrated causal infection chain rather than hash equality alone.

C:

A deployment workflow could install a Trojan or unwanted package on many endpoints without the malware replicating itself. That pattern differs from compromise spreading between adjacent systems without repeated user or management action. Investigators should look for outbound exploitation and new-host infection events from the first terminal, rather than classifying every multi-host installation as a self-propagating worm.

Question 102

A merchant's support laptop runs an unknown browser extension. The extension records visited internal dashboards and sends browsing history to an external host, but does not encrypt documents. Which category best matches the observed activity?

  1. Ransomware, because the extension transmits information.
  2. Spyware collecting user activity and disclosing it without authorization.
  3. A password policy violation with no software execution.
  4. An approved browser performance-monitoring extension sending aggregated and non-identifying diagnostic metrics to the company's contracted service.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Spyware monitors user or system activity and communicates collected information to another party. The unauthorized extension and external browsing-history transfer directly fit that behavior. Security should identify affected sessions, remove the extension safely and check whether credentials or other sensitive data were also captured. Browser-policy and extension-installation controls should be reviewed for recurrence.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Ransomware typically blocks or encrypts resources to create coercive leverage. Sending browsing records is exfiltration but does not establish file denial or payment extortion. The incident should be characterized by what the extension actually collects and transmits.

C:

Password policies control how authentication secrets are created and maintained. They do not describe a running browser extension gathering data. Even good passwords would not make unauthorized collection safe or prove that no executable component is involved.

D:

A legitimate telemetry add-on may transmit limited measurements when its purpose, destination and permissions are approved and disclosed. The observed extension instead records internal browsing history and sends it to an unapproved external host. That mismatch supports spyware behavior; simply describing an approved metrics integration would ignore the actual content and authorization evidence in the laptop investigation.

Question 103

A bank notices that a file executable copied through shared folders begins inserting its code into previously clean programs. Several other applications installed from a vendor image are merely unwanted promotional utilities. Which observation supports a virus classification?

  1. Promotional software occupies too much disk space.
  2. The vendor image contains a legitimate trial program.
  3. Malicious code infects host executables and propagates when those altered executables run.
  4. Vendor-bundled promotional utilities that remain separate programs and do not modify otherwise clean executable files.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

File-infecting viruses embed or attach malicious code to other executable files, allowing infections to spread when hosts run those programs. Changed program hashes and new infections associated with execution support that interpretation. The bank should preserve samples, isolate affected shares and avoid launching suspect executables during investigation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Large or annoying software can be bloatware without malicious replication. Storage consumption alone does not show alteration of other executables. A file-infecting virus needs evidence of code attaching to or modifying additional host programs.

B:

A trial application may be undesirable but can still be authorized and benign. Its presence in a legitimate system image does not prove viral behavior. Analysts should inspect propagation and program integrity, not infer malware type from marketing distribution.

D:

Unwanted utilities can be intrusive or waste resources, but they are not necessarily file-infecting viruses. The key property here is whether malicious code inserts itself into other legitimate executables and propagates when they run. Bundled promotional applications can be removed as bloatware without demonstrating viral modification of host program bytes.

Question 104

A supplier workstation develops an unexpected process hooking keyboard input APIs, and typed credentials appear in an unapproved local file before outbound transfer. Which attack behavior is most strongly supported?

  1. A keylogger recording user input for unauthorized collection.
  2. An authorized accessibility tool, because keyboard hooks are part of its normal design and no further explanation of the credential file is necessary.
  3. An endpoint performance monitor counting input events, because the presence of encrypted outbound traffic proves it records metrics rather than keystrokes.
  4. A sanctioned remote-assistance session, because the operator may observe a user typing and the tool appears within a legitimate desktop process.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Intercepting keystrokes and recording typed secrets is characteristic of a keylogger, whether implemented in software or a malicious driver. The outbound transfer makes credential theft a plausible goal. Investigators should isolate the host, inspect injection and persistence, and rotate potentially captured secrets with a clean device.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Accessibility utilities may legitimately use input-related APIs, but the scenario includes typed credentials being copied into an unapproved local file and transferred out. Those outcomes are not established as authorized service behavior. The analyst should validate the process identity, consent and destinations rather than letting one potentially benign API explain away the credential collection.

C:

Performance monitors can measure input rates, and encryption can protect authorized telemetry; neither fact proves that credentials were not copied to disk. The observed unapproved credential file conflicts with a benign count-only explanation. Investigators need process and file evidence to distinguish metrics from actual captured keystrokes.

D:

Authorized support might use screen or input sharing, but it does not automatically permit secret recording and export to an unknown destination. The scenario provides evidence of a local credential-capture file, making keylogging the stronger inference. Legitimate ownership or authorization would need independent session, software-signing and support-ticket evidence.

Question 105

A healthcare contractor's account is scheduled for termination on Friday. A discovered script waits for that account-disabling event and then deletes important configuration files. What malware behavior does the trigger illustrate?

  1. A benign scheduled backup whose deletion is normal retention.
  2. A scheduled maintenance cleanup that runs on a fixed date and deletes only files approved for retention expiry, regardless of account termination.
  3. An identity offboarding workflow that revokes the departing user's own credentials while preserving shared system configuration.
  4. A logic bomb activated by a specified condition rather than routine user action.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A logic bomb is malicious code designed to activate when a particular time or condition is met. The pending account disablement serves as the trigger for destructive action. Responders should safely disable the scheduled mechanism, preserve the code and investigate whether other deferred triggers are present.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Backups can purge expired files through approved retention jobs, but conditional deletion of important configurations tied to account termination is suspicious. The trigger is not a legitimate data lifecycle event in the description. Ownership and expected job behavior should be examined before classifying it as maintenance.

B:

Legitimate retention cleanup can remove files according to a known schedule, but it does not explain a script whose trigger is the disabling of one contractor identity and whose payload deletes important configuration. The conditional trigger tied to account termination is central. Analysts should examine the script's exact event predicate and ownership rather than assuming a normal calendar-driven maintenance job.

C:

Offboarding can legitimately disable accounts and revoke access without damaging unrelated configuration. The discovered script instead waits for that event and destroys important system files, demonstrating a hostile conditional payload. A routine identity lifecycle process does not justify deleting shared operational settings. The scope of deleted files and trigger distinguish this behavior from authorized account termination.

Question 106

A university endpoint-monitoring tool sees that system utilities report clean files while offline verification shows core binaries have different hashes and hidden drivers intercept enumeration calls. What conclusion is technically justified?

  1. Trust the live system utility output over offline hashes because operating-system tools are closer to the running files than forensic verification.
  2. Rootkit-like concealment and integrity tampering are plausible; attribution and scope require further forensic validation.
  3. Attribute the change to a particular external group based on the hidden-driver behavior alone, without independent command infrastructure or forensic corroboration.
  4. Reinstall the monitoring agent and mark the alert resolved without preserving the altered binaries or examining the hidden drivers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Hidden drivers intercepting enumeration calls, combined with differences from trusted offline binaries, suggest concealment consistent with rootkit behavior. The team should preserve evidence and compare against verified baselines. This supports a technical suspicion without proving who installed the code or exactly which systems are affected. Trusted offline acquisition helps avoid relying on utilities that a hidden driver may intercept. Investigators should preserve chain of custody, compare known-good cryptographic measurements, and distinguish the verified tampering indicators from speculation about the operator.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Local enumeration tools can be modified or intercepted by code with high privilege. The discrepancy between their output and independently obtained hashes is a reason to distrust them, not to dismiss offline results. Investigators should preserve acquisition context, verify tool integrity and compare known-good baselines before concluding what changed.

C:

Concealment and hash modification describe technique and possible compromise scope, not the identity of whoever deployed the code. Multiple actors can use related rootkit methods. Specific attribution needs corroborating infrastructure, campaign behavior or intelligence rather than assuming one group from a general kernel manipulation pattern.

D:

Reinstalling a monitoring component might restore some visibility, but it can also overwrite important evidence and leave a privileged implant active. The team should preserve forensic copies, contain the affected machine and validate the source of unauthorized changes. An agent restart is not proof that rootkit-like behavior has ceased.

Question 107

A municipal data center records the same staff badge being used at two server-room entrances within ten seconds even though the doors are several kilometers apart. Video shows only one genuine employee. What physical access threat merits investigation?

  1. A failed badge-reader clock synchronization process that makes two ordinary access events appear simultaneous when they occurred far apart in time.
  2. Normal access behavior because RFID readers cannot be abused.
  3. Possible badge cloning or credential replay, subject to reader-clock and log validation.
  4. A door-access management rule that lets a valid badge open multiple rooms, even though it should be limited to one authorized building.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Incompatible timestamps at distant doors suggest a duplicated credential, replay or faulty logging. The team should compare synchronized reader times, badge issue history, camera footage and anti-passback data before concluding compromise. Reissue affected badges if cloning is supported. Stronger cryptographic badge authentication and reader controls may reduce cloning exposure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Reader clock drift is a viable alternative explanation for an impossible-travel sequence and should be tested before accusing an employee. It is not itself a physical access threat involving a copied credential. The scenario asks what security threat deserves investigation, and a cloned badge or replay remains plausible given the same identity at separated doors. Investigators should reconcile clock sources and raw reader events before concluding either hypothesis.

B:

RFID badge identifiers can sometimes be copied or replayed depending on technology and controls. Log tampering and clock errors are additional possibilities. Assuming all reader data is invulnerable would overlook the physical access anomaly the site observed.

D:

Excessive badge privileges could permit access to several facilities over time, but do not explain the same credential being presented kilometers apart within ten seconds while video shows one genuine employee. Investigators should still assess policy scope, yet the anomalous simultaneity more specifically suggests copying or replay of a physical credential, subject to timestamp validation.

Question 108

A depot's equipment closet alarm activates with a broken latch and damaged hinge; another alert shows abnormal humidity but no broken entry seal. Which interpretation correctly separates the evidence?

  1. Forced-entry damage supports a physical intrusion hypothesis; environmental sensor changes require separate analysis and may reflect tampering or a normal fault.
  2. Every humidity alert proves a thief entered through the door.
  3. Attribute both the damaged latch and the humidity change to one environmental sensor failure, without collecting door-access or maintenance evidence.
  4. Both signals must be ordinary temperature monitoring and require no physical examination.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Visible lock or hinge damage is evidence of attempted or actual forced entry, while humidity readings alone do not identify a person or cause. Investigators should inspect the door, sensor wiring and environmental history independently. Correlating timestamps and cameras can show whether a human intrusion and environmental anomaly are linked.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Humidity can change due to equipment failure, airflow or weather as well as deliberate interference. Without entry evidence it cannot prove an intruder crossed the boundary. The depot should assess sensor calibration and surrounding observations before making that claim.

C:

Humidity sensors can produce false alarms or indicate abnormal conditions, but they do not explain visible mechanical damage to a latch and hinge by themselves. A physical-entry hypothesis needs examination and correlation with access records while environmental anomalies are investigated separately.

D:

Broken hardware is not just a numerical environmental reading. It can indicate attempted forced access and needs inspection, documentation and protective measures. Dismissing it because a separate sensor also alarmed would risk leaving a compromised closet unsecured.

Question 109

A logistics center receives a large UDP flood whose apparent sources are public DNS resolvers. Packet traces show small external queries producing much larger responses toward the victim, while another attack comes directly from infected endpoints. What is the distinctive first pattern?

  1. Authorized high-throughput replication between internal database nodes.
  2. A simple local ARP spoof with no internet traffic.
  3. A direct-source UDP flood from infected hosts, with no spoofed victim address or intervening DNS responders.
  4. Reflection and amplification: abused responders return disproportionately large DNS replies to a spoofed victim.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

In a DNS reflection/amplification attack, an adversary sends comparatively small queries to publicly reachable resolvers while spoofing the victim as the source address. The resolvers send larger replies toward the victim, increasing the volume delivered and disguising the initiating hosts. The observed query/reply size ratio and DNS response headers distinguish this from a direct botnet flood. Response-rate limiting, resolver controls and upstream anti-spoofing can reduce exposure but do not change the classification.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Database replication has defined authenticated peers and expected application payloads. Arbitrary public resolvers and asymmetric DNS reply volumes do not match this pattern. The center should investigate unexpected protocol traffic rather than label an internet flood as routine internal synchronization.

B:

ARP spoofing typically affects local link-layer address resolution and would be observed on a nearby broadcast domain. An internet-wide DNS flood through external resolvers is a different mechanism. Local ARP investigation would not explain the many independent public source servers.

C:

A direct botnet flood can overwhelm a service, but it lacks the two distinctive observations here: small queries apparently using the victim address and much larger replies returned by public DNS resolvers. Those characteristics point to reflected, amplified traffic rather than direct packets from each infected source.

Question 110

A plant control dashboard suddenly resolves its vendor's legitimate name to a new address serving a counterfeit login page. Endpoint DNS cache entries differ from the approved resolver, and there is no scheduled migration. Which threat best fits?

  1. A normal TLS renewal that changes no network destination.
  2. DNS response manipulation or poisoning that redirects users toward a credential-harvesting destination.
  3. A planned split-horizon DNS configuration sending plant clients to a vetted private vendor endpoint, without evidence of response tampering.
  4. A planned DNS failover to a backup vendor endpoint, presumed authorized solely because the site still loads over HTTPS.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Altered DNS answers can send users to a malicious host even when they type the legitimate vendor name. Divergent cache values and a fake login page support redirection as a working hypothesis. The team should validate resolver sources, clear poisoned entries and preserve DNS query evidence while isolating affected sessions.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Certificate renewal may change presented credentials or trust status without requiring a hostname to resolve to an attacker-controlled address. The central anomaly is the unexpected name-to-address mapping. Treating it as a routine TLS lifecycle event leaves the redirection unexplained.

C:

Split-horizon DNS can legitimately supply different answers to internal and external clients, but such changes require approved resolver configuration and known endpoint identities. The case instead reports an unplanned address change, a counterfeit sign-in page and client cache values inconsistent with the approved resolver. Those observations support DNS manipulation, not a verified planned internal-zone policy.

D:

A legitimate DNS failover would require change approval, authenticated endpoint ownership and validated records. The scenario supplies no scheduled migration, shows a counterfeit login page and notes disagreement with the approved resolver. Successful HTTPS navigation alone cannot establish that a new address belongs to the vendor. Treating that event as routine failover would ignore potential poisoned resolution and credential capture.

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