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CompTIA Security+ SY0-701 Practice Test 9

Question 80

A utility's maintenance program verifies that a configuration file is safe, waits for an operator prompt, then reopens the same pathname. Between the check and its later use, an unprivileged account can replace a symbolic link. What vulnerability is present?

  1. Time-of-check/time-of-use race, because the object being used may differ from the object validated.
  2. Cryptographic key exhaustion due to too many administrator accounts.
  3. A DNS cache poisoning issue that requires no local filesystem access.
  4. A certificate authority trust-chain problem causing an invalid timestamp.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A race arises because validation and subsequent use are separate operations on a mutable name. An attacker may redirect that name after the check, causing the privileged program to open another object. The fix should employ atomic or handle-based access with appropriate permission checks, not simply a longer wait.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Key exhaustion concerns a cryptographic or key-management design and is unrelated to a mutable symbolic link. The file path may change even if no encryption is involved. The utility should investigate filesystem identity and permissions rather than rotate unrelated credentials.

C:

DNS poisoning changes hostname resolution, whereas the example concerns a local path, symlink and process timing. There is no domain-name lookup in the described sequence. Network DNS controls would not remove the check-use gap in the maintenance program.

D:

A CA chain validates certificate identity, not the identity of a local file object reopened after a delay. The observed race can occur on systems without TLS certificates. Time in the vulnerability name refers to operation ordering, not certificate timestamps.

Question 81

A retailer uses automatically signed application updates. An attacker gains access to the supplier's build system and inserts an unauthorized module before the vendor's signing step. Which statement best captures the trust-chain risk?

  1. Accept the signed artifact if the signing key itself was not stolen, even though the build environment assembled the malicious module before signing.
  2. Pin the vendor signing certificate during installation and rely on the pinned identity alone to distinguish the authorized release from a malicious build.
  3. A compromised build pipeline can produce signed malicious updates; independent build provenance and release controls remain necessary.
  4. Require the vendor to timestamp each signed update, but keep accepting its output while the compromised build pipeline remains active.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The pipeline can be abused upstream of an otherwise functioning signature process. Reproducible builds, isolated signing roles, protected release approvals and independent artifact attestation reduce this risk. The retailer should quarantine the affected package version and examine what supplier assurances still hold. Trusted release metadata should be preserved for independent comparison.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A protected signing key authenticates the signer, not the integrity of every upstream build step. The compromised builder can submit altered bytes for a legitimate signature when authorization to sign is not constrained. Release provenance, build-system controls and approval evidence must be evaluated independently of cryptographic signature validity.

B:

Pinning helps verify the expected signer and can defend against some certificate substitution attacks. It does not protect against malicious source or build artifacts that reach the authentic signing service. The retailer needs independent evidence of build provenance and review of what was signed, not solely who signed it.

D:

Timestamps can help establish when a signature was produced and support later investigation, but they do not make altered code harmless. If build controls are compromised, malicious artifacts can still receive accurate timestamps and signatures. Deployment should be paused or constrained until trusted provenance and release controls are restored.

Question 82

An online checkout system depends on an end-of-life server OS that will receive no more vendor security patches. Its remote administration port must remain usable by a small internal support team until a tested replacement arrives in eight weeks; the port is currently internet-reachable. What interim decision best reduces exposure without falsely treating the OS as supported?

  1. Install a network monitor and mark the server supported again because active detection compensates for the vendor’s unavailable security fixes.
  2. Apply an untested community-built kernel update directly in production and close the risk record without verifying software provenance or checkout compatibility.
  3. Leave the public management port reachable until the scheduled replacement date because keeping the same OS image prevents new attack paths.
  4. Restrict administration to a tested authenticated management path, reduce unneeded services, monitor access, document time-bounded residual risk and complete the replacement plan.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Eliminating direct public administration and permitting only an approved, strongly authenticated management path reduces who can reach the unsupported OS. Service minimization, access telemetry and an expiring risk decision help control the interim exposure while replacement compatibility is tested. None of those steps makes an end-of-life platform patched or supported; the migration remains necessary and must be verified.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Monitoring can detect suspicious behavior, but it does not repair unpatched defects in the operating system or restore vendor maintenance. The internet-reachable management service remains a concrete exposure. An unsupported-status finding must stay visible while the team implements effective temporary access restrictions and plans a validated migration rather than relabeling the machine as maintained.

B:

A third-party patch may have its own integrity, compatibility and operational risks, particularly on a payment-dependent checkout system. Without a supported test and trusted provenance, immediate kernel replacement is not a reliable substitute for vendor security maintenance. The owner should prefer bounded controls that safely reduce access while preparing the approved platform replacement.

C:

Keeping the same software image does not eliminate vulnerabilities reachable through a public management interface. An attacker need not wait for a code change to exploit a known unpatched flaw. The current remote path should be restricted promptly, with documented testing so authorized administrators can still recover the checkout application during the short migration period.

Question 83

An unattended environmental IoT gateway at a bank branch accepts firmware images over a local maintenance interface. A technician finds that unsigned images install successfully. Which weakness is most concerning?

  1. Protect the firmware download with HTTPS and assume transport encryption makes signature verification of the installed image unnecessary.
  2. Firmware authenticity and integrity are not enforced, allowing untrusted code to be loaded through the update path.
  3. The gateway sends status data to a central monitor over TLS.
  4. Accept the unsigned firmware as trusted if its version number matches the device supplier’s published release notes and the gateway was purchased from an authorized distributor.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Unverified firmware can install attacker-modified functionality even if the gateway was initially trustworthy. Signed firmware with protected verification keys and rollback controls can help prevent unauthorized changes. The bank should check update authorization, physical access and whether the firmware currently installed matches a trusted release. The bank should inventory the affected gateway model and version, limit who can access the maintenance interface, and check whether a secure-boot or measured-integrity capability can detect unauthorized images. An update accepted successfully is not evidence it was trustworthy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

TLS can protect a download against some interception attacks when peers are verified, but it is not equivalent to authenticating a firmware image at install time. An image supplied locally or through a compromised trusted service can still be unauthorized if the gateway lacks an enforced software-signing policy.

C:

TLS can protect data moving to a monitor and does not inherently create an unsigned-firmware vulnerability. Encrypted telemetry might coexist with insecure updates, so neither control replaces the other. The maintenance interface needs its own software integrity protection.

D:

A known model and published version label cannot authenticate the specific bytes being installed; an adversary can package malicious firmware with the expected version metadata. Approved procurement and release notes provide useful context, but the update path still needs protected signature or equivalent provenance verification before flash operations. The exposed maintenance interface can otherwise install unauthorized code.

Question 84

A supplier's web portal logs a request that changes a product search parameter into a quoted database command. In another session a comment contains a script tag intended to run in viewers' browsers. Which pairing best distinguishes the vulnerabilities?

  1. Both are buffer-overflow attacks because the inputs contain nonalphabetic characters.
  2. The search request is cross-site scripting in the browser, while the submitted comment is SQL injection against the product database.
  3. SQL injection targets database query interpretation; cross-site scripting targets the browser's treatment of untrusted page content.
  4. Both are harmless while the edge firewall accepts only syntactically valid HTTP requests, even if the application concatenates SQL or renders user HTML.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

SQL injection can alter a backend query when user input is improperly concatenated into SQL. Cross-site scripting can execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in a victim's browser if untrusted content is rendered unsafely. Parametrized queries and context-appropriate output encoding address different mechanisms; tests should target each interpretation boundary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Suspicious punctuation alone does not establish writing past a memory buffer. The relevant contexts are database query construction and web-page rendering. Treating every malicious input as overflow would miss the precise server-side and client-side trust boundaries.

B:

This option reverses the evidenced interpretation boundaries. The quoted command is supplied to a product-search path constructing a database query, while the comment contains executable script intended for later viewers' browsers. XSS and SQL injection are both input-handling defects, but remediation depends on where the value is interpreted: database parameterization for the former search query and safe HTML output handling for the latter comment.

D:

An HTTP packet may conform to its protocol while carrying malicious text that an application later interprets as executable SQL or browser script. The critical trust boundary is where untrusted values become commands or active content. A general transport firewall does not guarantee safe query construction and output encoding.

Question 85

A healthcare portal stores user comments and later displays them in an HTML page. One submitted comment contains a script that reads non-HttpOnly session data in another visitor's browser. Which flaw enables this behavior?

  1. Stored cross-site scripting caused by unsafe rendering of untrusted comments.
  2. Encrypt the database containing comments at rest, then render the decrypted comment text as trusted HTML without context-sensitive encoding.
  3. Apply SameSite=Strict to the session cookie, but continue rendering comment-supplied scripts inside the same trusted web origin.
  4. Rely only on a permissive Content Security Policy while continuing to insert untrusted comments as executable HTML.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Persisted attacker-controlled content executes when the portal renders it without suitable escaping or sanitization. This is stored XSS because later viewers, not just the original submitter, can be affected. The team should enforce context-aware output encoding and restrictive session handling while reviewing which stored comments need cleanup.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Database encryption can protect stored comment bytes under appropriate key control, but the browser ultimately receives decrypted page content. If the application injects that content as executable HTML, an attacker-controlled script may still run in visitors’ sessions. Storage confidentiality and output-context encoding address different boundaries; the former cannot prevent stored cross-site scripting.

C:

SameSite helps control when a browser sends cookies with cross-site requests. It is not a general JavaScript execution barrier and does not stop a script already executing in the application’s own origin from accessing non-HttpOnly data. The stored-comment rendering must use appropriate encoding or sanitization; cookie attributes provide complementary session protections.

D:

Content Security Policy is an additional defense-in-depth measure, but a permissive policy that allows the relevant script execution does not fix the unsafe rendering flaw. The application must handle untrusted comments as data, with suitable output encoding or sanitization and appropriate session protection.

Question 86

A university web application runs as a service account with write access to the entire operating-system configuration directory. Its request handlers otherwise use parameterized database queries. Which underlying weakness is most directly demonstrated?

  1. SQL injection because all web applications have database vulnerabilities.
  2. Insecure operating-system/service-account permissions that increase impact if the application is compromised.
  3. An overly broad database role assigned to the application, rather than operating-system file permissions.
  4. A browser cookie attribute problem that can be fixed solely by setting SameSite.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A service identity with unnecessary write privileges can modify critical system files if abused, increasing the blast radius of an application flaw or stolen credential. Least privilege should limit it to required paths. The university should document normal write operations and remove broad configuration-directory access after testing legitimate functionality.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Parameterized queries are a defensive measure against SQL injection for the described data path; no injected query is shown. Overbroad filesystem rights are a different problem. Assuming a database exploit would ignore the permissions evidence that actually exists.

C:

Database privileges can certainly increase the impact of a compromised application, but the facts identify write permission to the operating-system configuration directory. The scenario says the relevant database queries are parameterized and does not establish an excessive database grant, so the observed flaw is at the OS/service-account boundary.

D:

SameSite influences browser cookie transmission in some cross-site contexts. It does not remove a server process's ability to write operating-system configuration. Client session hardening may be valuable, but it cannot fix overprivileged service identities.

Question 87

A public-sector service runs two isolated virtual machines on the same hypervisor. A security report alleges that code in one guest accessed the hypervisor management process, but the only observed evidence is an overly broad guest firewall rule. What conclusion is justified?

  1. Report a confirmed hypervisor escape because the permissive guest firewall would allow the compromised VM to attempt communication with adjacent systems.
  2. Dismiss the broad guest firewall rule because hypervisor security updates are current and there are no host-level alerts.
  3. Concentrate exclusively on hypervisor forensic logs and defer correcting the verified guest firewall exposure until an escape exploit is proven.
  4. Guest network misconfiguration is observed; a VM escape would require evidence that isolation into the hypervisor was actually crossed.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The broad rule can be remediated through segmentation and a guest firewall policy. Investigators should examine hypervisor logs, host integrity and exploit evidence before labeling the incident VM escape. This avoids both underestimating the confirmed rule exposure and exaggerating the unsupported host-compromise hypothesis. Record confidence levels for each observation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A guest firewall gap can enable network access between machines, but does not demonstrate code execution in the hypervisor's privileged processes. Crossing into the virtualization host is a distinct boundary requiring exploit, telemetry or integrity evidence. The known permissive rule should be remediated without inflating the incident classification.

B:

A patched hypervisor reduces some isolation risks but does not correct an overly permissive guest network policy. The observed exposure can permit unintended peer traffic even if no escape occurred. The team should fix the confirmed guest control gap and separately assess whether hypervisor compromise indicators exist.

C:

Investigating an allegation is appropriate, but postponing a confirmed network-permission defect preserves an avoidable lateral path. The organization should handle both tracks: remediate the guest rule and seek independent evidence for the stronger host-compromise claim. The current observation cannot certify a VM escape.

Question 88

A cloud provider recycles a virtual compute host for a new customer. An engineer proposes reusing a raw disk image that might contain another customer's deleted API tokens. Which risk must be addressed before assignment?

  1. Residual secret exposure from improperly sanitized reused storage or memory, violating tenant separation.
  2. Create a fresh filesystem on the reused virtual disk without verifying that previous blocks and snapshots containing other tenant data were sanitized.
  3. Attach the previous customer’s disk image read-only to the new VM so inherited files cannot be changed by the new customer.
  4. Require the new tenant to use full-disk encryption for future writes while leaving the old image contents accessible for compatibility.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Deleted files or snapshots may leave recoverable data if storage is not securely reset. Reusing a disk across tenants therefore requires trusted sanitization and isolation controls, not just a new customer account. The provider should validate that previous customer secrets cannot be recovered from the assigned resource.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A new filesystem can hide older file entries without necessarily overwriting underlying blocks, unallocated extents or snapshots. The new tenant may still be able to recover residual secrets depending on the storage implementation. The provider needs a verifiable sanitization or cryptographic-erase procedure appropriate to the virtualization and storage layer.

C:

Read-only access prevents modification but does not prevent confidentiality loss. The new tenant could still inspect recoverable API tokens or metadata in the inherited image. Reassignment should deliver a clean resource with separation validated before any new customer receives access, regardless of whether writes are enabled.

D:

Encryption of newly written blocks does not retroactively erase a previous tenant’s data from inherited sectors or snapshots. The provider remains responsible for reliable separation at reuse. The old storage contents must be sanitized or rendered cryptographically inaccessible before attaching the resource to another tenant.

Question 89

A company migrates workloads to IaaS. Its cloud provider secures data-center hosts, but the customer configures an identity role allowing every internet user to read a private object store. Who owns the access-policy mistake?

  1. Only the provider, because the provider runs the physical machines.
  2. Neither party, because object storage is not part of a security boundary.
  3. The customer, which configured overly permissive cloud IAM under the shared-responsibility model.
  4. Only the internet service provider, because the objects are accessed over its network.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Shared responsibility assigns controls according to the service model; here the customer owns the policy that grants public access. It should remove unnecessary principals, review exposure logs and implement policy validation. A provider hardware compromise is not needed to explain a customer-created authorization flaw. The cloud resource-policy history should identify which change exposed the objects.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Host and data-center protection do not make the provider responsible for every customer IAM decision. In many IaaS configurations, customers control their resource policies and identities. The organization should distinguish provider infrastructure safeguards from the access settings it deliberately applied.

B:

Object storage contains resources with confidentiality and authorization requirements. Public-read grants are meaningful control settings regardless of whether the underlying disks are managed. Dismissing them would ignore the direct data-exposure evidence in the policy.

D:

Internet carriers route packets but ordinarily do not decide which principal an object-store IAM policy authorizes. Network transit responsibility cannot substitute for resource access configuration. The specific permission is controlled in the cloud account, not by an external routing service.

Question 90

A water-treatment facility installs remote-management software from a contractor. The installer includes a library from an unmaintained third-party repository, and the binary's provenance cannot be established. Which exposure is most relevant?

  1. A guaranteed physical valve failure because the software includes an outside library.
  2. A software supply-chain dependency with uncertain integrity and maintenance, requiring verification before the install enters the operational network.
  3. The contractor can compensate for unknown package provenance by signing the outer installer with its ordinary deployment certificate after the library is included.
  4. Only a performance-tuning question, because third-party packages cannot contain malicious code.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Third-party components may be compromised, vulnerable or unsupported even when distributed inside an apparently legitimate installer. Validating signatures, software bills of materials, hash provenance and approved versions reduces uncertainty before OT deployment. The facility should isolate testing and review supplier maintenance commitments before granting remote-management privileges.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Untrusted dependencies can introduce software defects or malicious behavior, but a valve malfunction is not inevitable from library provenance alone. The plant must assess deployment paths and safety impact rather than asserting an incident without evidence. Precaution is justified without exaggerating current consequences.

C:

A signed installer can establish who distributed the final package and whether the bytes changed after signing; it cannot prove an unknown dependency is maintained or free of malicious code before the signing step. The plant needs dependency inventory, component provenance and testing. Signing is useful but not a substitute for supply-chain assurance.

D:

Software libraries execute with application privileges and can introduce exploitable flaws or intentionally malicious behavior. Origin and maintenance are security-relevant facts, not solely performance concerns. Ignoring the source would bypass necessary supplier and artifact assurance.

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