JN0-650 Premium File
- 107 Questions & Answers
- Last Update: Nov 8, 2026
A fabric leaf has a BGP EVPN session in Established but no MAC reachability for VNI 50100 while other VNIs work. The proposed correction is: Verify the VNI's route-target import/export and Type 2 route visibility across the EVPN peers. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?
Type 2 MAC routes for VNI 50100 are received and installed only by intended tenant members. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: A fabric leaf has a BGP EVPN session in Established but no MAC reachability for VNI 50100 while other VNIs work. The mechanism being validated is: EVPN route targets constrain which tenant reachability a participating leaf imports.
Type 2 entries identify the host next hop while Type 3 supports BUM delivery. That would validate a different condition: A remote VXLAN leaf receives an EVPN Type 3 route for a VNI but no tenant host routes and the engineer assumes Type 3 can replace MAC reachability. The decisive check for the current issue is: Type 2 MAC routes for VNI 50100 are received and installed only by intended tenant members.
The remote tenant VRF receives the appropriate IP prefix with valid overlay next-hop resolution. That would validate a different condition: A fabric control plane should recognize a subnet's tenant IP prefix for inter-subnet forwarding, but the team is examining only EVPN MAC route tables. The decisive check for the current issue is: Type 2 MAC routes for VNI 50100 are received and installed only by intended tenant members.
Frames received from a multihomed segment are not forwarded back toward that same Ethernet segment. That would validate a different condition: An EVPN fabric uses two active PEs for one Ethernet segment, but return traffic loops back to the same segment through a remote peer. The decisive check for the current issue is: Type 2 MAC routes for VNI 50100 are received and installed only by intended tenant members.
A Junos engineer proposes this response: Verify the VNI's route-target import/export and Type 2 route visibility across the EVPN peers. The situation is: A fabric leaf has a BGP EVPN session in Established but no MAC reachability for VNI 50100 while other VNIs work. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?
EVPN route targets constrain which tenant reachability a participating leaf imports. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: A fabric leaf has a BGP EVPN session in Established but no MAC reachability for VNI 50100 while other VNIs work. It predicts the acceptance result: Type 2 MAC routes for VNI 50100 are received and installed only by intended tenant members.
EVPN Type 2 routes advertise MAC and optionally IP reachability information between participating leaves. This principle explains a separate situation: An EVPN-VXLAN leaf learns a local tenant MAC but remote VTEPs never learn that endpoint's MAC/IP binding from the control plane. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: EVPN route targets constrain which tenant reachability a participating leaf imports.
VXLAN VNIs identify isolated logical overlay segments over a shared routed underlay. This principle explains a separate situation: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: EVPN route targets constrain which tenant reachability a participating leaf imports.
EVPN MAC mobility mechanisms coordinate changed endpoint attachment locations. This principle explains a separate situation: A virtual machine moves to a different EVPN leaf, yet remote leaves continue using the stale previous VTEP for its MAC. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: EVPN route targets constrain which tenant reachability a participating leaf imports.
A fabric leaf has a BGP EVPN session in Established but no MAC reachability for VNI 50100 while other VNIs work. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Verify the VNI's route-target import/export and Type 2 route visibility across the EVPN peers.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?
A working BGP session does not imply every VNI's EVPN routes are imported. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: A fabric leaf has a BGP EVPN session in Established but no MAC reachability for VNI 50100 while other VNIs work. It is prevented by: Verify the VNI's route-target import/export and Type 2 route visibility across the EVPN peers. The underlying reason is: EVPN route targets constrain which tenant reachability a participating leaf imports.
Absent Type 2 reachability can force unnecessary flooding or prevent remote unicast delivery. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: An EVPN-VXLAN leaf learns a local tenant MAC but remote VTEPs never learn that endpoint's MAC/IP binding from the control plane. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: A working BGP session does not imply every VNI's EVPN routes are imported. The appropriate mitigation is: Verify the VNI's route-target import/export and Type 2 route visibility across the EVPN peers.
Reusing a tenant VNI inadvertently can merge unrelated broadcast domains. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: A working BGP session does not imply every VNI's EVPN routes are imported. The appropriate mitigation is: Verify the VNI's route-target import/export and Type 2 route visibility across the EVPN peers.
Stale endpoint location information can blackhole traffic after a server migration. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A virtual machine moves to a different EVPN leaf, yet remote leaves continue using the stale previous VTEP for its MAC. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: A working BGP session does not imply every VNI's EVPN routes are imported. The appropriate mitigation is: Verify the VNI's route-target import/export and Type 2 route visibility across the EVPN peers.
Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. Which targeted engineering change is MOST directly justified by the observed evidence?
Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership. This change specifically addresses the reported evidence: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. The relevant protocol mechanism is: VXLAN VNIs identify isolated logical overlay segments over a shared routed underlay. A decisive acceptance test would be: Traffic reaches only VTEPs participating in the appropriate tenant VNI.
Check Type 3 inclusive-multicast EVPN routes and the configured BUM delivery method for that VNI. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: Two EVPN fabric leaves share a broadcast domain, but unknown-unicast and broadcast packets do not reach remote VTEPs. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. The required targeted change is: Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership.
Verify BGP EVPN Type 2 MAC/IP route origination and route-target import for the affected VNI. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: An EVPN-VXLAN leaf learns a local tenant MAC but remote VTEPs never learn that endpoint's MAC/IP binding from the control plane. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. The required targeted change is: Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership.
Verify the supported EVPN IP-prefix route model, including Type 5 where required by the design. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A fabric control plane should recognize a subnet's tenant IP prefix for inter-subnet forwarding, but the team is examining only EVPN MAC route tables. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. The required targeted change is: Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership.
Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. The proposed correction is: Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?
Traffic reaches only VTEPs participating in the appropriate tenant VNI. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. The mechanism being validated is: VXLAN VNIs identify isolated logical overlay segments over a shared routed underlay.
The intended remote VTEPs appear in the VNI's BUM replication or multicast distribution state. That would validate a different condition: Two EVPN fabric leaves share a broadcast domain, but unknown-unicast and broadcast packets do not reach remote VTEPs. The decisive check for the current issue is: Traffic reaches only VTEPs participating in the appropriate tenant VNI.
The remote leaf receives the intended Type 2 route and resolves the tenant MAC through the correct VTEP. That would validate a different condition: An EVPN-VXLAN leaf learns a local tenant MAC but remote VTEPs never learn that endpoint's MAC/IP binding from the control plane. The decisive check for the current issue is: Traffic reaches only VTEPs participating in the appropriate tenant VNI.
The remote tenant VRF receives the appropriate IP prefix with valid overlay next-hop resolution. That would validate a different condition: A fabric control plane should recognize a subnet's tenant IP prefix for inter-subnet forwarding, but the team is examining only EVPN MAC route tables. The decisive check for the current issue is: Traffic reaches only VTEPs participating in the appropriate tenant VNI.
A Junos engineer proposes this response: Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership. The situation is: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?
VXLAN VNIs identify isolated logical overlay segments over a shared routed underlay. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. It predicts the acceptance result: Traffic reaches only VTEPs participating in the appropriate tenant VNI.
EVPN Type 3 routes signal inclusive multicast membership for broadcast, unknown unicast, and multicast delivery. This principle explains a separate situation: Two EVPN fabric leaves share a broadcast domain, but unknown-unicast and broadcast packets do not reach remote VTEPs. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: VXLAN VNIs identify isolated logical overlay segments over a shared routed underlay.
EVPN Type 2 routes advertise MAC and optionally IP reachability information between participating leaves. This principle explains a separate situation: An EVPN-VXLAN leaf learns a local tenant MAC but remote VTEPs never learn that endpoint's MAC/IP binding from the control plane. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: VXLAN VNIs identify isolated logical overlay segments over a shared routed underlay.
EVPN Type 5 can advertise IP prefixes for tenant inter-subnet routed overlay connectivity. This principle explains a separate situation: A fabric control plane should recognize a subnet's tenant IP prefix for inter-subnet forwarding, but the team is examining only EVPN MAC route tables. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: VXLAN VNIs identify isolated logical overlay segments over a shared routed underlay.
Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?
Reusing a tenant VNI inadvertently can merge unrelated broadcast domains. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. It is prevented by: Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership. The underlying reason is: VXLAN VNIs identify isolated logical overlay segments over a shared routed underlay.
Missing Type 3 membership can blackhole broadcast and discovery traffic across the VXLAN overlay. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: Two EVPN fabric leaves share a broadcast domain, but unknown-unicast and broadcast packets do not reach remote VTEPs. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Reusing a tenant VNI inadvertently can merge unrelated broadcast domains. The appropriate mitigation is: Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership.
Absent Type 2 reachability can force unnecessary flooding or prevent remote unicast delivery. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: An EVPN-VXLAN leaf learns a local tenant MAC but remote VTEPs never learn that endpoint's MAC/IP binding from the control plane. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Reusing a tenant VNI inadvertently can merge unrelated broadcast domains. The appropriate mitigation is: Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership.
Expecting MAC-only routes to replace required tenant IP prefix exchange can break routed overlay traffic. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A fabric control plane should recognize a subnet's tenant IP prefix for inter-subnet forwarding, but the team is examining only EVPN MAC route tables. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Reusing a tenant VNI inadvertently can merge unrelated broadcast domains. The appropriate mitigation is: Map each tenant broadcast domain to distinct VNIs and matching EVPN route-target membership.
An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. Which targeted engineering change is MOST directly justified by the observed evidence?
Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints. This change specifically addresses the reported evidence: An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. The relevant protocol mechanism is: EVPN BGP advertises reachability while VXLAN encapsulation carries actual Ethernet frames over IP. A decisive acceptance test would be: VXLAN packets traverse the underlay and remote tenant unicast frames reach the destination.
Verify BGP EVPN Type 2 MAC/IP route origination and route-target import for the affected VNI. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: An EVPN-VXLAN leaf learns a local tenant MAC but remote VTEPs never learn that endpoint's MAC/IP binding from the control plane. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. The required targeted change is: Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints.
Inspect new Type 2 MAC advertisement and MAC mobility sequence handling after the move. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A virtual machine moves to a different EVPN leaf, yet remote leaves continue using the stale previous VTEP for its MAC. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. The required targeted change is: Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints.
Verify the supported EVPN IP-prefix route model, including Type 5 where required by the design. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A fabric control plane should recognize a subnet's tenant IP prefix for inter-subnet forwarding, but the team is examining only EVPN MAC route tables. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. The required targeted change is: Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints.
An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. The proposed correction is: Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?
VXLAN packets traverse the underlay and remote tenant unicast frames reach the destination. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. The mechanism being validated is: EVPN BGP advertises reachability while VXLAN encapsulation carries actual Ethernet frames over IP.
The remote leaf receives the intended Type 2 route and resolves the tenant MAC through the correct VTEP. That would validate a different condition: An EVPN-VXLAN leaf learns a local tenant MAC but remote VTEPs never learn that endpoint's MAC/IP binding from the control plane. The decisive check for the current issue is: VXLAN packets traverse the underlay and remote tenant unicast frames reach the destination.
Remote leaves update the MAC-to-VTEP mapping and forwarding reaches the VM's new location. That would validate a different condition: A virtual machine moves to a different EVPN leaf, yet remote leaves continue using the stale previous VTEP for its MAC. The decisive check for the current issue is: VXLAN packets traverse the underlay and remote tenant unicast frames reach the destination.
Traffic reaches only VTEPs participating in the appropriate tenant VNI. That would validate a different condition: Two tenants share the same physical VXLAN underlay but their Layer 2 broadcasts must remain separate despite overlapping inner VLAN numbers. The decisive check for the current issue is: VXLAN packets traverse the underlay and remote tenant unicast frames reach the destination.
A Junos engineer proposes this response: Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints. The situation is: An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?
EVPN BGP advertises reachability while VXLAN encapsulation carries actual Ethernet frames over IP. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. It predicts the acceptance result: VXLAN packets traverse the underlay and remote tenant unicast frames reach the destination.
EVPN Type 2 routes advertise MAC and optionally IP reachability information between participating leaves. This principle explains a separate situation: An EVPN-VXLAN leaf learns a local tenant MAC but remote VTEPs never learn that endpoint's MAC/IP binding from the control plane. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: EVPN BGP advertises reachability while VXLAN encapsulation carries actual Ethernet frames over IP.
EVPN MAC mobility mechanisms coordinate changed endpoint attachment locations. This principle explains a separate situation: A virtual machine moves to a different EVPN leaf, yet remote leaves continue using the stale previous VTEP for its MAC. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: EVPN BGP advertises reachability while VXLAN encapsulation carries actual Ethernet frames over IP.
EVPN Type 5 can advertise IP prefixes for tenant inter-subnet routed overlay connectivity. This principle explains a separate situation: A fabric control plane should recognize a subnet's tenant IP prefix for inter-subnet forwarding, but the team is examining only EVPN MAC route tables. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: EVPN BGP advertises reachability while VXLAN encapsulation carries actual Ethernet frames over IP.
An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?
An established control-plane session cannot compensate for a blocked VXLAN data path. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: An EVPN-VXLAN service has correct BGP Type 2 MAC routes but VXLAN data packets fail between leaves because UDP overlay transport is blocked by a security device. It is prevented by: Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints. The underlying reason is: EVPN BGP advertises reachability while VXLAN encapsulation carries actual Ethernet frames over IP.
Absent Type 2 reachability can force unnecessary flooding or prevent remote unicast delivery. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: An EVPN-VXLAN leaf learns a local tenant MAC but remote VTEPs never learn that endpoint's MAC/IP binding from the control plane. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: An established control-plane session cannot compensate for a blocked VXLAN data path. The appropriate mitigation is: Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints.
Stale endpoint location information can blackhole traffic after a server migration. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A virtual machine moves to a different EVPN leaf, yet remote leaves continue using the stale previous VTEP for its MAC. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: An established control-plane session cannot compensate for a blocked VXLAN data path. The appropriate mitigation is: Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints.
Expecting MAC-only routes to replace required tenant IP prefix exchange can break routed overlay traffic. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A fabric control plane should recognize a subnet's tenant IP prefix for inter-subnet forwarding, but the team is examining only EVPN MAC route tables. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: An established control-plane session cannot compensate for a blocked VXLAN data path. The appropriate mitigation is: Restore authorized VXLAN UDP transport and IP reachability between the participating VTEP endpoints.
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