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A Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN deployment engineer is handling this requirement: A regulated workflow requires inspection of selected TLS application traffic while protecting private keys and avoiding broad decryption. Which action BEST addresses the situation?
Design a supported SSL or TLS proxy inspection policy with authorized certificate trust and exclusions. This is the targeted action for the stated case: A regulated workflow requires inspection of selected TLS application traffic while protecting private keys and avoiding broad decryption. The specific technical reason is: TLS proxy inspection terminates and reestablishes eligible encrypted sessions under configured trust controls. Verification should demonstrate: Approved HTTPS traffic is inspected under the deployed proxy policy and excluded sensitive flows remain protected.
Configure supported Advanced Malware Protection file inspection and appropriate action policy. This would help with a different network situation: A security team wants to detect suspicious executable files crossing an Edge, not just known malicious IPs.
Deploy supported next-generation firewall controls for permitted internet and service traffic in addition to transport encryption. This would help with a different network situation: A branch internet breakout exposes applications to threats even though the SD-WAN IPsec overlay is encrypted.
Design redundant supported SIG tunnel endpoints and verify route preference or failover. This would help with a different network situation: A cloud security tunnel to the primary SIG endpoint fails, yet the branch has a healthy backup internet circuit.
Consider this Catalyst SD-WAN operating scenario: A finance service VPN should learn only hub-originated networks while other branch prefixes remain isolated. Which corrective response most directly meets the requirement?
Create a centralized OMP control policy filtering accepted VPN routes by site or prefix list. This is the targeted action for the stated case: A finance service VPN should learn only hub-originated networks while other branch prefixes remain isolated. The specific technical reason is: Central control policies govern OMP route distribution before remote WAN Edges install usable prefixes. Verification should demonstrate: Spoke Edges learn hub routes and do not install unauthorized spoke-to-spoke VPN prefixes.
Add an appropriate reject condition in a centralized control policy for the unauthorized route attributes. This would help with a different network situation: An SD-WAN Controller accepts an OMP route from an untrusted segment, exposing it to unrelated branch sites.
Use the supported application-identification match in the AAR policy for the intended traffic class. This would help with a different network situation: A critical financial application is identified by DPI but the AAR rule matches only TCP port 443 without app context.
Filter or modify TLOC advertisements with scoped centralized control policy as supported. This would help with a different network situation: A Controller advertises a TLOC route to an Edge that lacks an authorized transport color for that topology.
A network troubleshooting report describes the following condition: A voice call experiences moderate random packet loss and the operator wants recovery without full duplicate packets. Which consequence explains why this issue must be addressed?
Enabling full packet duplication for every low-loss flow can waste bandwidth compared with suitable FEC. Forward Error Correction adds recovery information so receivers can repair some losses without retransmission. The recommended mitigation is: Use supported Forward Error Correction with a suitable adaptive or always policy and loss threshold.
Repeated identical payloads can consume scarce link capacity when redundancy is not eliminated. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A file-transfer workload repeatedly sends substantially identical large data blocks over a constrained WAN.
Adding raw bandwidth without checking TCP behavior may not improve latency-bound transactions. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A high-latency WAN hosts an application with numerous small TCP exchanges and poor response time.
Hairpinning every packet through the central firewall unnecessarily adds latency and consumes capacity. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A campus has three security zones and only traffic crossing zones needs a firewall hop.
A Catalyst SD-WAN operations review encounters this case: A policy author creates a list of branch sites but mistakenly applies it without matching the intended VPN. What failure mode is MOST directly associated with leaving it uncorrected?
Broad policy scope can unintentionally change routing for other isolated customer VPNs. Central control policy application uses site and VPN context to constrain overlay route treatment. The recommended mitigation is: Use both site-list and appropriate VPN-list scope in the central control policy attachment.
Changing OMP path preference globally can divert unrelated application traffic. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A branch should steer a known backup application through MPLS while allowing routine internet browsing through local DIA.
Setting a traffic shaper cannot determine OMP path preference for a VPN prefix. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A regional fabric requires preferred routing to a backup data center when the primary hub withdraws a prefix.
Failing to filter prohibited OMP advertisements can spread reachability outside intended trust zones. That risk applies mainly to a different case: An SD-WAN Controller accepts an OMP route from an untrusted segment, exposing it to unrelated branch sites.
A Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN deployment engineer is handling this requirement: AAR path changes oscillate as transport loss fluctuates around a threshold during busy hours. Which action BEST addresses the situation?
Review measured SLA windows, threshold settings and supported path-selection stability controls. This is the targeted action for the stated case: AAR path changes oscillate as transport loss fluctuates around a threshold during busy hours. The specific technical reason is: SLA measurement windows and policy preferences influence when an application changes overlay paths. Verification should demonstrate: Telemetry shows fewer disruptive path switches while the application still avoids sustained bad paths.
Verify that the data policy is activated and applied to the correct site, VPN, and direction. This would help with a different network situation: A policy is visible in Manager but no user traffic matches it on the designated WAN Edge.
Bind the SLA class to the intended AAR policy and activate it at the appropriate sites and VPNs. This would help with a different network situation: A network operator creates a new latency SLA but never associates it with any application traffic policy.
Use the supported application-identification match in the AAR policy for the intended traffic class. This would help with a different network situation: A critical financial application is identified by DPI but the AAR rule matches only TCP port 443 without app context.
Consider the following branch WAN issue: A branch needs a centralized security and service-chain location at a partner colocation facility before reaching external services. What is the most relevant operational risk in this situation?
Routing all traffic directly to the internet can bypass centrally required inspection at the colocation site. Cloud OnRamp for Colocation integrates SD-WAN connectivity with shared colocation service functions. The recommended mitigation is: Evaluate Cloud OnRamp for Colocation and its supported service-chain architecture.
Assuming the geographically closest exit always has the best SaaS path can degrade application experience. That risk applies mainly to a different case: Cloud OnRamp for SaaS reports that a nearby direct-internet egress is worse for an application than a regional gateway.
Conflating TLOC routes with vRoutes causes wrong overlay reachability and policy decisions. That risk applies mainly to a different case: An engineer sees an OMP TLOC route and concludes that it is itself a customer's service-VPN network prefix.
Applying a catch-all hairpin through the colocation site can congest backhaul and disrupt service. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A network team must send only approved application categories through a colocation security stack, retaining other traffic on DIA.
A network troubleshooting report describes the following condition: A new branch can reach a hub's external service VPN but not a second shared-services VPN. Which consequence explains why this issue must be addressed?
Transport connectivity does not automatically grant service VPN route visibility between tenants. VPN membership and route distribution determine which segment's prefixes each Edge can access. The recommended mitigation is: Verify that the branch is an authorized member of the second VPN and that its routes are exported.
Full-mesh OMP route distribution can violate a hub-only traffic topology requirement. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A company wants branches to reach headquarters servers but forbids direct branch-to-branch sessions.
Moving traffic off a central security hub without equivalent safeguards can expose users to threats. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A branch enables direct internet breakout for employees without a firewall or DNS security plan.
Assigning a numeric VPN without membership or matching OMP advertisements does not create end-to-end reachability. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A cloud branch is assigned to a new customer VPN but the Controller continues to distribute only the default service VPN.
A Catalyst SD-WAN operations review encounters this case: A new firmware image is published but the operator assumes uploading it to Manager immediately activates it on every Edge. What failure mode is MOST directly associated with leaving it uncorrected?
Image upload without installation or activation does not change the running device software. The software image lifecycle distinguishes repository upload, device distribution, installation and activation. The recommended mitigation is: Schedule a controlled install and activation workflow, with pilot devices and intended reboot behavior.
Assuming every failed upgrade automatically reverts safely can extend the outage. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A WAN Edge upgrade completes on one router but not another, and the operator needs a reliable rollback decision.
Separate local shared admin passwords weaken accountability and access lifecycle control. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A security team wants Catalyst SD-WAN administrative authentication delegated to corporate identity services.
One-off untracked image transfers increase version drift and change risk. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A maintenance team must upgrade 300 WAN Edge routers without transferring individual software images manually.
A fabric administrator recommends the following change: Send or synchronize the current authorized device list to all relevant control components. The triggering scenario is: A network operator imports Edge serial numbers into Manager but never distributes the updated list to the Controllers. Which underlying SD-WAN behavior BEST explains the response?
The authorized WAN Edge list must be synchronized from management to control components. This technical mechanism explains why the recommended action works: Send or synchronize the current authorized device list to all relevant control components. A successful deployment should show: The Controller recognizes the new Edge serial and its secure session is admitted.
Secure control sessions require current signed device certificates that remain within their validity interval. This principle is associated more closely with another situation: A control node's identity certificate will expire during a planned campus change freeze.
Device authorization relies on trusted identity certificates and the approved WAN Edge serial-number list. This principle is associated more closely with another situation: A newly delivered Edge has a valid certificate but its serial number is absent from the fabric's authorized device inventory.
Cloud-hosted controllers still require network reachability through enterprise transport firewalls and NAT. This principle is associated more closely with another situation: A provider-hosted Manager shows all Edges as disconnected after an internet egress policy update.
A Catalyst SD-WAN operations review encounters this case: The enterprise spans three regional fabrics, and an administrator wants to suppress needless routes outside their home region. What failure mode is MOST directly associated with leaving it uncorrected?
Propagating every regional prefix to every Edge can increase control-plane scale and exposure. Hierarchical SD-WAN regions manage route distribution across distinct regional forwarding domains. The recommended mitigation is: Use the appropriate Multi-Region Fabric inter-region border controls and route policy design.
Treating all cloud-destined traffic as the same category can bypass required security inspection. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A security team insists that public-cloud workloads use inspected regional egress while ordinary user SaaS traffic may use local DIA.
Using cleartext transport without the specified overlay protection can disclose branch application traffic. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A branch uses broadband underlay and the owner requires confidential payload forwarding between WAN Edge routers.
Mislabeling a public interface with a private transport color can undermine intended path reachability. That risk applies mainly to a different case: A fabric uses MPLS and internet transports and must prevent internet-only endpoints from being mistaken for private MPLS circuits.
After a controlled WAN fabric change, operations reports this action: Send or synchronize the current authorized device list to all relevant control components. The original case is: A network operator imports Edge serial numbers into Manager but never distributes the updated list to the Controllers. Which specific measurement would justify closing the change ticket?
The Controller recognizes the new Edge serial and its secure session is admitted. This observable result validates the corrective action: Send or synchronize the current authorized device list to all relevant control components.
After correcting the identity fault, the Edge establishes authenticated control peers without interface changes. That observation would verify another change: A Controller displays the Edge certificate as invalid even though the fabric underlay has no packet loss. The expected result instead is: The Controller recognizes the new Edge serial and its secure session is admitted.
Secure control handshakes recognize the same organization identity and reach established state. That observation would verify another change: Two controller nodes use different organization-name values despite sharing the same trust root. The expected result instead is: The Controller recognizes the new Edge serial and its secure session is admitted.
The Manager shows a valid signed Controller certificate and secure control authentication succeeds. That observation would verify another change: An SD-WAN Manager generates a CSR for a new Controller but the administrator assumes it is already trusted. The expected result instead is: The Controller recognizes the new Edge serial and its secure session is admitted.
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