This would validate MAC authentication fallback fault, not power-over-Ethernet failure. Endpoints without a supported supplicant need a deliberate alternative classification mechanism, not general unrestricted VLAN access. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

An unsupported or poorly coupled optical path prevents reliable Ethernet signalling regardless of correct routing or authentication configuration. The indicated result—supported optics show acceptable diagnostics and stable link state across a representative traffic test—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required power-over-Ethernet failure outcome.

That result—The documented root and port state match the intended loop-free topology and active links forward without loops—concerns spanning-tree blocked forwarding. A correctly blocked path may be essential loop prevention; unblocking without analyzing topology can trigger broadcasts and MAC instability. It can be healthy even while the current power-over-Ethernet failure problem remains.

The alternative targets SSID role and VLAN assignment, where authentication success is not the same as authorization; WLAN roles and VLAN selection determine where the user can forward traffic. It does not establish the intended SSID-to-forwarding path consistency behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Apply authorized MAC-based device classification with restrictive role enforcement where 802.1X is unavailable—is relevant to MAC authentication for headless devices. MAC authentication can support devices without a supplicant but is weaker than cryptographic identity, so narrow policy and inventory are essential. It does not correct the observed SSID-to-forwarding path consistency condition.

Uncontrolled Ethernet loops replicate broadcasts and destabilize MAC learning; redundant links require a mechanism to block or logically aggregate unsafe cycles. Keep an appropriate spanning-tree or supported loop-free design across redundant Layer 2 paths. would address spanning-tree loop prevention, but the reported facts instead point to SSID-to-forwarding path consistency. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

This would validate periodic baseline refresh, not interference spectrum diagnosis. A fixed historical baseline can become misleading as workload mix and client capability change; thresholds should reflect current accepted operating conditions. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—The post-change channel plan reduces nearby cochannel competition and measured client retries—concerns channel reuse planning. Co-channel neighbors share airtime when within interference range; thoughtful reuse can reduce contention without simply widening channels. It can be healthy even while the current interference spectrum diagnosis problem remains.

Wide channels can improve peak rates per connection yet shrink available channel separation, raising cochannel contention in dense networks. The indicated result—peak-load tests show better aggregate throughput and fewer collisions with the selected width—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required interference spectrum diagnosis outcome.

The alternative targets role-based access decisions, where successful authentication proves identity; separate authorization decisions determine permitted destinations, services and segmentation. It does not establish the intended management-plane security behavior described in the scenario.

Real-time applications can fail with adequate average throughput when contention increases delay or jitter; requirement gathering must distinguish traffic classes. Capture application latency, jitter, loss and priority requirements as distinct design constraints. would address critical application traffic profile, but the reported facts instead point to management-plane security. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Create a detailed port, VLAN, power and uplink mapping for implementation—is relevant to low-level port map. Physical installation and initial configuration depend on explicit interface-level intent; ambiguities produce swapped services or accidental trunk exposure. It does not correct the observed management-plane security condition.

That result—Offers from untrusted access ports are dropped and clients receive leases only from the approved DHCP service—concerns unauthorized DHCP server. DHCP snooping restricts untrusted hosts from responding as servers and can help preserve legitimate addressing information on the VLAN. It can be healthy even while the current OSPF prefix advertisement omission problem remains.

This would validate SVI down due to VLAN state, not OSPF prefix advertisement omission. A configured SVI cannot act as the client gateway without operational Layer 2 underlay and correct interface state. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

Routing protocol control packets may be rejected when authentication differs, even if underlying Layer 3 ping succeeds. The indicated result—the neighbor reaches Full and logs no authentication failures after the matched configuration is applied—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required OSPF prefix advertisement omission outcome.

This would validate configuration API idempotence, not NTP clock alignment. An idempotent workflow can be safely retried without proliferating duplicate objects or introducing inconsistent partial configuration. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—A scoped automation token reads intended resources, fails prohibited write operations and is absent from code repositories—concerns REST API authentication boundaries. API access is a privileged operational interface; overbroad or leaked tokens can compromise configuration and monitoring data. It can be healthy even while the current NTP clock alignment problem remains.

Release-specific feature and compatibility constraints can break management or forwarding despite a successful image installation. The indicated result—the approved compatibility matrix and staged test confirm dependent components function on the selected release set—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required NTP clock alignment outcome.

This would validate MAC authentication fallback fault, not IPv6 router-advertisement spoofing. Endpoints without a supported supplicant need a deliberate alternative classification mechanism, not general unrestricted VLAN access. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

Repeated link transitions and frame errors point to Layer 1 quality or negotiation rather than an unseen WLAN authentication issue. The indicated result—the repaired link remains stable under load and physical error counters stop increasing unexpectedly—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required IPv6 router-advertisement spoofing outcome.

That result—The effective device value is traced to its controlling scope and the corrected override restores intended behavior—concerns wrong Central scope override. Scoped configuration precedence can explain isolated divergence; changing the shared profile again can unintentionally impact healthy devices. It can be healthy even while the current IPv6 router-advertisement spoofing problem remains.

The alternative targets central API unauthorized response, where a valid login or token does not imply access to every management resource; 403 generally indicates denied permissions rather than a switch port failure. It does not establish the intended unauthorized DHCP server behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Inspect applied scopes and higher-precedence device overrides for the affected component—is relevant to wrong Central scope override. Scoped configuration precedence can explain isolated divergence; changing the shared profile again can unintentionally impact healthy devices. It does not correct the observed unauthorized DHCP server condition.

EAP-TLS relies on a trusted certificate path; successful network reachability does not bypass expired or unknown issuing authorities. Inspect EAP-TLS certificate trust, validity and identity on both authentication sides. would address EAP-TLS trust-chain failure, but the reported facts instead point to unauthorized DHCP server. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

Uncontrolled Ethernet loops replicate broadcasts and destabilize MAC learning; redundant links require a mechanism to block or logically aggregate unsafe cycles. Keep an appropriate spanning-tree or supported loop-free design across redundant Layer 2 paths. would address spanning-tree loop prevention, but the reported facts instead point to native VLAN alignment. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets corporate EAP-TLS SSID, where EAP-TLS verifies certificate-based identities through the configured authentication system; a shared PSK does not give per-device certificate identity. It does not establish the intended native VLAN alignment behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Enable suitable BPDU protection on ports intended only for endpoints—is relevant to BPDU Guard at edge ports. Edge ports should not accept topology-control messages from unauthorized bridges; BPDU Guard can protect the switching domain by restricting offending links. It does not correct the observed native VLAN alignment condition.

Wireless features depend on the wired uplink and power available to the AP; sufficient coverage does not prove the device is operating at full capacity. The indicated result—AP status confirms full required power mode and negotiated uplink speed without feature restrictions—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required SSID-to-forwarding path consistency outcome.

This would validate dynamic role enforcement, not SSID-to-forwarding path consistency. A RADIUS Access-Accept alone does not prove the switch or gateway applied the intended role policy to user sessions. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—The AP radio state uses legally permitted channels and clients connect under the intended local regulatory settings—concerns AP country-code and RF regulatory setting. Radio operation is constrained by regional rules, and an incorrect country or channel plan can prevent valid operation or break client support. It can be healthy even while the current SSID-to-forwarding path consistency problem remains.

The alternative targets missing default gateway, where traffic bound for other subnets needs a reachable Layer 3 next hop; a functioning local broadcast domain does not provide routing. It does not establish the intended route missing in correct VRF behavior described in the scenario.

Stateful firewalls can drop replies they did not see established; checking only the outbound route misses asymmetric forwarding. Trace both forward and return paths through stateful security boundaries. would address asymmetric path enforcement, but the reported facts instead point to route missing in correct VRF. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Trace DHCP relay, VLAN forwarding and server responses after successful WLAN authentication—is relevant to wireless DHCP failure stage. Client association and 802.1X success occur before address allocation; VLAN or relay faults can prevent DHCP without an RF fault. It does not correct the observed route missing in correct VRF condition.