Management intent, synchronization status and the running device state are distinct; failed changes or local overrides can leave unintended effective configuration. Inspect configuration audit and effective device state rather than assuming an issued change was applied. would address central configuration audit, but the reported facts instead point to central device inventory onboarding. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Assign devices to compatible Central groups or functions before applying shared configurations—is relevant to device group selection. A device must receive intent appropriate to its product family and role; the wrong group or persona can apply unrelated settings or reject configuration. It does not correct the observed central device inventory onboarding condition.

The alternative targets corporate EAP-TLS SSID, where EAP-TLS verifies certificate-based identities through the configured authentication system; a shared PSK does not give per-device certificate identity. It does not establish the intended central device inventory onboarding behavior described in the scenario.

That result—Peak-load tests show better aggregate throughput and fewer collisions with the selected width—concerns WLAN channel-width optimization. Wide channels can improve peak rates per connection yet shrink available channel separation, raising cochannel contention in dense networks. It can be healthy even while the current failure recovery time objective problem remains.

This would validate security-preserving optimization, not failure recovery time objective. A performance gain is not acceptable if it weakens required access boundaries; improvements must meet both service and security acceptance criteria. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

A change may help one metric while degrading another; phased deployment and recovery thresholds protect production service continuity. The indicated result—pilot results meet both targeted improvement and adjacent-service safeguards before broader deployment—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required failure recovery time objective outcome.

That action—Update topology, ownership and change documentation alongside effective network changes—is relevant to topology and documentation currency. Operational documents are useful only when they reflect the running state and its change history; stale diagrams waste troubleshooting effort. It does not correct the observed REST API authentication boundaries condition.

An idempotent workflow can be safely retried without proliferating duplicate objects or introducing inconsistent partial configuration. Design repeatable API updates to check existing state and converge on intended configuration. would address configuration API idempotence, but the reported facts instead point to REST API authentication boundaries. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets access-control change verification, where successful application traffic is only half of policy correctness; overbroad authorization can create exposure while the reported symptom appears resolved. It does not establish the intended REST API authentication boundaries behavior described in the scenario.

If IP connectivity works but hostname access fails, DNS queries, responses or resolver policy may be broken despite healthy network routes. Compare name resolution with direct IP reachability to isolate the DNS dependency. would address DNS mistaken for routing failure, but the reported facts instead point to wrong Central scope override. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets client isolation and peer access, where client isolation can intentionally prevent peer-to-peer wireless communication despite successful association, addressing and external reachability. It does not establish the intended wrong Central scope override behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Trace rule order, matching source/destination and protocol before changing ACL scope—is relevant to ACL deny versus service outage. An ACL can block selected Layer 4 flows while other connectivity remains healthy; removing all controls is an unsafe shortcut. It does not correct the observed wrong Central scope override condition.

This would validate UXI application tests, not topology and documentation currency. Network device health does not establish application experience; end-to-end synthetic tests expose DNS, transport and service delays along the client path. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

An idempotent workflow can be safely retried without proliferating duplicate objects or introducing inconsistent partial configuration. The indicated result—two successive authorized automation runs leave one correct intended configuration and no duplicate managed objects—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required topology and documentation currency outcome.

That result—A controlled test retrieves all expected records and handles pagination or retryable response codes without data loss—concerns API paging and rate limits. Management APIs may return segmented data or throttle callers, so automation must recognize incomplete and transient outcomes instead of silently succeeding. It can be healthy even while the current topology and documentation currency problem remains.

This would validate default-route propagation, not OSPF passive interfaces. A routing protocol's internal adjacency does not guarantee a usable route for unknown destinations; a valid and authorized default egress is needed. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—The active client session displays the correct assigned role and an explicit deny test confirms enforcement—concerns dynamic role enforcement. A RADIUS Access-Accept alone does not prove the switch or gateway applied the intended role policy to user sessions. It can be healthy even while the current OSPF passive interfaces problem remains.

A virtual first-hop gateway provides a stable client next-hop while authorized peers coordinate active forwarding after failure. The indicated result—a peer failure preserves client reachability to the virtual gateway and restores traffic within the approved recovery target—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required OSPF passive interfaces outcome.

The alternative targets unauthorized DHCP server, where DHCP snooping restricts untrusted hosts from responding as servers and can help preserve legitimate addressing information on the VLAN. It does not establish the intended firmware-induced configuration drift behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Trace DHCP relay, VLAN forwarding and server responses after successful WLAN authentication—is relevant to wireless DHCP failure stage. Client association and 802.1X success occur before address allocation; VLAN or relay faults can prevent DHCP without an RF fault. It does not correct the observed firmware-induced configuration drift condition.

A valid login or token does not imply access to every management resource; 403 generally indicates denied permissions rather than a switch port failure. Inspect token scopes and endpoint authorization when the API returns a forbidden response. would address central API unauthorized response, but the reported facts instead point to firmware-induced configuration drift. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle, where EAP-TLS authenticates with certificates, so healthy network transport alone cannot correct absent trust, expired credentials or unmanaged key lifecycle. It does not establish the intended firmware feature-support planning behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Identify shared failure domains and separate critical links, power and devices where feasible—is relevant to failure-domain isolation. Two logical paths do not provide independent availability when they share a single cable route, power supply or upstream component. It does not correct the observed firmware feature-support planning condition.

Management interfaces and privileged control operations need narrower access than ordinary client traffic to reduce compromise and configuration risk. Separate and secure device management access using least privilege and accountable administrator identities. would address management-plane security, but the reported facts instead point to firmware feature-support planning. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets RADIUS service resilience, where identity services become campus availability dependencies; redundant switches cannot authenticate users when all RADIUS paths fail. It does not establish the intended role-based access decisions behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Size DHCP scopes and client subnets against simultaneous address demand and lease behavior—is relevant to address pool capacity. More APs cannot solve exhaustion of the IP-address pool; usable addresses, lease duration and peak devices must be evaluated together. It does not correct the observed role-based access decisions condition.

Product capabilities and configuration syntax depend on supported hardware and software releases; a feature described in another model's guide may be unavailable. Verify platform model, software release and licensed-feature compatibility in the design. would address firmware feature-support planning, but the reported facts instead point to role-based access decisions. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Define explicit identity-to-role and role-to-policy mappings for campus clients—is relevant to role-based access decisions. Successful authentication proves identity; separate authorization decisions determine permitted destinations, services and segmentation. It does not correct the observed campus requirements and acceptance criteria condition.

The alternative targets poE budget planning, where available port count does not establish available power; a switch can have free interfaces while its aggregate PoE budget is exhausted. It does not establish the intended campus requirements and acceptance criteria behavior described in the scenario.

Propagation and attenuation vary with walls, shelving and device environments; a diagram alone cannot establish coverage or service quality. Plan an RF site survey that incorporates floor materials, interference and required client behavior. would address RF survey and building materials, but the reported facts instead point to campus requirements and acceptance criteria. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

Wireless capacity depends on shared airtime and contention as well as signal quality; excessive power can enlarge overlap without adding usable spectrum. Optimize cell sizing, channel reuse and client load distribution for crowded WLAN areas. would address high-density WLAN airtime optimization, but the reported facts instead point to trust and QoS marking boundary. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Configure storm-control thresholds based on observed legitimate broadcast levels and incident risk—is relevant to storm control tuning. Overly aggressive limits can discard necessary discovery traffic, while absent protection permits broadcasts to overwhelm forwarding capacity. It does not correct the observed trust and QoS marking boundary condition.

The alternative targets traffic policing versus shaping, where traffic shaping delays packets to smooth bursts, whereas policing enforces a rate by dropping or remarking nonconforming traffic; operational tradeoffs differ. It does not establish the intended trust and QoS marking boundary behavior described in the scenario.