Wide channels can improve peak rates per connection yet shrink available channel separation, raising cochannel contention in dense networks. Choose channel width that balances individual throughput with channel reuse and interference. would address WLAN channel-width optimization, but the reported facts instead point to channel reuse planning. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets traffic policing versus shaping, where traffic shaping delays packets to smooth bursts, whereas policing enforces a rate by dropping or remarking nonconforming traffic; operational tradeoffs differ. It does not establish the intended channel reuse planning behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Adjust transmit power to balance bidirectional coverage and cell size—is relevant to transmit-power balance. Downlink strength from a powerful AP does not increase client transmit capability; asymmetric links and oversized cells can harm roaming. It does not correct the observed channel reuse planning condition.

DHCP snooping restricts untrusted hosts from responding as servers and can help preserve legitimate addressing information on the VLAN. Apply DHCP snooping with trusted server-facing ports and untrusted client-facing ports. would address unauthorized DHCP server, but the reported facts instead point to wrong Central scope override. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets firmware-induced configuration drift, where successful reboot and version display do not establish that all intended policies and interface behaviors survived the change. It does not establish the intended wrong Central scope override behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Inspect matching route prefixes and prefer the longest matching prefix in path analysis—is relevant to longest-prefix route selection. IP forwarding selects the most specific matching destination prefix before comparing less-specific alternatives; a summary route does not override a more-specific match. It does not correct the observed wrong Central scope override condition.

That action—Define outage constraints, prerequisites, rollback triggers and restoration steps before deployment—is relevant to change-window and rollback requirements. A planned change must include dependencies and a reversible path because a correct configuration can still disrupt business services during transition. It does not correct the observed campus requirements and acceptance criteria condition.

The alternative targets EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle, where EAP-TLS authenticates with certificates, so healthy network transport alone cannot correct absent trust, expired credentials or unmanaged key lifecycle. It does not establish the intended campus requirements and acceptance criteria behavior described in the scenario.

Available port count does not establish available power; a switch can have free interfaces while its aggregate PoE budget is exhausted. Calculate the access-switch PoE budget including device draw and operational headroom. would address poE budget planning, but the reported facts instead point to campus requirements and acceptance criteria. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

Client isolation can intentionally prevent peer-to-peer wireless communication despite successful association, addressing and external reachability. The indicated result—the intended peer-access policy is confirmed and permitted test clients connect while prohibited peers remain isolated—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required wireless DHCP failure stage outcome.

This would validate RADIUS server reachability, not wireless DHCP failure stage. A silent RADIUS transport failure prevents normal authentication regardless of whether the user certificate or role rules are correct. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—The selected RF adjustment reduces retries and busy-channel time without causing new coverage holes—concerns RF interference and retries. Strong signal cannot cure collisions or non-Wi-Fi interference; airtime contention and retransmission consume the shared radio medium. It can be healthy even while the current wireless DHCP failure stage problem remains.

That action—Design cell overlap and roaming characteristics to support application handoff requirements—is relevant to roaming voice coverage overlap. A reliable voice WLAN needs usable signal and timely authentication/roaming behavior between neighboring cells, not maximum isolated AP range. It does not correct the observed 5 GHz regulatory channel constraints condition.

The low-level design should express observable outcomes such as authentication success, endpoint reachability, failover behavior and performance thresholds rather than only equipment names. Translate business requirements into measurable network acceptance criteria before selecting configurations. would address campus requirements and acceptance criteria, but the reported facts instead point to 5 GHz regulatory channel constraints. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets 6 GHz WLAN compatibility, where 6 GHz operation requires capable client hardware and supported regulatory and security settings; enabling the band does not upgrade legacy adapters. It does not establish the intended 5 GHz regulatory channel constraints behavior described in the scenario.

This would validate OSPF prefix advertisement omission, not route missing in correct VRF. A healthy neighbor relationship does not imply every desired route is present; network statements, redistribution and policy can omit a prefix. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

IP forwarding selects the most specific matching destination prefix before comparing less-specific alternatives; a summary route does not override a more-specific match. The indicated result—the forwarding-table lookup identifies the most-specific active prefix and its corresponding next hop for the test address—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required route missing in correct VRF outcome.

That result—The authorized API call succeeds with appropriately scoped access while prohibited operations continue to return denial—concerns central API unauthorized response. A valid login or token does not imply access to every management resource; 403 generally indicates denied permissions rather than a switch port failure. It can be healthy even while the current route missing in correct VRF problem remains.

Subscriber tracking lets a switch direct multicast toward active receivers instead of flooding every port, protecting shared access bandwidth. Enable and validate IGMP-based multicast receiver forwarding where supported. would address multicast traffic scope, but the reported facts instead point to traffic policing versus shaping. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets uplink oversubscription tuning, where access port sum can greatly exceed distribution bandwidth, so congestion and burst tolerance must be planned rather than inferred from port speed labels. It does not establish the intended traffic policing versus shaping behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Adjust supported power or capacity policies according to measured usage while preserving peak service requirements—is relevant to energy and utilization efficiency. Right-sized operation reduces unnecessary resource use, but energy or capacity savings must not remove availability when users actually need the network. It does not correct the observed traffic policing versus shaping condition.

This would validate storm control tuning, not WLAN channel-width optimization. Overly aggressive limits can discard necessary discovery traffic, while absent protection permits broadcasts to overwhelm forwarding capacity. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

Low PHY data rates use more airtime per transmitted bit; rate changes must be constrained by coverage and device support. The indicated result—the pilot shows less management/data airtime overhead while required legacy clients remain supported or have a documented exception—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required WLAN channel-width optimization outcome.

That result—Spectrum observations isolate the interference source and the post-remediation error rate falls measurably—concerns interference spectrum diagnosis. Non-802.11 emitters can occupy channel energy without appearing as normal Wi-Fi neighbors; channel changes or source mitigation need measured evidence. It can be healthy even while the current WLAN channel-width optimization problem remains.

This would validate network asset lifecycle, not REST API authentication boundaries. Stale registrations and credentials introduce operational confusion and potential access risk even when hardware is no longer installed. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—The capture workstation receives the expected test flow and does not inadvertently mirror unrelated sensitive traffic—concerns port mirroring for packet capture. A capture tool sees only frames delivered to it; a correctly scoped mirror copies relevant ingress or egress traffic without changing production forwarding. It can be healthy even while the current REST API authentication boundaries problem remains.

Auditability requires associating control-plane changes with an identity, time, reason and prior state, not just the new value. The indicated result—the change record identifies the actor, approval, before-and-after configuration and affected device scope—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required REST API authentication boundaries outcome.

This would validate VLAN and subnet segmentation, not change-risk classification. Separate segments help control broadcast reachability and policy scope; a VLAN label alone is not an authorization policy. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

Identity services become campus availability dependencies; redundant switches cannot authenticate users when all RADIUS paths fail. The indicated result—a controlled AAA failover test confirms appropriate continued or restricted access under the documented policy—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required change-risk classification outcome.

That result—The identity design includes certificate enrollment, renewal, revocation and a successful mutual-trust authentication test—concerns EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle. EAP-TLS authenticates with certificates, so healthy network transport alone cannot correct absent trust, expired credentials or unmanaged key lifecycle. It can be healthy even while the current change-risk classification problem remains.

That action—Select the correct device function/persona when assigning New Central configuration profiles—is relevant to new Central persona applicability. Configuration applies according to supported device function as well as scope, so a role mismatch can prevent intended policy from being deployed. It does not correct the observed AP country-code and RF regulatory setting condition.

The alternative targets BPDU Guard at edge ports, where edge ports should not accept topology-control messages from unauthorized bridges; BPDU Guard can protect the switching domain by restricting offending links. It does not establish the intended AP country-code and RF regulatory setting behavior described in the scenario.

Management intent, synchronization status and the running device state are distinct; failed changes or local overrides can leave unintended effective configuration. Inspect configuration audit and effective device state rather than assuming an issued change was applied. would address central configuration audit, but the reported facts instead point to AP country-code and RF regulatory setting. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.