This would validate RADIUS accounting versus authorization, not longest-prefix route selection. Authentication and authorization can work while accounting packets are missing; reliable session tracking needs the additional accounting path. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—The correct VRF has an installed destination route and permitted traffic uses the intended next hop—concerns route missing in correct VRF. Separate VRFs maintain distinct forwarding information bases; routes visible in one context do not automatically apply in another. It can be healthy even while the current longest-prefix route selection problem remains.

Traffic bound for other subnets needs a reachable Layer 3 next hop; a functioning local broadcast domain does not provide routing. The indicated result—the client ARPs or resolves the correct first hop and successfully reaches an approved remote subnet—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required longest-prefix route selection outcome.

This would validate new Central scoped inheritance, not classic Central site versus group. New Central includes global, collection, site and device scopes; more specific applicable configuration can override broader inherited values. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—The intended device has an active default route toward the approved security edge and external test traffic uses it—concerns default-route propagation. A routing protocol's internal adjacency does not guarantee a usable route for unknown destinations; a valid and authorized default egress is needed. It can be healthy even while the current classic Central site versus group problem remains.

Central enrollment requires correctly routed and resolved management traffic; a working user VLAN does not guarantee reachability of the management plane. The indicated result—management endpoint resolution and permitted connectivity tests succeed and the device subsequently establishes cloud management—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required classic Central site versus group outcome.

Routes and interfaces are looked up within the relevant VRF; a default route in a different table cannot repair a missing path. Place the SVI and required routes in the correct VRF routing context. would address VRF route-context configuration, but the reported facts instead point to DHCP relay on routed segments. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets guest captive-portal flow, where association and address assignment alone cannot enforce guest registration or policy acceptance; the portal and post-login role must be connected. It does not establish the intended DHCP relay on routed segments behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Assign the correct access VLAN and verify the port's effective untagged membership—is relevant to access port VLAN membership. Client frames received untagged are placed in the port's access VLAN; a healthy physical link cannot compensate for wrong Layer 2 membership. It does not correct the observed DHCP relay on routed segments condition.

Mismatched physical link parameters can create collisions or errors despite a link-up status, so higher-layer policy changes cannot repair them. The indicated result—both interfaces report compatible negotiated parameters and throughput tests show no related error growth—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required ACL deny versus service outage outcome.

This would validate MAC authentication fallback fault, not ACL deny versus service outage. Endpoints without a supported supplicant need a deliberate alternative classification mechanism, not general unrestricted VLAN access. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—Offers from untrusted access ports are dropped and clients receive leases only from the approved DHCP service—concerns unauthorized DHCP server. DHCP snooping restricts untrusted hosts from responding as servers and can help preserve legitimate addressing information on the VLAN. It can be healthy even while the current ACL deny versus service outage problem remains.

A functional hierarchy clarifies where endpoints attach, where traffic aggregates and where policy or Layer 3 boundaries belong. The indicated result—the low-level topology labels uplink capacity, device roles, VLAN boundaries and redundant forwarding paths—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required dual-homed downstream aggregation outcome.

That result—The resiliency checklist documents independent components and demonstrates recovery from each designated single failure—concerns failure-domain isolation. Two logical paths do not provide independent availability when they share a single cable route, power supply or upstream component. It can be healthy even while the current dual-homed downstream aggregation problem remains.

This would validate EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle, not dual-homed downstream aggregation. EAP-TLS authenticates with certificates, so healthy network transport alone cannot correct absent trust, expired credentials or unmanaged key lifecycle. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

This would validate central configuration audit, not template variable rendering. Management intent, synchronization status and the running device state are distinct; failed changes or local overrides can leave unintended effective configuration. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—A first-time visitor is presented the expected portal and gains only the approved access after completing it—concerns guest captive-portal flow. Association and address assignment alone cannot enforce guest registration or policy acceptance; the portal and post-login role must be connected. It can be healthy even while the current template variable rendering problem remains.

A device must receive intent appropriate to its product family and role; the wrong group or persona can apply unrelated settings or reject configuration. The indicated result—the provisioned device reports the intended group and compatible configuration with no unaddressed sync errors—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required template variable rendering outcome.

The alternative targets LACP bundled links, where aggregated links require compatible control and interface parameters; mismatched LACP or VLAN settings can prevent members from joining. It does not establish the intended DHCP relay on routed segments behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Configure and verify explicit VSX synchronization for supported shared features while managing independent settings separately—is relevant to VSX peer synchronization. VSX peers retain independent control planes and only designated supported feature sets synchronize; unchecked settings may diverge. It does not correct the observed DHCP relay on routed segments condition.

Uncontrolled Ethernet loops replicate broadcasts and destabilize MAC learning; redundant links require a mechanism to block or logically aggregate unsafe cycles. Keep an appropriate spanning-tree or supported loop-free design across redundant Layer 2 paths. would address spanning-tree loop prevention, but the reported facts instead point to DHCP relay on routed segments. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets new Central scoped inheritance, where new Central includes global, collection, site and device scopes; more specific applicable configuration can override broader inherited values. It does not establish the intended gateway role deployment behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Supply and verify unique per-device variables before applying a reusable provisioning template—is relevant to template variable rendering. Shared templates are reusable only when site-specific identity, address and port data are correctly substituted for each target device. It does not correct the observed gateway role deployment condition.

IGMP membership information lets switches constrain Layer 2 multicast distribution instead of flooding traffic indiscriminately. Enable appropriate IGMP snooping and multicast forwarding behavior for subscriber VLANs. would address multicast receiver handling, but the reported facts instead point to gateway role deployment. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Apply appropriate queue scheduling for delay-sensitive traffic at the congested interface—is relevant to voice queuing under load. QoS can prioritize selected packets when contention occurs but cannot create bandwidth; correct queue treatment reduces latency for critical applications. It does not correct the observed baseline before optimization condition.

The alternative targets periodic baseline refresh, where a fixed historical baseline can become misleading as workload mix and client capability change; thresholds should reflect current accepted operating conditions. It does not establish the intended baseline before optimization behavior described in the scenario.

A performance gain is not acceptable if it weakens required access boundaries; improvements must meet both service and security acceptance criteria. Retain mandatory authorization and segmentation controls while optimizing forwarding or QoS. would address security-preserving optimization, but the reported facts instead point to baseline before optimization. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That result—Test rogue advertisements are blocked while approved router advertisements continue to reach clients—concerns IPv6 router-advertisement spoofing. IPv4 ARP safeguards do not inspect ICMPv6 router announcements; RA protection constrains unauthorized router information on client segments. It can be healthy even while the current unauthorized DHCP server problem remains.

Mismatched physical link parameters can create collisions or errors despite a link-up status, so higher-layer policy changes cannot repair them. The indicated result—both interfaces report compatible negotiated parameters and throughput tests show no related error growth—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required unauthorized DHCP server outcome.

This would validate RADIUS accounting versus authorization, not unauthorized DHCP server. Authentication and authorization can work while accounting packets are missing; reliable session tracking needs the additional accounting path. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

Traffic bound for other subnets needs a reachable Layer 3 next hop; a functioning local broadcast domain does not provide routing. Verify the endpoint's default gateway and local first-hop reachability. would address missing default gateway, but the reported facts instead point to OSPF authentication mismatch. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets access VLAN misassignment, where the VLAN used for an untagged or dynamically authorized session determines its broadcast and DHCP context; physical link state is not enough. It does not establish the intended OSPF authentication mismatch behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Check VLAN operational state and active interface membership when an SVI is down—is relevant to SVI down due to VLAN state. A configured SVI cannot act as the client gateway without operational Layer 2 underlay and correct interface state. It does not correct the observed OSPF authentication mismatch condition.