Overly aggressive limits can discard necessary discovery traffic, while absent protection permits broadcasts to overwhelm forwarding capacity. Configure storm-control thresholds based on observed legitimate broadcast levels and incident risk. would address storm control tuning, but the reported facts instead point to voice queuing under load. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets uplink oversubscription tuning, where access port sum can greatly exceed distribution bandwidth, so congestion and burst tolerance must be planned rather than inferred from port speed labels. It does not establish the intended voice queuing under load behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Adjust transmit power to balance bidirectional coverage and cell size—is relevant to transmit-power balance. Downlink strength from a powerful AP does not increase client transmit capability; asymmetric links and oversized cells can harm roaming. It does not correct the observed voice queuing under load condition.

LACP only selects compatible links for aggregation; forcing an incompatible member can create unexpected hashing or forwarding behavior. The indicated result—the bundle shows all intended collecting/distributing members with consistent partner and interface parameters—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required MAC learning and unintended loops outcome.

That result—RADIUS requests and responses traverse the approved path and the client reaches its intended authorized role—concerns RADIUS server reachability. A silent RADIUS transport failure prevents normal authentication regardless of whether the user certificate or role rules are correct. It can be healthy even while the current MAC learning and unintended loops problem remains.

This would validate power-over-Ethernet failure, not MAC learning and unintended loops. A data VLAN or management group cannot correct a switch power budget that denies the PD enough electrical power. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

The alternative targets BPDU Guard at edge ports, where edge ports should not accept topology-control messages from unauthorized bridges; BPDU Guard can protect the switching domain by restricting offending links. It does not establish the intended access port VLAN membership behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Enable wired 802.1X port-access control with the intended authentication and fallback policy—is relevant to wired 802.1X port control. An AAA server cannot enforce identity on a port whose access-control mechanism is disabled; unauthorized endpoints must receive a restricted result. It does not correct the observed access port VLAN membership condition.

A route must identify the desired prefix and a valid forwarding path; a configured but unresolved next hop does not deliver packets. Install a destination route with a reachable next hop or appropriate outgoing interface. would address static route and next-hop reachability, but the reported facts instead point to access port VLAN membership. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Check VLAN operational state and active interface membership when an SVI is down—is relevant to SVI down due to VLAN state. A configured SVI cannot act as the client gateway without operational Layer 2 underlay and correct interface state. It does not correct the observed route missing in correct VRF condition.

The alternative targets OSPF prefix advertisement omission, where a healthy neighbor relationship does not imply every desired route is present; network statements, redistribution and policy can omit a prefix. It does not establish the intended route missing in correct VRF behavior described in the scenario.

A correctly blocked path may be essential loop prevention; unblocking without analyzing topology can trigger broadcasts and MAC instability. Inspect STP port roles and topology before overriding a blocked redundant link. would address spanning-tree blocked forwarding, but the reported facts instead point to route missing in correct VRF. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

This would validate central API unauthorized response, not roaming reassociation delay. A valid login or token does not imply access to every management resource; 403 generally indicates denied permissions rather than a switch port failure. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

A silent RADIUS transport failure prevents normal authentication regardless of whether the user certificate or role rules are correct. The indicated result—RADIUS requests and responses traverse the approved path and the client reaches its intended authorized role—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required roaming reassociation delay outcome.

That result—The intended radio advertises the configured SSID on a permitted channel visible to supported test clients—concerns AP radio disabled or unsupported channel. Cloud device online status does not prove every radio is active or that target clients can discover the selected channel. It can be healthy even while the current roaming reassociation delay problem remains.

The alternative targets periodic baseline refresh, where a fixed historical baseline can become misleading as workload mix and client capability change; thresholds should reflect current accepted operating conditions. It does not establish the intended energy and utilization efficiency behavior described in the scenario.

A change may help one metric while degrading another; phased deployment and recovery thresholds protect production service continuity. Pilot optimization with measurable success criteria and a tested rollback condition. would address optimization with rollback, but the reported facts instead point to energy and utilization efficiency. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Apply appropriate queue scheduling for delay-sensitive traffic at the congested interface—is relevant to voice queuing under load. QoS can prioritize selected packets when contention occurs but cannot create bandwidth; correct queue treatment reduces latency for critical applications. It does not correct the observed energy and utilization efficiency condition.

API access is a privileged operational interface; overbroad or leaked tokens can compromise configuration and monitoring data. The indicated result—a scoped automation token reads intended resources, fails prohibited write operations and is absent from code repositories—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required configuration backup before changes outcome.

This would validate change freeze and backout criteria, not configuration backup before changes. Recovery decisions based on elapsed time and service impact are more reliable than an operator's improvised judgment under incident pressure. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—Approved managed and denied test identities produce expected authorization outcomes before wider AAA rollout—concerns AAA change coordination. Identity changes impact access before network routing tests can begin; testing distinct client classes limits unintended lockouts. It can be healthy even while the current configuration backup before changes problem remains.

This would validate coverage versus capacity tradeoff, not high-density channel-width choice. A higher RSSI does not remove contention; channel planning, cell sizing and client density are needed to increase effective capacity. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

Available port count does not establish available power; a switch can have free interfaces while its aggregate PoE budget is exhausted. The indicated result—the bill of materials and live PoE telemetry show that all expected powered endpoints fit within supported budget limits—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required high-density channel-width choice outcome.

That result—RF survey measurements show the desired coverage footprint and acceptable interference outside the targeted zone—concerns directional antenna selection. Directional gain shapes energy into target areas and can reduce unwanted spill, but a poorly aimed directional antenna creates coverage holes elsewhere. It can be healthy even while the current high-density channel-width choice problem remains.

This would validate default-route propagation, not OSPF passive interfaces. A routing protocol's internal adjacency does not guarantee a usable route for unknown destinations; a valid and authorized default egress is needed. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

A route must identify the desired prefix and a valid forwarding path; a configured but unresolved next hop does not deliver packets. The indicated result—the switch routing table selects the intended prefix and traffic reaches the remote subnet over the verified next hop—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required OSPF passive interfaces outcome.

That result—Both routers report a stable Full neighbor state and the intended routes appear in the correct routing table—concerns OSPF adjacency prerequisites. OSPF adjacency depends on compatible peer parameters and reachable interfaces; a live link is insufficient when control-plane settings disagree. It can be healthy even while the current OSPF passive interfaces problem remains.

RADIUS exchanges rely on correctly configured shared secrets and client definitions; basic IP reachability does not establish a valid AAA relationship. Match the network access device's RADIUS client settings and shared secret to the authorized server definition. would address RADIUS shared-secret consistency, but the reported facts instead point to VSX peer synchronization. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets OSPF adjacency prerequisites, where OSPF adjacency depends on compatible peer parameters and reachable interfaces; a live link is insufficient when control-plane settings disagree. It does not establish the intended VSX peer synchronization behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Use OSPF passive-interface behavior on endpoint-facing networks that need no routing neighbors—is relevant to OSPF passive interfaces. A passive interface can advertise its connected prefix through the process while avoiding unwanted OSPF hello exchanges toward endpoints. It does not correct the observed VSX peer synchronization condition.

This would validate syslog event centralization, not firmware compatibility dependency. Centralized time-stamped records preserve context for multi-device analysis and avoid relying on volatile local event buffers. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

Healthy RF and RADIUS reachability cannot compensate for an expired or untrusted certificate that fails the authentication handshake. The indicated result—certificate inventory and alerts show sufficient renewal lead time and successful test authentication after renewal—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required firmware compatibility dependency outcome.

That result—Approved managed and denied test identities produce expected authorization outcomes before wider AAA rollout—concerns AAA change coordination. Identity changes impact access before network routing tests can begin; testing distinct client classes limits unintended lockouts. It can be healthy even while the current firmware compatibility dependency problem remains.