JN0-364 Premium File
- 69 Questions & Answers
- Last Update: Nov 4, 2026
Before changing configuration at Silverpeak Data Networks, an engineer investigates: A provider turns on ECMP routing but the forwarding table still resolves customer flows to just one path and operators mistake RIB entries for per-flow distribution. Which first diagnostic most directly tests the suspected cause?
Inspect route next-hop eligibility and the forwarding-table route for that prefix, then check the load-balancing policy and counters per next hop. Equal routes in a control-plane table alone do not prove forwarding-plane hashing or path sharing is active.
That evidence could be normal while the reported defect persists. It is aimed at: Two wholesale customers use overlapping IPv4 ranges and route lookups occur in the default table, causing one tenant's prefix to shadow the other's. Instead inspect: Inspect route next-hop eligibility and the forwarding-table route for that prefix, then check the load-balancing policy and counters per next hop.
The check diagnoses a different layer of service. Its source issue is: A provider aggregate continues to be advertised when an operator assumes that any configured aggregate is independent of contributing routes, and wants to validate how the summary activates. The relevant initial check is: Inspect route next-hop eligibility and the forwarding-table route for that prefix, then check the load-balancing policy and counters per next hop.
This check may help with another root cause, for example: A routing policy change appears to accept a reserved loopback or multicast source as an ordinary Internet destination, and the team needs to separate policy bugs from invalid route treatment. It does not test the first failed condition; start with: Inspect route next-hop eligibility and the forwarding-table route for that prefix, then check the load-balancing policy and counters per next hop.
At Cloverbank Mobile, a service provider router shows this failure: A packet class identified by source address needs to use a dedicated service routing table, but packets still follow the global destination-based path. What is the best targeted configuration or operations action?
The other action is relevant when Traffic to one equal-cost destination uses only a single next hop despite two active parallel paths and an approved traffic-sharing requirement. The current case instead requires: Build a narrowly matched firewall filter that selects the intended forwarding routing instance and verify the target instance has the necessary route and next-hop resolution. The distinction is: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
That would address a separate configuration fault: A service edge was renumbered and its manually configured static next hop still points to the former address, blackholing one customer subnet despite healthy dynamic adjacencies. This stem identifies a different cause, corrected by: Build a narrowly matched firewall filter that selects the intended forwarding routing instance and verify the target instance has the necessary route and next-hop resolution.
This action may apply to a different problem, for example: Two wholesale customers use overlapping IPv4 ranges and route lookups occur in the default table, causing one tenant's prefix to shadow the other's. It does not repair the stated failure boundary. The case-specific reason is: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
Build a narrowly matched firewall filter that selects the intended forwarding routing instance and verify the target instance has the necessary route and next-hop resolution. The case-specific reason is: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route. A direct acceptance test is: Only packets matching the defined steering terms are looked up in the intended forwarding table; nonmatching traffic stays on the default path.
A change auditor at Cloverbank Mobile must validate remediation of this finding: A packet class identified by source address needs to use a dedicated service routing table, but packets still follow the global destination-based path. Which test outcome is the strongest acceptance evidence?
The observation confirms a different component's behavior. Its source context is: A maintenance circuit has been retired but an old static route still directs a private customer prefix toward its unresponsive next hop, even while a learned backup route exists. In this case the success criterion is: Only packets matching the defined steering terms are looked up in the intended forwarding table; nonmatching traffic stays on the default path.
That check proves something else, such as: A provider turns on ECMP routing but the forwarding table still resolves customer flows to just one path and operators mistake RIB entries for per-flow distribution. It could pass while the stated problem remains. The targeted evidence here is: Only packets matching the defined steering terms are looked up in the intended forwarding table; nonmatching traffic stays on the default path.
This would be valid for another situation: A static route and OSPF route cover the identical prefix; the active path is the static one even though the team expected OSPF to win. It does not establish that the failing boundary in this scenario works; verify: Only packets matching the defined steering terms are looked up in the intended forwarding table; nonmatching traffic stays on the default path.
Only packets matching the defined steering terms are looked up in the intended forwarding table; nonmatching traffic stays on the default path. A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
The operations training team at Cloverbank Mobile discusses this issue: A packet class identified by source address needs to use a dedicated service routing table, but packets still follow the global destination-based path. Which technical explanation matches the intended correction?
Filter-based forwarding applies a routing-instance lookup decision based on a firewall filter rather than relying only on the ordinary destination table. The key distinction is: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route. Accordingly the remedy is: Build a narrowly matched firewall filter that selects the intended forwarding routing instance and verify the target instance has the necessary route and next-hop resolution.
The statement can be true when A services router has a valid connected path in the primary instance yet a policy-dependent secondary RIB never receives it after a routing-instance refactor. But it does not explain the reported failure. Here: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
That principle belongs to a different service stage: A static route and OSPF route cover the identical prefix; the active path is the static one even though the team expected OSPF to win. The directly relevant mechanism is: Filter-based forwarding applies a routing-instance lookup decision based on a firewall filter rather than relying only on the ordinary destination table.
This explains a separate protocol behavior: A provider turns on ECMP routing but the forwarding table still resolves customer flows to just one path and operators mistake RIB entries for per-flow distribution. In the current facts, the controlling mechanism is: Filter-based forwarding applies a routing-instance lookup decision based on a firewall filter rather than relying only on the ordinary destination table.
At Cloverbank Mobile, a service acceptance review considers the unresolved issue: A packet class identified by source address needs to use a dedicated service routing table, but packets still follow the global destination-based path. Which operational exposure follows most directly?
Traffic can bypass the required service path or reach a routing instance with no usable route, creating policy bypass or a blackhole. The direct mitigation is: Build a narrowly matched firewall filter that selects the intended forwarding routing instance and verify the target instance has the necessary route and next-hop resolution.
The concern could occur elsewhere when A services router has a valid connected path in the primary instance yet a policy-dependent secondary RIB never receives it after a routing-instance refactor. For the stated scenario, the immediate risk is: Traffic can bypass the required service path or reach a routing instance with no usable route, creating policy bypass or a blackhole.
That consequence is more closely associated with another deficiency, such as: A static route and OSPF route cover the identical prefix; the active path is the static one even though the team expected OSPF to win. The described fault instead exposes: Traffic can bypass the required service path or reach a routing instance with no usable route, creating policy bypass or a blackhole.
It is a risk in another topology or protocol state: A provider migrates a service into a separate virtual routing instance but tests only inet.0 and falsely concludes that the tenant route is absent. Here the most direct failure path is: Traffic can bypass the required service path or reach a routing instance with no usable route, creating policy bypass or a blackhole.
Before changing configuration at Cloverbank Mobile, an engineer investigates: A packet class identified by source address needs to use a dedicated service routing table, but packets still follow the global destination-based path. Which first diagnostic most directly tests the suspected cause?
The check diagnoses a different layer of service. Its source issue is: Two wholesale customers use overlapping IPv4 ranges and route lookups occur in the default table, causing one tenant's prefix to shadow the other's. The relevant initial check is: Verify filter term counters and `then routing-instance`, ingress placement, and a matching route plus resolved next hop in the target table.
This check may help with another root cause, for example: A services router has a valid connected path in the primary instance yet a policy-dependent secondary RIB never receives it after a routing-instance refactor. It does not test the first failed condition; start with: Verify filter term counters and `then routing-instance`, ingress placement, and a matching route plus resolved next hop in the target table.
Verify filter term counters and `then routing-instance`, ingress placement, and a matching route plus resolved next hop in the target table. A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
The check diagnoses a different layer of service. Its source issue is: An operations runbook treats discard and reject forwarding actions as interchangeable and fails to explain the expected behavior for unmatched packets. The relevant initial check is: Verify filter term counters and `then routing-instance`, ingress placement, and a matching route plus resolved next hop in the target table.
During a Junos network change at Redleaf Airports, the engineer observes: A provider's firewall filter counts customer steering matches yet tagged traffic goes to the ordinary next hop because the `then routing-instance` forwarding path was not verified. Which remediation most directly fixes the described problem?
This action may apply to a different problem, for example: A provider migrates a service into a separate virtual routing instance but tests only inet.0 and falsely concludes that the tenant route is absent. It does not repair the stated failure boundary. The case-specific reason is: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
The other action is relevant when A provider intends a protective summary for address space with sparse more-specific destinations but needs unmatched traffic to be dropped predictably rather than looped. The current case instead requires: Build a narrowly matched firewall filter that selects the intended forwarding routing instance and verify the target instance has the necessary route and next-hop resolution. The distinction is: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
Build a narrowly matched firewall filter that selects the intended forwarding routing instance and verify the target instance has the necessary route and next-hop resolution. The case-specific reason is: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route. A direct acceptance test is: Only packets matching the defined steering terms are looked up in the intended forwarding table; nonmatching traffic stays on the default path.
This action may apply to a different problem, for example: An edge advertises dozens of customer-specific routes instead of the intended summary, and the operations team wants to reduce external route-table size without creating an unsupported more-specific next hop. It does not repair the stated failure boundary. The case-specific reason is: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
The Junos team at Redleaf Airports needs a success criterion for this defect: A provider's firewall filter counts customer steering matches yet tagged traffic goes to the ordinary next hop because the `then routing-instance` forwarding path was not verified. Which observed result most precisely confirms the intended repair?
This would be valid for another situation: Two route sources advertise an identical subnet; engineers compare IGP metric values while ignoring Junos inter-protocol preference. It does not establish that the failing boundary in this scenario works; verify: Only packets matching the defined steering terms are looked up in the intended forwarding table; nonmatching traffic stays on the default path.
Only packets matching the defined steering terms are looked up in the intended forwarding table; nonmatching traffic stays on the default path. A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
That check proves something else, such as: An operations runbook treats discard and reject forwarding actions as interchangeable and fails to explain the expected behavior for unmatched packets. It could pass while the stated problem remains. The targeted evidence here is: Only packets matching the defined steering terms are looked up in the intended forwarding table; nonmatching traffic stays on the default path.
This would be valid for another situation: Two wholesale customers use overlapping IPv4 ranges and route lookups occur in the default table, causing one tenant's prefix to shadow the other's. It does not establish that the failing boundary in this scenario works; verify: Only packets matching the defined steering terms are looked up in the intended forwarding table; nonmatching traffic stays on the default path.
While analyzing a service failure at Redleaf Airports, the following is observed: A provider's firewall filter counts customer steering matches yet tagged traffic goes to the ordinary next hop because the `then routing-instance` forwarding path was not verified. Which mechanism best explains the underlying control-plane or forwarding behavior?
Filter-based forwarding applies a routing-instance lookup decision based on a firewall filter rather than relying only on the ordinary destination table. The key distinction is: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route. Accordingly the remedy is: Build a narrowly matched firewall filter that selects the intended forwarding routing instance and verify the target instance has the necessary route and next-hop resolution.
This explains a separate protocol behavior: A routing policy change appears to accept a reserved loopback or multicast source as an ordinary Internet destination, and the team needs to separate policy bugs from invalid route treatment. In the current facts, the controlling mechanism is: Filter-based forwarding applies a routing-instance lookup decision based on a firewall filter rather than relying only on the ordinary destination table.
The statement can be true when A provider turns on ECMP routing but the forwarding table still resolves customer flows to just one path and operators mistake RIB entries for per-flow distribution. But it does not explain the reported failure. Here: A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
That principle belongs to a different service stage: Two wholesale customers use overlapping IPv4 ranges and route lookups occur in the default table, causing one tenant's prefix to shadow the other's. The directly relevant mechanism is: Filter-based forwarding applies a routing-instance lookup decision based on a firewall filter rather than relying only on the ordinary destination table.
The following provider defect remains uncorrected at Redleaf Airports: A provider's firewall filter counts customer steering matches yet tagged traffic goes to the ordinary next hop because the `then routing-instance` forwarding path was not verified. What is the most direct service or security risk of leaving it unresolved?
That consequence is more closely associated with another deficiency, such as: A provider aggregate continues to be advertised when an operator assumes that any configured aggregate is independent of contributing routes, and wants to validate how the summary activates. The described fault instead exposes: Traffic can bypass the required service path or reach a routing instance with no usable route, creating policy bypass or a blackhole.
Traffic can bypass the required service path or reach a routing instance with no usable route, creating policy bypass or a blackhole. The direct mitigation is: Build a narrowly matched firewall filter that selects the intended forwarding routing instance and verify the target instance has the necessary route and next-hop resolution.
The concern could occur elsewhere when A provider migrates a service into a separate virtual routing instance but tests only inet.0 and falsely concludes that the tenant route is absent. For the stated scenario, the immediate risk is: Traffic can bypass the required service path or reach a routing instance with no usable route, creating policy bypass or a blackhole.
That consequence is more closely associated with another deficiency, such as: A maintenance circuit has been retired but an old static route still directs a private customer prefix toward its unresponsive next hop, even while a learned backup route exists. The described fault instead exposes: Traffic can bypass the required service path or reach a routing instance with no usable route, creating policy bypass or a blackhole.
A support escalation at Redleaf Airports describes: A provider's firewall filter counts customer steering matches yet tagged traffic goes to the ordinary next hop because the `then routing-instance` forwarding path was not verified. Where should the Junos operator look first for decisive evidence?
Verify filter term counters and `then routing-instance`, ingress placement, and a matching route plus resolved next hop in the target table. A filter counter increment does not show that the forwarding lookup moved into the correct table and found a viable route.
The check diagnoses a different layer of service. Its source issue is: A provider intends a protective summary for address space with sparse more-specific destinations but needs unmatched traffic to be dropped predictably rather than looped. The relevant initial check is: Verify filter term counters and `then routing-instance`, ingress placement, and a matching route plus resolved next hop in the target table.
This check may help with another root cause, for example: A provider aggregate continues to be advertised when an operator assumes that any configured aggregate is independent of contributing routes, and wants to validate how the summary activates. It does not test the first failed condition; start with: Verify filter term counters and `then routing-instance`, ingress placement, and a matching route plus resolved next hop in the target table.
That evidence could be normal while the reported defect persists. It is aimed at: A static route and OSPF route cover the identical prefix; the active path is the static one even though the team expected OSPF to win. Instead inspect: Verify filter term counters and `then routing-instance`, ingress placement, and a matching route plus resolved next hop in the target table.
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