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Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) JN0-650 Practice Test 14

Question 130

An EBGP peer unexpectedly rejects local advertisements after the enterprise appends its own AS number twice in an outbound policy. The proposed correction is: Inspect AS-path contents and the remote peer's loop prevention policy for repeated local AS entries. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?

  1. The next hop resolves and the received BGP prefix becomes eligible for active selection.
  2. The accepted received AS path no longer violates the intended AS-loop policy at the upstream peer.
  3. The remote AS sees the intended additional AS hops and its chosen inbound path changes where policy permits.
  4. The downstream IBGP client learns the intended route without creating an unintended loop.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The accepted received AS path no longer violates the intended AS-loop policy at the upstream peer. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: An EBGP peer unexpectedly rejects local advertisements after the enterprise appends its own AS number twice in an outbound policy. The mechanism being validated is: BGP AS-path records traversed autonomous systems and supports AS-loop detection.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The next hop resolves and the received BGP prefix becomes eligible for active selection. That would validate a different condition: A route from an EBGP peer shows a valid next-hop address that cannot be resolved to any active transport route. The decisive check for the current issue is: The accepted received AS path no longer violates the intended AS-loop policy at the upstream peer.

C:

The remote AS sees the intended additional AS hops and its chosen inbound path changes where policy permits. That would validate a different condition: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. The decisive check for the current issue is: The accepted received AS path no longer violates the intended AS-loop policy at the upstream peer.

D:

The downstream IBGP client learns the intended route without creating an unintended loop. That would validate a different condition: An IBGP router fails to advertise a route received from one IBGP peer to another IBGP peer in a non-route-reflected full mesh gap. The decisive check for the current issue is: The accepted received AS path no longer violates the intended AS-loop policy at the upstream peer.

Question 131

A Junos engineer proposes this response: Inspect AS-path contents and the remote peer's loop prevention policy for repeated local AS entries. The situation is: An EBGP peer unexpectedly rejects local advertisements after the enterprise appends its own AS number twice in an outbound policy. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?

  1. BGP next-hop reachability must be established before a route can be used for forwarding.
  2. AS-path prepending can influence remote path choice but does not guarantee it overrides remote local preference.
  3. BGP AS-path records traversed autonomous systems and supports AS-loop detection.
  4. IBGP split-horizon advertisement rules prevent ordinary IBGP-to-IBGP readvertisement without reflection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

BGP AS-path records traversed autonomous systems and supports AS-loop detection. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: An EBGP peer unexpectedly rejects local advertisements after the enterprise appends its own AS number twice in an outbound policy. It predicts the acceptance result: The accepted received AS path no longer violates the intended AS-loop policy at the upstream peer.

Incorrect Answers

A:

BGP next-hop reachability must be established before a route can be used for forwarding. This principle explains a separate situation: A route from an EBGP peer shows a valid next-hop address that cannot be resolved to any active transport route. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: BGP AS-path records traversed autonomous systems and supports AS-loop detection.

B:

AS-path prepending can influence remote path choice but does not guarantee it overrides remote local preference. This principle explains a separate situation: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: BGP AS-path records traversed autonomous systems and supports AS-loop detection.

D:

IBGP split-horizon advertisement rules prevent ordinary IBGP-to-IBGP readvertisement without reflection. This principle explains a separate situation: An IBGP router fails to advertise a route received from one IBGP peer to another IBGP peer in a non-route-reflected full mesh gap. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: BGP AS-path records traversed autonomous systems and supports AS-loop detection.

Question 132

An EBGP peer unexpectedly rejects local advertisements after the enterprise appends its own AS number twice in an outbound policy. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Inspect AS-path contents and the remote peer's loop prevention policy for repeated local AS entries.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?

  1. A high-preference route with an unreachable next hop cannot become a viable forwarding path.
  2. Assuming prepending always wins can leave traffic using the undesired upstream during congestion.
  3. Assuming IBGP is transitive through any intermediate speaker can strand learned prefixes.
  4. Careless prepending that introduces the recipient's own AS can cause an advertised route to be rejected.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Careless prepending that introduces the recipient's own AS can cause an advertised route to be rejected. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: An EBGP peer unexpectedly rejects local advertisements after the enterprise appends its own AS number twice in an outbound policy. It is prevented by: Inspect AS-path contents and the remote peer's loop prevention policy for repeated local AS entries. The underlying reason is: BGP AS-path records traversed autonomous systems and supports AS-loop detection.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A high-preference route with an unreachable next hop cannot become a viable forwarding path. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A route from an EBGP peer shows a valid next-hop address that cannot be resolved to any active transport route. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Careless prepending that introduces the recipient's own AS can cause an advertised route to be rejected. The appropriate mitigation is: Inspect AS-path contents and the remote peer's loop prevention policy for repeated local AS entries.

B:

Assuming prepending always wins can leave traffic using the undesired upstream during congestion. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Careless prepending that introduces the recipient's own AS can cause an advertised route to be rejected. The appropriate mitigation is: Inspect AS-path contents and the remote peer's loop prevention policy for repeated local AS entries.

C:

Assuming IBGP is transitive through any intermediate speaker can strand learned prefixes. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: An IBGP router fails to advertise a route received from one IBGP peer to another IBGP peer in a non-route-reflected full mesh gap. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Careless prepending that introduces the recipient's own AS can cause an advertised route to be rejected. The appropriate mitigation is: Inspect AS-path contents and the remote peer's loop prevention policy for repeated local AS entries.

Question 133

The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. Which targeted engineering change is MOST directly justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Assign a higher local preference to the primary ISP routes at ingress and propagate it internally.
  2. Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer.
  3. Inspect AS-path contents and the remote peer's loop prevention policy for repeated local AS entries.
  4. Confirm the appropriate family and community propagation settings on the BGP peering path.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer. This change specifically addresses the reported evidence: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. The relevant protocol mechanism is: AS-path prepending can influence remote path choice but does not guarantee it overrides remote local preference. A decisive acceptance test would be: The remote AS sees the intended additional AS hops and its chosen inbound path changes where policy permits.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assign a higher local preference to the primary ISP routes at ingress and propagate it internally. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: An enterprise wants every internal BGP router to favor the primary upstream even though that primary route traverses more external autonomous systems. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. The required targeted change is: Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer.

C:

Inspect AS-path contents and the remote peer's loop prevention policy for repeated local AS entries. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: An EBGP peer unexpectedly rejects local advertisements after the enterprise appends its own AS number twice in an outbound policy. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. The required targeted change is: Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer.

D:

Confirm the appropriate family and community propagation settings on the BGP peering path. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: Two routers share BGP routes but their intended extended-community values are absent at a downstream policy boundary. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. The required targeted change is: Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer.

Question 134

The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. The proposed correction is: Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?

  1. IBGP speakers select the preferred primary egress consistently for the target prefixes.
  2. The accepted received AS path no longer violates the intended AS-loop policy at the upstream peer.
  3. The remote AS sees the intended additional AS hops and its chosen inbound path changes where policy permits.
  4. The intended extended-community values appear on the received route and relevant policies match them.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The remote AS sees the intended additional AS hops and its chosen inbound path changes where policy permits. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. The mechanism being validated is: AS-path prepending can influence remote path choice but does not guarantee it overrides remote local preference.

Incorrect Answers

A:

IBGP speakers select the preferred primary egress consistently for the target prefixes. That would validate a different condition: An enterprise wants every internal BGP router to favor the primary upstream even though that primary route traverses more external autonomous systems. The decisive check for the current issue is: The remote AS sees the intended additional AS hops and its chosen inbound path changes where policy permits.

B:

The accepted received AS path no longer violates the intended AS-loop policy at the upstream peer. That would validate a different condition: An EBGP peer unexpectedly rejects local advertisements after the enterprise appends its own AS number twice in an outbound policy. The decisive check for the current issue is: The remote AS sees the intended additional AS hops and its chosen inbound path changes where policy permits.

D:

The intended extended-community values appear on the received route and relevant policies match them. That would validate a different condition: Two routers share BGP routes but their intended extended-community values are absent at a downstream policy boundary. The decisive check for the current issue is: The remote AS sees the intended additional AS hops and its chosen inbound path changes where policy permits.

Question 135

A Junos engineer proposes this response: Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer. The situation is: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?

  1. LOCAL_PREF is propagated inside the AS and selects the preferred external exit among reachable paths.
  2. BGP AS-path records traversed autonomous systems and supports AS-loop detection.
  3. Extended communities provide structured BGP route metadata for supported applications and policies.
  4. AS-path prepending can influence remote path choice but does not guarantee it overrides remote local preference.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

AS-path prepending can influence remote path choice but does not guarantee it overrides remote local preference. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. It predicts the acceptance result: The remote AS sees the intended additional AS hops and its chosen inbound path changes where policy permits.

Incorrect Answers

A:

LOCAL_PREF is propagated inside the AS and selects the preferred external exit among reachable paths. This principle explains a separate situation: An enterprise wants every internal BGP router to favor the primary upstream even though that primary route traverses more external autonomous systems. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: AS-path prepending can influence remote path choice but does not guarantee it overrides remote local preference.

B:

BGP AS-path records traversed autonomous systems and supports AS-loop detection. This principle explains a separate situation: An EBGP peer unexpectedly rejects local advertisements after the enterprise appends its own AS number twice in an outbound policy. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: AS-path prepending can influence remote path choice but does not guarantee it overrides remote local preference.

C:

Extended communities provide structured BGP route metadata for supported applications and policies. This principle explains a separate situation: Two routers share BGP routes but their intended extended-community values are absent at a downstream policy boundary. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: AS-path prepending can influence remote path choice but does not guarantee it overrides remote local preference.

Question 136

The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?

  1. Assuming prepending always wins can leave traffic using the undesired upstream during congestion.
  2. Adjusting only MED on external advertisements may not control the enterprise's own outbound choice.
  3. Careless prepending that introduces the recipient's own AS can cause an advertised route to be rejected.
  4. Losing required extended-community metadata can break downstream tagging or route-target policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Assuming prepending always wins can leave traffic using the undesired upstream during congestion. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: The team needs to make an inbound path from one external peer less attractive to another AS without changing its own internal preference. It is prevented by: Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer. The underlying reason is: AS-path prepending can influence remote path choice but does not guarantee it overrides remote local preference.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Adjusting only MED on external advertisements may not control the enterprise's own outbound choice. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: An enterprise wants every internal BGP router to favor the primary upstream even though that primary route traverses more external autonomous systems. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Assuming prepending always wins can leave traffic using the undesired upstream during congestion. The appropriate mitigation is: Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer.

C:

Careless prepending that introduces the recipient's own AS can cause an advertised route to be rejected. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: An EBGP peer unexpectedly rejects local advertisements after the enterprise appends its own AS number twice in an outbound policy. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Assuming prepending always wins can leave traffic using the undesired upstream during congestion. The appropriate mitigation is: Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer.

D:

Losing required extended-community metadata can break downstream tagging or route-target policy. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: Two routers share BGP routes but their intended extended-community values are absent at a downstream policy boundary. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Assuming prepending always wins can leave traffic using the undesired upstream during congestion. The appropriate mitigation is: Apply controlled AS-path prepending on the applicable outbound advertisement to that external peer.

Question 137

A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. Which targeted engineering change is MOST directly justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Replace catchall acceptance with ordered exact route-filter terms for permitted customer prefixes.
  2. Restore a usable unicast route to the BGP next hop before trying to override local preference.
  3. Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix.
  4. Apply an appropriate peer or policy AS-path limit while preserving explicitly permitted customer destinations.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix. This change specifically addresses the reported evidence: A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. The relevant protocol mechanism is: Junos BGP export policy controls which locally eligible routes enter peer advertisements. A decisive acceptance test would be: The peer receives precisely the eligible prefix and withdraws it when export conditions fail.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Replace catchall acceptance with ordered exact route-filter terms for permitted customer prefixes. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A BGP edge is advertising an unintended private infrastructure prefix because a catchall export policy term accepted every active route. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. The required targeted change is: Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix.

B:

Restore a usable unicast route to the BGP next hop before trying to override local preference. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A route from an EBGP peer shows a valid next-hop address that cannot be resolved to any active transport route. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. The required targeted change is: Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix.

D:

Apply an appropriate peer or policy AS-path limit while preserving explicitly permitted customer destinations. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: One EBGP customer sends a path with too many AS numbers and the provider wants a protective bound on accepted AS paths. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. The required targeted change is: Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix.

Question 138

A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. The proposed correction is: Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?

  1. Only customer-approved routes are exported and the private infrastructure prefix remains hidden.
  2. The received prefixes appear in the correct table and resolve the intended next hops.
  3. The BGP session reports inet6 capability and advertises the expected IPv6 prefix.
  4. The peer receives precisely the eligible prefix and withdraws it when export conditions fail.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The peer receives precisely the eligible prefix and withdraws it when export conditions fail. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. The mechanism being validated is: Junos BGP export policy controls which locally eligible routes enter peer advertisements.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Only customer-approved routes are exported and the private infrastructure prefix remains hidden. That would validate a different condition: A BGP edge is advertising an unintended private infrastructure prefix because a catchall export policy term accepted every active route. The decisive check for the current issue is: The peer receives precisely the eligible prefix and withdraws it when export conditions fail.

B:

The received prefixes appear in the correct table and resolve the intended next hops. That would validate a different condition: A BGP neighbor advertises prefixes but the receiving Junos instance assigns them to the wrong logical routing table because family/instance design differs. The decisive check for the current issue is: The peer receives precisely the eligible prefix and withdraws it when export conditions fail.

C:

The BGP session reports inet6 capability and advertises the expected IPv6 prefix. That would validate a different condition: An IPv6-only prefix should be exchanged over an existing BGP neighbor but the group currently negotiates only inet unicast. The decisive check for the current issue is: The peer receives precisely the eligible prefix and withdraws it when export conditions fail.

Question 139

A Junos engineer proposes this response: Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix. The situation is: A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?

  1. Junos BGP export policy controls which locally eligible routes enter peer advertisements.
  2. Junos routing policy evaluates ordered matching terms and their explicit accept or reject actions.
  3. BGP address-family and routing-instance context determine where received routes are stored.
  4. BGP AS-path validation and peer protection can constrain anomalously long path information.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Junos BGP export policy controls which locally eligible routes enter peer advertisements. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. It predicts the acceptance result: The peer receives precisely the eligible prefix and withdraws it when export conditions fail.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Junos routing policy evaluates ordered matching terms and their explicit accept or reject actions. This principle explains a separate situation: A BGP edge is advertising an unintended private infrastructure prefix because a catchall export policy term accepted every active route. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: Junos BGP export policy controls which locally eligible routes enter peer advertisements.

C:

BGP address-family and routing-instance context determine where received routes are stored. This principle explains a separate situation: A BGP neighbor advertises prefixes but the receiving Junos instance assigns them to the wrong logical routing table because family/instance design differs. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: Junos BGP export policy controls which locally eligible routes enter peer advertisements.

D:

BGP AS-path validation and peer protection can constrain anomalously long path information. This principle explains a separate situation: One EBGP customer sends a path with too many AS numbers and the provider wants a protective bound on accepted AS paths. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: Junos BGP export policy controls which locally eligible routes enter peer advertisements.

Question 140

A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?

  1. A permissive final term can leak sensitive topology into external BGP advertisements.
  2. An unconditional export can leak prefixes when the intended backing reachability disappears.
  3. Mixing route families or virtual tables can make reachable prefixes invisible to the intended service.
  4. A working IPv4 BGP session does not imply IPv6 unicast NLRI negotiation is enabled.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

An unconditional export can leak prefixes when the intended backing reachability disappears. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: A partner asks a Junos edge to advertise a longer prefix only when a certain route is present in the active routing table. It is prevented by: Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix. The underlying reason is: Junos BGP export policy controls which locally eligible routes enter peer advertisements.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A permissive final term can leak sensitive topology into external BGP advertisements. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A BGP edge is advertising an unintended private infrastructure prefix because a catchall export policy term accepted every active route. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: An unconditional export can leak prefixes when the intended backing reachability disappears. The appropriate mitigation is: Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix.

C:

Mixing route families or virtual tables can make reachable prefixes invisible to the intended service. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A BGP neighbor advertises prefixes but the receiving Junos instance assigns them to the wrong logical routing table because family/instance design differs. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: An unconditional export can leak prefixes when the intended backing reachability disappears. The appropriate mitigation is: Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix.

D:

A working IPv4 BGP session does not imply IPv6 unicast NLRI negotiation is enabled. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: An IPv6-only prefix should be exchanged over an existing BGP neighbor but the group currently negotiates only inet unicast. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: An unconditional export can leak prefixes when the intended backing reachability disappears. The appropriate mitigation is: Use a term-based BGP export policy that matches the authorized active route and accepted prefix.

Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) (JN0-650) Practice Tests

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