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A BitLocker recovery key was disclosed during a help-desk repair. An endpoint administrator proposes: Rotate the affected device's BitLocker recovery password through the supported Intune action. Which technical explanation most directly supports the proposed action?
A previously exposed recovery key remains a security risk until replaced. The new recovery key identifier and escrowed recovery material are recorded for the correct device, and the previous exposed protector is no longer valid.
The proposition ‘Changing local Administrator credentials invalidates the drive recovery-key protectors used by BitLocker’ is not the reason the selected control works. A previously exposed recovery key remains a security risk until replaced.
A portal policy status alone may not identify which client-side component failed. The controlling technical behavior here is A previously exposed recovery key remains a security risk until replaced.
Rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state. The controlling technical behavior here is A previously exposed recovery key remains a security risk until replaced.
A BitLocker recovery key was disclosed during a help-desk repair. The approved approach is: Rotate the affected device's BitLocker recovery password through the supported Intune action. Which observable test result best confirms the proposed outcome?
The new recovery key identifier and escrowed recovery material are recorded for the correct device, and the previous exposed protector is no longer valid. A previously exposed recovery key remains a security risk until replaced.
The proposed observation ‘An Intune action was queued, but no updated BitLocker protector ID or escrowed recovery key is confirmed’ does not establish the target state. The new recovery key identifier and escrowed recovery material are recorded for the correct device, and the previous exposed protector is no longer valid.
The device action progresses to a client-confirmed wipe outcome when it reconnects; access revocation is verified independently. The required observation is the new recovery key identifier and escrowed recovery material are recorded for the correct device, and the previous exposed protector is no longer valid.
An authorized admin retrieves the current key for the correct device and can verify rotation. The required observation is the new recovery key identifier and escrowed recovery material are recorded for the correct device, and the previous exposed protector is no longer valid.
A BitLocker recovery key was disclosed during a help-desk repair. After implementing: Rotate the affected device's BitLocker recovery password through the supported Intune action. Which continuing safeguard best prevents this problem from recurring?
Audit recovery-key viewing and rotate promptly after exposure. A previously exposed recovery key remains a security risk until replaced. The new recovery key identifier and escrowed recovery material are recorded for the correct device, and the previous exposed protector is no longer valid.
The alternative ‘Monitor missing escrow records and least-privileged recovery access’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Audit recovery-key viewing and rotate promptly after exposure’.
The suggested safeguard ‘Retain exposed BitLocker recovery keys indefinitely while limiting only LAPS password retrieval’ would leave the demonstrated risk unresolved. Audit recovery-key viewing and rotate promptly after exposure.
The alternative ‘Monitor signature freshness and exceptions for offline devices’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Audit recovery-key viewing and rotate promptly after exposure’.
The security team plans BitLocker recovery key rotation but cannot locate the device's escrowed recovery key. Which administrative action most directly meets the stated requirement?
Confirm BitLocker escrow, device identity and administrator retrieval rights. Rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state. An authorized admin retrieves the current key for the correct device and can verify rotation.
The proposed ‘Rotate the Windows LAPS password and treat it as replacement for an exposed BitLocker recovery password’ does not implement the required change. Rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state.
The alternative ‘Check query scope, supported device properties and device-query prerequisites’ does not implement the required action ‘Confirm BitLocker escrow, device identity and administrator retrieval rights’. Rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state.
The alternative ‘Rotate the affected device's BitLocker recovery password through the supported Intune action’ does not implement the required action ‘Confirm BitLocker escrow, device identity and administrator retrieval rights’. Rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state.
The security team plans BitLocker recovery key rotation but cannot locate the device's escrowed recovery key. An endpoint administrator proposes: Confirm BitLocker escrow, device identity and administrator retrieval rights. Which technical explanation most directly supports the proposed action?
Rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state. An authorized admin retrieves the current key for the correct device and can verify rotation.
A previously exposed recovery key remains a security risk until replaced. The controlling technical behavior here is rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state.
The proposition ‘Changing local Administrator credentials invalidates the drive recovery-key protectors used by BitLocker’ is not the reason the selected control works. Rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state.
A remote sync requests new MDM communication but does not itself fix the underlying policy value. The controlling technical behavior here is rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state.
The security team plans BitLocker recovery key rotation but cannot locate the device's escrowed recovery key. The approved approach is: Confirm BitLocker escrow, device identity and administrator retrieval rights. Which observable test result best confirms the proposed outcome?
An authorized admin retrieves the current key for the correct device and can verify rotation. Rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state.
The new recovery key identifier and escrowed recovery material are recorded for the correct device, and the previous exposed protector is no longer valid. The required observation is an authorized admin retrieves the current key for the correct device and can verify rotation.
The proposed observation ‘An Intune action was queued, but no updated BitLocker protector ID or escrowed recovery key is confirmed’ does not establish the target state. An authorized admin retrieves the current key for the correct device and can verify rotation.
The endpoint reports the expected current intelligence version after update. The required observation is an authorized admin retrieves the current key for the correct device and can verify rotation.
The security team plans BitLocker recovery key rotation but cannot locate the device's escrowed recovery key. After implementing: Confirm BitLocker escrow, device identity and administrator retrieval rights. Which continuing safeguard best prevents this problem from recurring?
Monitor missing escrow records and least-privileged recovery access. Rotating or recovering a BitLocker protector depends on correct device association and backed-up key state. An authorized admin retrieves the current key for the correct device and can verify rotation.
The suggested safeguard ‘Retain exposed BitLocker recovery keys indefinitely while limiting only LAPS password retrieval’ would leave the demonstrated risk unresolved. Monitor missing escrow records and least-privileged recovery access.
The alternative ‘Alert on long signature-update age and device connectivity failures’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Monitor missing escrow records and least-privileged recovery access’.
The alternative ‘Audit recovery-key viewing and rotate promptly after exposure’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Monitor missing escrow records and least-privileged recovery access’.
A local administrator password was shared outside the support team during a repair. Which administrative action most directly meets the stated requirement?
Request Windows LAPS password rotation on the specific managed device. The previously recovered local password should not remain usable after exposure. An authorized test sees a new local admin password and the old password fails.
The proposed ‘Rotate the BitLocker drive recovery protector while retaining the previously disclosed Windows LAPS local administrator secret’ does not implement the required change. The previously recovered local password should not remain usable after exposure.
The alternative ‘Diagnose Intune/LAPS management connectivity before retrying the rotation command’ does not implement the required action ‘Request Windows LAPS password rotation on the specific managed device’. The previously recovered local password should not remain usable after exposure.
The alternative ‘Rotate the affected device's BitLocker recovery password through the supported Intune action’ does not implement the required action ‘Request Windows LAPS password rotation on the specific managed device’. The previously recovered local password should not remain usable after exposure.
A local administrator password was shared outside the support team during a repair. An endpoint administrator proposes: Request Windows LAPS password rotation on the specific managed device. Which technical explanation most directly supports the proposed action?
The previously recovered local password should not remain usable after exposure. An authorized test sees a new local admin password and the old password fails.
The proposition ‘Changing the BitLocker recovery key also invalidates the separate Windows local Administrator account password’ is not the reason the selected control works. The previously recovered local password should not remain usable after exposure.
An update command can fail when network or service prerequisites are unavailable. The controlling technical behavior here is the previously recovered local password should not remain usable after exposure.
Remote password rotation requires the managed endpoint to process the instruction. The controlling technical behavior here is the previously recovered local password should not remain usable after exposure.
A local administrator password was shared outside the support team during a repair. The approved approach is: Request Windows LAPS password rotation on the specific managed device. Which observable test result best confirms the proposed outcome?
An authorized test sees a new local admin password and the old password fails. The previously recovered local password should not remain usable after exposure.
The proposed observation ‘The LAPS rotation request is queued, but the device has not reported a new backed-up local password’ does not establish the target state. An authorized test sees a new local admin password and the old password fails.
The query returns devices that match the specified build predicate. The required observation is an authorized test sees a new local admin password and the old password fails.
A new device check-in completes the requested LAPS rotation and directory backup. The required observation is an authorized test sees a new local admin password and the old password fails.
A local administrator password was shared outside the support team during a repair. After implementing: Request Windows LAPS password rotation on the specific managed device. Which continuing safeguard best prevents this problem from recurring?
Audit who retrieved LAPS secrets and rotate after support use. The previously recovered local password should not remain usable after exposure. An authorized test sees a new local admin password and the old password fails.
The suggested safeguard ‘Audit only disk-encryption keys and leave local administrator password retrieval and rotation unmonitored’ would leave the demonstrated risk unresolved. Audit who retrieved LAPS secrets and rotate after support use.
The alternative ‘Use sync sparingly and check last contact before escalating failures’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Audit who retrieved LAPS secrets and rotate after support use’.
The alternative ‘Set stale-check-in alerts and avoid repeatedly exposing current passwords’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Audit who retrieved LAPS secrets and rotate after support use’.
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