An assigned EDR policy is insufficient if sensor onboarding or connectivity is broken. The controlling technical behavior here is EDR risk signals and Intune device compliance represent different services that can be integrated for access enforcement.

The proposition ‘All Defender for Endpoint threat-risk signals automatically influence Intune compliance even when service integration is disabled’ is not the reason the selected control works. EDR risk signals and Intune device compliance represent different services that can be integrated for access enforcement.

Intune configuration status alone does not provide full threat alert evidence or incident triage context. The controlling technical behavior here is EDR risk signals and Intune device compliance represent different services that can be integrated for access enforcement.

The proposed observation ‘The device appears in Intune but the Defender connection or risk-based compliance result has not been checked’ does not establish the target state. A risky pilot device receives the intended risk-based compliance treatment.

The device appears healthy and sends a test signal to the Defender portal. The required observation is A risky pilot device receives the intended risk-based compliance treatment.

The incident view links the malicious activity and affected managed endpoint. The required observation is A risky pilot device receives the intended risk-based compliance treatment.

The suggested safeguard ‘Ignore connector health and EDR sensor status after linking Intune and Defender services’ would leave the demonstrated risk unresolved. Monitor connector health, licensing and risk evaluation timing.

The alternative ‘Maintain EDR alert routing and endpoint incident response escalation’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Monitor connector health, licensing and risk evaluation timing’.

The alternative ‘Alert on unmanaged or inactive EDR sensors and recheck policy targeting’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Monitor connector health, licensing and risk evaluation timing’.

The alternative ‘Assign an Intune endpoint security antivirus policy with the required settings’ does not implement the required action ‘Use Defender for Endpoint alert and incident investigation, correlating the enrolled device identity’. Intune configuration status alone does not provide full threat alert evidence or incident triage context.

The proposed ‘Treat Intune device enrollment alone as proof that Defender threat risk is integrated into Conditional Access’ does not implement the required change. Intune configuration status alone does not provide full threat alert evidence or incident triage context.

The alternative ‘Check Defender sensor onboarding and service-health prerequisites rather than assuming policy assignment equals protection’ does not implement the required action ‘Use Defender for Endpoint alert and incident investigation, correlating the enrolled device identity’. Intune configuration status alone does not provide full threat alert evidence or incident triage context.

The proposition ‘All Defender for Endpoint threat-risk signals automatically influence Intune compliance even when service integration is disabled’ is not the reason the selected control works. Intune configuration status alone does not provide full threat alert evidence or incident triage context.

Protecting sensitive folders reduces untrusted modification opportunities but can affect legitimate file operations. The controlling technical behavior here is intune configuration status alone does not provide full threat alert evidence or incident triage context.

EDR risk signals and Intune device compliance represent different services that can be integrated for access enforcement. The controlling technical behavior here is intune configuration status alone does not provide full threat alert evidence or incident triage context.

The proposed observation ‘The device appears in Intune but the Defender connection or risk-based compliance result has not been checked’ does not establish the target state. The incident view links the malicious activity and affected managed endpoint.

The device appears healthy and sends a test signal to the Defender portal. The required observation is the incident view links the malicious activity and affected managed endpoint.

A controlled pilot passes compatibility tests using the reviewed baseline version. The required observation is the incident view links the malicious activity and affected managed endpoint.

The alternative ‘Version the selected baseline and review updated recommendations’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Maintain EDR alert routing and endpoint incident response escalation’.

The suggested safeguard ‘Ignore connector health and EDR sensor status after linking Intune and Defender services’ would leave the demonstrated risk unresolved. Maintain EDR alert routing and endpoint incident response escalation.

The alternative ‘Alert on unmanaged or inactive EDR sensors and recheck policy targeting’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Maintain EDR alert routing and endpoint incident response escalation’.

The alternative ‘Offboard it using the supported process, then onboard to the approved Defender tenant’ does not implement the required action ‘Check Defender sensor onboarding and service-health prerequisites rather than assuming policy assignment equals protection’. An assigned EDR policy is insufficient if sensor onboarding or connectivity is broken.

The proposed ‘Treat Intune device enrollment alone as proof that Defender threat risk is integrated into Conditional Access’ does not implement the required change. An assigned EDR policy is insufficient if sensor onboarding or connectivity is broken.

The alternative ‘Connect the Intune and Defender for Endpoint services and enable the supported threat-risk compliance integration’ does not implement the required action ‘Check Defender sensor onboarding and service-health prerequisites rather than assuming policy assignment equals protection’. An assigned EDR policy is insufficient if sensor onboarding or connectivity is broken.

The proposition ‘All Defender for Endpoint threat-risk signals automatically influence Intune compliance even when service integration is disabled’ is not the reason the selected control works. An assigned EDR policy is insufficient if sensor onboarding or connectivity is broken.

EDR risk signals and Intune device compliance represent different services that can be integrated for access enforcement. The controlling technical behavior here is an assigned EDR policy is insufficient if sensor onboarding or connectivity is broken.

App Control can enforce executable trust decisions before unapproved code runs. The controlling technical behavior here is an assigned EDR policy is insufficient if sensor onboarding or connectivity is broken.

The proposed observation ‘The device appears in Intune but the Defender connection or risk-based compliance result has not been checked’ does not establish the target state. The device appears healthy and sends a test signal to the Defender portal.

A pilot appears in the Defender device inventory with an active sensor and test telemetry. The required observation is the device appears healthy and sends a test signal to the Defender portal.

A risky pilot device receives the intended risk-based compliance treatment. The required observation is the device appears healthy and sends a test signal to the Defender portal.

The suggested safeguard ‘Ignore connector health and EDR sensor status after linking Intune and Defender services’ would leave the demonstrated risk unresolved. Alert on unmanaged or inactive EDR sensors and recheck policy targeting.

The alternative ‘Record baseline version approvals and rollback criteria’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Alert on unmanaged or inactive EDR sensors and recheck policy targeting’.

The alternative ‘Monitor connector health, licensing and risk evaluation timing’ is not the continuing control for this configuration. The relevant safeguard is ‘Alert on unmanaged or inactive EDR sensors and recheck policy targeting’.