The alternative targets optics compatibility and signal levels, where an unsupported or poorly coupled optical path prevents reliable Ethernet signalling regardless of correct routing or authentication configuration. It does not establish the intended RADIUS server reachability behavior described in the scenario.

EAP-TLS relies on a trusted certificate path; successful network reachability does not bypass expired or unknown issuing authorities. Inspect EAP-TLS certificate trust, validity and identity on both authentication sides. would address EAP-TLS trust-chain failure, but the reported facts instead point to RADIUS server reachability. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Inspect roam timing, neighbor coverage and security reauthentication behavior during movement—is relevant to roaming reassociation delay. Roaming quality depends on usable overlap and timely client/security transitions; stationary speed tests cannot diagnose roaming interruption. It does not correct the observed RADIUS server reachability condition.

Traffic shaping delays packets to smooth bursts, whereas policing enforces a rate by dropping or remarking nonconforming traffic; operational tradeoffs differ. The indicated result—measured egress conforms to the intended service rate without unnecessary burst drops for the selected application profile—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required security-preserving optimization outcome.

This would validate energy and utilization efficiency, not security-preserving optimization. Right-sized operation reduces unnecessary resource use, but energy or capacity savings must not remove availability when users actually need the network. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—The report contrasts like-for-like baseline and post-change throughput, latency, retries and error statistics—concerns baseline before optimization. Optimization claims require equivalent loads, test methods and service metrics before and after; otherwise changes in demand confound comparison. It can be healthy even while the current security-preserving optimization problem remains.

The alternative targets RF interference and retries, where strong signal cannot cure collisions or non-Wi-Fi interference; airtime contention and retransmission consume the shared radio medium. It does not establish the intended duplex and speed negotiation behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Inspect STP port roles and topology before overriding a blocked redundant link—is relevant to spanning-tree blocked forwarding. A correctly blocked path may be essential loop prevention; unblocking without analyzing topology can trigger broadcasts and MAC instability. It does not correct the observed duplex and speed negotiation condition.

Rapid MAC moves and broadcast amplification indicate switching topology instability, not a problem fixed by adding a default route. Investigate Layer 2 loops and unstable MAC learning before changing IP routing. would address MAC learning and unintended loops, but the reported facts instead point to duplex and speed negotiation. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

This would validate VRF route-context configuration, not SVI inter-VLAN gateway. Routes and interfaces are looked up within the relevant VRF; a default route in a different table cannot repair a missing path. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

New Central includes global, collection, site and device scopes; more specific applicable configuration can override broader inherited values. The indicated result—the effective device configuration reflects documented scoped intent and any deliberate higher-priority exception—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required SVI inter-VLAN gateway outcome.

That result—The relay forwards requests to the approved DHCP service and clients receive leases in the correct subnet—concerns DHCP relay on routed segments. Layer 3 boundaries do not normally forward client DHCP broadcasts without relay behavior; the helper target must also be reachable. It can be healthy even while the current SVI inter-VLAN gateway problem remains.

The alternative targets coverage versus capacity tradeoff, where a higher RSSI does not remove contention; channel planning, cell sizing and client density are needed to increase effective capacity. It does not establish the intended high-density channel-width choice behavior described in the scenario.

A reliable voice WLAN needs usable signal and timely authentication/roaming behavior between neighboring cells, not maximum isolated AP range. Design cell overlap and roaming characteristics to support application handoff requirements. would address roaming voice coverage overlap, but the reported facts instead point to high-density channel-width choice. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Size the wireless design for peak concurrent airtime demand rather than signal strength alone—is relevant to peak WLAN concurrency. RF coverage establishes reception, whereas channel contention and client airtime demand govern usable capacity in dense spaces. It does not correct the observed high-density channel-width choice condition.

The alternative targets inventory and dependency discovery, where missing uplink, power, VLAN, routing and identity dependencies cause apparently successful device replacements to disconnect applications or clients unexpectedly. It does not establish the intended 2.4 GHz interference planning behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Specify guest identity, addressing and policy isolation before enabling the guest WLAN—is relevant to guest network isolation requirements. An SSID name is not a security boundary; guest users need controlled authorization and routes that limit access to internal resources. It does not correct the observed 2.4 GHz interference planning condition.

Directional gain shapes energy into target areas and can reduce unwanted spill, but a poorly aimed directional antenna creates coverage holes elsewhere. Choose antenna pattern and placement for the coverage geometry and client distribution. would address directional antenna selection, but the reported facts instead point to 2.4 GHz interference planning. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

Recovery decisions based on elapsed time and service impact are more reliable than an operator's improvised judgment under incident pressure. The indicated result—change records show a clear checkpoint decision and a restore test when acceptance thresholds are not met—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required access-control change verification outcome.

That result—Certificate inventory and alerts show sufficient renewal lead time and successful test authentication after renewal—concerns certificate expiry monitoring. Healthy RF and RADIUS reachability cannot compensate for an expired or untrusted certificate that fails the authentication handshake. It can be healthy even while the current access-control change verification problem remains.

This would validate configuration revision and approval history, not access-control change verification. Auditability requires associating control-plane changes with an identity, time, reason and prior state, not just the new value. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That action—Configure the AP regulatory domain and permissible channels for its actual deployment location—is relevant to AP country-code and RF regulatory setting. Radio operation is constrained by regional rules, and an incorrect country or channel plan can prevent valid operation or break client support. It does not correct the observed dynamic role enforcement condition.

Authentication success is not the same as authorization; WLAN roles and VLAN selection determine where the user can forward traffic. Map the authenticated wireless identity to the intended role and network segment. would address SSID role and VLAN assignment, but the reported facts instead point to dynamic role enforcement. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets guest captive-portal flow, where association and address assignment alone cannot enforce guest registration or policy acceptance; the portal and post-login role must be connected. It does not establish the intended dynamic role enforcement behavior described in the scenario.

An idempotent workflow can be safely retried without proliferating duplicate objects or introducing inconsistent partial configuration. The indicated result—two successive authorized automation runs leave one correct intended configuration and no duplicate managed objects—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required network asset lifecycle outcome.

This would validate NAE event rules on AOS-CX, not network asset lifecycle. AOS-CX NAE provides locally evaluated telemetry/event logic; defining useful triggers matters more than merely enabling generic monitoring. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—A controlled test retrieves all expected records and handles pagination or retryable response codes without data loss—concerns API paging and rate limits. Management APIs may return segmented data or throttle callers, so automation must recognize incomplete and transient outcomes instead of silently succeeding. It can be healthy even while the current network asset lifecycle problem remains.

That action—Inspect New Central scope inheritance and device-level precedence before changing shared policy—is relevant to new Central scoped inheritance. New Central includes global, collection, site and device scopes; more specific applicable configuration can override broader inherited values. It does not correct the observed OSPF passive interfaces condition.

The alternative targets multicast receiver handling, where IGMP membership information lets switches constrain Layer 2 multicast distribution instead of flooding traffic indiscriminately. It does not establish the intended OSPF passive interfaces behavior described in the scenario.

OSPF adjacency depends on compatible peer parameters and reachable interfaces; a live link is insufficient when control-plane settings disagree. Align OSPF interface network, area, timers and authentication requirements across neighbors. would address OSPF adjacency prerequisites, but the reported facts instead point to OSPF passive interfaces. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

Overly aggressive limits can discard necessary discovery traffic, while absent protection permits broadcasts to overwhelm forwarding capacity. The indicated result—peak legitimate discovery succeeds and a simulated excessive broadcast rate triggers the intended bounded protection—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required LAG capacity and hash distribution outcome.

This would validate optimization with rollback, not LAG capacity and hash distribution. A change may help one metric while degrading another; phased deployment and recovery thresholds protect production service continuity. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—Queue counters and packet markings confirm trusted voice traffic receives priority while guest bulk flows remain appropriately classified—concerns trust and QoS marking boundary. Blindly trusting endpoint markings lets untrusted traffic dominate queues; classification must reflect approved service importance. It can be healthy even while the current LAG capacity and hash distribution problem remains.