That action—Verify that the intended connected subnet is advertised and permitted by OSPF configuration and filters—is relevant to OSPF prefix advertisement omission. A healthy neighbor relationship does not imply every desired route is present; network statements, redistribution and policy can omit a prefix. It does not correct the observed SVI down due to VLAN state condition.

If IP connectivity works but hostname access fails, DNS queries, responses or resolver policy may be broken despite healthy network routes. Compare name resolution with direct IP reachability to isolate the DNS dependency. would address DNS mistaken for routing failure, but the reported facts instead point to SVI down due to VLAN state. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets unauthorized DHCP server, where DHCP snooping restricts untrusted hosts from responding as servers and can help preserve legitimate addressing information on the VLAN. It does not establish the intended SVI down due to VLAN state behavior described in the scenario.

This would validate OSPF neighbor area mismatch, not DNS mistaken for routing failure. OSPF requires compatible area identity, network type and essential adjacency parameters; IP reachability alone does not establish a neighbor. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

IP forwarding selects the most specific matching destination prefix before comparing less-specific alternatives; a summary route does not override a more-specific match. The indicated result—the forwarding-table lookup identifies the most-specific active prefix and its corresponding next hop for the test address—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required DNS mistaken for routing failure outcome.

That result—Supported optics show acceptable diagnostics and stable link state across a representative traffic test—concerns optics compatibility and signal levels. An unsupported or poorly coupled optical path prevents reliable Ethernet signalling regardless of correct routing or authentication configuration. It can be healthy even while the current DNS mistaken for routing failure problem remains.

Propagation and attenuation vary with walls, shelving and device environments; a diagram alone cannot establish coverage or service quality. The indicated result—predictive and on-site measurements identify weak areas and confirm intended application-level RF coverage—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle outcome.

That result—Administrative access tests allow authorized management sources and reject unauthorized clients with attributable audit events—concerns management-plane security. Management interfaces and privileged control operations need narrower access than ordinary client traffic to reduce compromise and configuration risk. It can be healthy even while the current EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle problem remains.

This would validate low-level port map, not EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle. Physical installation and initial configuration depend on explicit interface-level intent; ambiguities produce swapped services or accidental trunk exposure. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

Changing many dependent control planes at once obscures root causes and enlarges outage blast radius; staging supplies evidence and rollback points. Break high-risk campus migration into staged, independently validated change waves. would address change-risk classification, but the reported facts instead point to low-level port map. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Verify platform model, software release and licensed-feature compatibility in the design—is relevant to firmware feature-support planning. Product capabilities and configuration syntax depend on supported hardware and software releases; a feature described in another model's guide may be unavailable. It does not correct the observed low-level port map condition.

The alternative targets failure-domain isolation, where two logical paths do not provide independent availability when they share a single cable route, power supply or upstream component. It does not establish the intended low-level port map behavior described in the scenario.

Release-specific feature and compatibility constraints can break management or forwarding despite a successful image installation. Verify supported firmware interoperability across dependent devices and management tools. would address firmware compatibility dependency, but the reported facts instead point to change freeze and backout criteria. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Retain attributable configuration history and link changes to reviewable approvals—is relevant to configuration revision and approval history. Auditability requires associating control-plane changes with an identity, time, reason and prior state, not just the new value. It does not correct the observed change freeze and backout criteria condition.

The alternative targets AAA change coordination, where identity changes impact access before network routing tests can begin; testing distinct client classes limits unintended lockouts. It does not establish the intended change freeze and backout criteria behavior described in the scenario.

Mismatched physical link parameters can create collisions or errors despite a link-up status, so higher-layer policy changes cannot repair them. Verify compatible link speed, duplex and negotiation settings on both interface ends. would address duplex and speed negotiation, but the reported facts instead point to captive portal redirect fault. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets EAP-TLS trust-chain failure, where EAP-TLS relies on a trusted certificate path; successful network reachability does not bypass expired or unknown issuing authorities. It does not establish the intended captive portal redirect fault behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Check the endpoint's 802.1X supplicant configuration and initial EAPOL exchange—is relevant to 802.1X supplicant disabled. An authentication server cannot authorize an endpoint that never initiates the intended EAP handshake on the controlled link. It does not correct the observed captive portal redirect fault condition.

6 GHz operation requires capable client hardware and supported regulatory and security settings; enabling the band does not upgrade legacy adapters. The indicated result—pilot devices supporting the target band join securely and unsupported clients have a documented alternative network—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required role-based access decisions outcome.

This would validate EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle, not role-based access decisions. EAP-TLS authenticates with certificates, so healthy network transport alone cannot correct absent trust, expired credentials or unmanaged key lifecycle. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—Test records show representative clients join, receive correct roles, roam and reach only approved services—concerns acceptance of WLAN security and mobility. An AP advertising a network does not prove that clients can authenticate, receive approved privileges or maintain application continuity while moving. It can be healthy even while the current role-based access decisions problem remains.

This would validate missing default gateway, not RADIUS accounting versus authorization. Traffic bound for other subnets needs a reachable Layer 3 next hop; a functioning local broadcast domain does not provide routing. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—The post-upgrade configuration matches approved intent and critical wired/wireless service tests pass—concerns firmware-induced configuration drift. Successful reboot and version display do not establish that all intended policies and interface behaviors survived the change. It can be healthy even while the current RADIUS accounting versus authorization problem remains.

Scoped configuration precedence can explain isolated divergence; changing the shared profile again can unintentionally impact healthy devices. The indicated result—the effective device value is traced to its controlling scope and the corrected override restores intended behavior—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required RADIUS accounting versus authorization outcome.

That action—Adjust supported power or capacity policies according to measured usage while preserving peak service requirements—is relevant to energy and utilization efficiency. Right-sized operation reduces unnecessary resource use, but energy or capacity savings must not remove availability when users actually need the network. It does not correct the observed periodic baseline refresh condition.

The alternative targets transmit-power balance, where downlink strength from a powerful AP does not increase client transmit capability; asymmetric links and oversized cells can harm roaming. It does not establish the intended periodic baseline refresh behavior described in the scenario.

A performance gain is not acceptable if it weakens required access boundaries; improvements must meet both service and security acceptance criteria. Retain mandatory authorization and segmentation controls while optimizing forwarding or QoS. would address security-preserving optimization, but the reported facts instead point to periodic baseline refresh. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Select VSF or VSX based on supported switch family and the required control-plane model—is relevant to VSF versus VSX platform planning. VSF forms a virtual switch with supported stacking members; VSX coordinates two peers while retaining separate control planes, so support and failure domains differ. It does not correct the observed routing and VRF separation condition.

A functional hierarchy clarifies where endpoints attach, where traffic aggregates and where policy or Layer 3 boundaries belong. Assign clear access, aggregation and routing roles and validate their traffic and scale requirements. would address access/distribution hierarchy, but the reported facts instead point to routing and VRF separation. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets firmware feature-support planning, where product capabilities and configuration syntax depend on supported hardware and software releases; a feature described in another model's guide may be unavailable. It does not establish the intended routing and VRF separation behavior described in the scenario.

The alternative targets legacy low-rate airtime overhead, where low PHY data rates use more airtime per transmitted bit; rate changes must be constrained by coverage and device support. It does not establish the intended roaming voice latency behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Configure storm-control thresholds based on observed legitimate broadcast levels and incident risk—is relevant to storm control tuning. Overly aggressive limits can discard necessary discovery traffic, while absent protection permits broadcasts to overwhelm forwarding capacity. It does not correct the observed roaming voice latency condition.

Wireless capacity depends on shared airtime and contention as well as signal quality; excessive power can enlarge overlap without adding usable spectrum. Optimize cell sizing, channel reuse and client load distribution for crowded WLAN areas. would address high-density WLAN airtime optimization, but the reported facts instead point to roaming voice latency. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.