The alternative targets MAC learning and unintended loops, where rapid MAC moves and broadcast amplification indicate switching topology instability, not a problem fixed by adding a default route. It does not establish the intended missing default gateway behavior described in the scenario.

Routing protocol control packets may be rejected when authentication differs, even if underlying Layer 3 ping succeeds. Match OSPF authentication method and key material on the intended neighbors. would address OSPF authentication mismatch, but the reported facts instead point to missing default gateway. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Check the routing table and route installation in the source interface's VRF—is relevant to route missing in correct VRF. Separate VRFs maintain distinct forwarding information bases; routes visible in one context do not automatically apply in another. It does not correct the observed missing default gateway condition.

A planned change must include dependencies and a reversible path because a correct configuration can still disrupt business services during transition. The indicated result—the approved implementation plan states change windows, rollback thresholds, recovery owner and end-to-end validation steps—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required RF survey and building materials outcome.

That result—The bill of materials and live PoE telemetry show that all expected powered endpoints fit within supported budget limits—concerns poE budget planning. Available port count does not establish available power; a switch can have free interfaces while its aggregate PoE budget is exhausted. It can be healthy even while the current RF survey and building materials problem remains.

This would validate coverage versus capacity tradeoff, not RF survey and building materials. A higher RSSI does not remove contention; channel planning, cell sizing and client density are needed to increase effective capacity. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

This would validate BPDU Guard at edge ports, not spanning-tree loop prevention. Edge ports should not accept topology-control messages from unauthorized bridges; BPDU Guard can protect the switching domain by restricting offending links. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

A VLAN's existence on each switch is insufficient if the inter-switch trunk omits it, so frames cannot traverse the missing membership. The indicated result—the VLAN is present on each relevant trunk and authenticated client traffic traverses the expected path—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required spanning-tree loop prevention outcome.

That result—AP status confirms full required power mode and negotiated uplink speed without feature restrictions—concerns AP uplink power and negotiation. Wireless features depend on the wired uplink and power available to the AP; sufficient coverage does not prove the device is operating at full capacity. It can be healthy even while the current spanning-tree loop prevention problem remains.

The alternative targets management-plane security, where management interfaces and privileged control operations need narrower access than ordinary client traffic to reduce compromise and configuration risk. It does not establish the intended change-risk classification behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Verify platform model, software release and licensed-feature compatibility in the design—is relevant to firmware feature-support planning. Product capabilities and configuration syntax depend on supported hardware and software releases; a feature described in another model's guide may be unavailable. It does not correct the observed change-risk classification condition.

Hardware redundancy is ineffective if every downstream path still depends on one forwarding node or unsound Layer 2 topology. Design dual-homed access uplinks with suitable link aggregation and loop prevention for the selected platform. would address dual-homed downstream aggregation, but the reported facts instead point to change-risk classification. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets new Central persona applicability, where configuration applies according to supported device function as well as scope, so a role mismatch can prevent intended policy from being deployed. It does not establish the intended VRRP gateway resilience behavior described in the scenario.

VSF presents supported physical members as a virtual switch while retaining operational requirements for healthy stacking links and member state. Provision the supported VSF stack topology, member roles and intermember links consistently. would address VSF member management, but the reported facts instead point to VRRP gateway resilience. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Configure a controlled default route and distribute it only where the campus topology requires—is relevant to default-route propagation. A routing protocol's internal adjacency does not guarantee a usable route for unknown destinations; a valid and authorized default egress is needed. It does not correct the observed VRRP gateway resilience condition.

The alternative targets firmware rollout staging, where software changes can alter forwarding, management or authentication behavior, so a limited pilot provides evidence before broad deployment. It does not establish the intended central client health visibility behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Configure supported SNMP monitoring and validate selected interface and system objects—is relevant to SNMP monitoring scope. Monitoring requires authorized protocol access and device-supported counters; the existence of a monitoring server alone produces no reliable telemetry. It does not correct the observed central client health visibility condition.

Centralized time-stamped records preserve context for multi-device analysis and avoid relying on volatile local event buffers. Forward relevant device and security logs to an authorized central log collector. would address syslog event centralization, but the reported facts instead point to central client health visibility. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That result—The client resolves the intended address using the approved DNS server and connects using the application hostname—concerns DNS mistaken for routing failure. If IP connectivity works but hostname access fails, DNS queries, responses or resolver policy may be broken despite healthy network routes. It can be healthy even while the current wireless DHCP failure stage problem remains.

This would validate captive portal redirect fault, not wireless DHCP failure stage. A guest can associate and receive a lease without completing the portal flow; redirect and pre-auth policy must permit necessary portal dependencies. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

An authentication server cannot authorize an endpoint that never initiates the intended EAP handshake on the controlled link. The indicated result—packet capture shows the expected EAPOL handshake and the endpoint reaches the assigned authorized session state—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required wireless DHCP failure stage outcome.

Aggregated links require compatible control and interface parameters; mismatched LACP or VLAN settings can prevent members from joining. The indicated result—the LAG status shows intended active members with consistent partner identifiers and forwarding behavior—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required access port VLAN membership outcome.

That result—The RADIUS server accepts requests from the expected client and the 802.1X session completes under the intended authorization—concerns RADIUS shared-secret consistency. RADIUS exchanges rely on correctly configured shared secrets and client definitions; basic IP reachability does not establish a valid AAA relationship. It can be healthy even while the current access port VLAN membership problem remains.

This would validate trunk allowed VLAN list, not access port VLAN membership. A VLAN's existence on each switch is insufficient if the inter-switch trunk omits it, so frames cannot traverse the missing membership. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

A RADIUS Access-Accept alone does not prove the switch or gateway applied the intended role policy to user sessions. Bind returned authorization roles to correct local or downloadable enforcement behavior. would address dynamic role enforcement, but the reported facts instead point to wired 802.1X port control. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Map the authenticated wireless identity to the intended role and network segment—is relevant to SSID role and VLAN assignment. Authentication success is not the same as authorization; WLAN roles and VLAN selection determine where the user can forward traffic. It does not correct the observed wired 802.1X port control condition.

The alternative targets central configuration audit, where management intent, synchronization status and the running device state are distinct; failed changes or local overrides can leave unintended effective configuration. It does not establish the intended wired 802.1X port control behavior described in the scenario.

The alternative targets captive portal redirect fault, where a guest can associate and receive a lease without completing the portal flow; redirect and pre-auth policy must permit necessary portal dependencies. It does not establish the intended roaming reassociation delay behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Inspect matching route prefixes and prefer the longest matching prefix in path analysis—is relevant to longest-prefix route selection. IP forwarding selects the most specific matching destination prefix before comparing less-specific alternatives; a summary route does not override a more-specific match. It does not correct the observed roaming reassociation delay condition.

Cloud device online status does not prove every radio is active or that target clients can discover the selected channel. Check AP radio administrative state, band and regulatory channel support. would address AP radio disabled or unsupported channel, but the reported facts instead point to roaming reassociation delay. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

A route must identify the desired prefix and a valid forwarding path; a configured but unresolved next hop does not deliver packets. The indicated result—the switch routing table selects the intended prefix and traffic reaches the remote subnet over the verified next hop—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required SSID-to-forwarding path consistency outcome.

This would validate SSID role and VLAN assignment, not SSID-to-forwarding path consistency. Authentication success is not the same as authorization; WLAN roles and VLAN selection determine where the user can forward traffic. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—A first-time visitor is presented the expected portal and gains only the approved access after completing it—concerns guest captive-portal flow. Association and address assignment alone cannot enforce guest registration or policy acceptance; the portal and post-login role must be connected. It can be healthy even while the current SSID-to-forwarding path consistency problem remains.