A route must identify the desired prefix and a valid forwarding path; a configured but unresolved next hop does not deliver packets. The indicated result—the switch routing table selects the intended prefix and traffic reaches the remote subnet over the verified next hop—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required SSID-to-forwarding path consistency outcome.

This would validate SSID role and VLAN assignment, not SSID-to-forwarding path consistency. Authentication success is not the same as authorization; WLAN roles and VLAN selection determine where the user can forward traffic. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—A first-time visitor is presented the expected portal and gains only the approved access after completing it—concerns guest captive-portal flow. Association and address assignment alone cannot enforce guest registration or policy acceptance; the portal and post-login role must be connected. It can be healthy even while the current SSID-to-forwarding path consistency problem remains.

A frame cannot traverse a trunk on which its tagged VLAN is not allowed; local endpoint configuration can be fully correct. The indicated result—the required VLAN is allowed end-to-end and representative frames cross the uplink without unexpected tagging—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required client isolation and peer access outcome.

This would validate central API unauthorized response, not client isolation and peer access. A valid login or token does not imply access to every management resource; 403 generally indicates denied permissions rather than a switch port failure. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—Policy logs or counters identify the matching rule and the repaired rule permits only the approved service—concerns ACL deny versus service outage. An ACL can block selected Layer 4 flows while other connectivity remains healthy; removing all controls is an unsafe shortcut. It can be healthy even while the current client isolation and peer access problem remains.

That action—Size DHCP scopes and client subnets against simultaneous address demand and lease behavior—is relevant to address pool capacity. More APs cannot solve exhaustion of the IP-address pool; usable addresses, lease duration and peak devices must be evaluated together. It does not correct the observed access/distribution hierarchy condition.

Area design controls link-state information distribution, and nonbackbone areas normally connect through Area 0 via appropriate routers. Plan OSPF area boundaries and backbone reachability before implementing neighbors. would address OSPF area design, but the reported facts instead point to access/distribution hierarchy. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets VSF versus VSX platform planning, where VSF forms a virtual switch with supported stacking members; VSX coordinates two peers while retaining separate control planes, so support and failure domains differ. It does not establish the intended access/distribution hierarchy behavior described in the scenario.

That result—A walk test records acceptable handoff delay and voice packet loss under normal movement paths—concerns roaming voice latency. Fast reliable handoff requires compatible client capabilities, adequate AP overlap and secure authentication continuity rather than just increasing bandwidth. It can be healthy even while the current security-preserving optimization problem remains.

This would validate failure recovery time objective, not security-preserving optimization. Resilience depends on recovery behavior, routing/bridging convergence and application tolerance, not the number of installed redundant devices. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

A fixed historical baseline can become misleading as workload mix and client capability change; thresholds should reflect current accepted operating conditions. The indicated result—the revised performance baseline includes recent peak usage and documented changes to client mix, application load and network capacity—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required security-preserving optimization outcome.

That action—Create a detailed port, VLAN, power and uplink mapping for implementation—is relevant to low-level port map. Physical installation and initial configuration depend on explicit interface-level intent; ambiguities produce swapped services or accidental trunk exposure. It does not correct the observed EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle condition.

The alternative targets change-risk classification, where changing many dependent control planes at once obscures root causes and enlarges outage blast radius; staging supplies evidence and rollback points. It does not establish the intended EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle behavior described in the scenario.

The 2.4 GHz band has limited nonoverlapping channel choices in typical regulatory domains, so channel overlap and wide channels intensify contention. Use appropriately separated 2.4 GHz channels and narrow channel widths for dense coverage. would address 2.4 GHz interference planning, but the reported facts instead point to EAP-TLS certificate lifecycle. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

Traffic bound for other subnets needs a reachable Layer 3 next hop; a functioning local broadcast domain does not provide routing. The indicated result—the client ARPs or resolves the correct first hop and successfully reaches an approved remote subnet—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required OSPF authentication mismatch outcome.

That result—The selected RF adjustment reduces retries and busy-channel time without causing new coverage holes—concerns RF interference and retries. Strong signal cannot cure collisions or non-Wi-Fi interference; airtime contention and retransmission consume the shared radio medium. It can be healthy even while the current OSPF authentication mismatch problem remains.

This would validate DNS mistaken for routing failure, not OSPF authentication mismatch. If IP connectivity works but hostname access fails, DNS queries, responses or resolver policy may be broken despite healthy network routes. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

The alternative targets REST API authentication boundaries, where API access is a privileged operational interface; overbroad or leaked tokens can compromise configuration and monitoring data. It does not establish the intended config drift after manual overrides behavior described in the scenario.

That action—Validate both allowed and forbidden flows after a security-policy change—is relevant to access-control change verification. Successful application traffic is only half of policy correctness; overbroad authorization can create exposure while the reported symptom appears resolved. It does not correct the observed config drift after manual overrides condition.

Healthy RF and RADIUS reachability cannot compensate for an expired or untrusted certificate that fails the authentication handshake. Monitor and renew EAP-TLS trust-chain certificates before their validity ends. would address certificate expiry monitoring, but the reported facts instead point to config drift after manual overrides. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Compare post-upgrade effective settings with the saved pre-upgrade baseline and release compatibility—is relevant to firmware-induced configuration drift. Successful reboot and version display do not establish that all intended policies and interface behaviors survived the change. It does not correct the observed unauthorized DHCP server condition.

A valid login or token does not imply access to every management resource; 403 generally indicates denied permissions rather than a switch port failure. Inspect token scopes and endpoint authorization when the API returns a forbidden response. would address central API unauthorized response, but the reported facts instead point to unauthorized DHCP server. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

The alternative targets power-over-Ethernet failure, where a data VLAN or management group cannot correct a switch power budget that denies the PD enough electrical power. It does not establish the intended unauthorized DHCP server behavior described in the scenario.

This would validate multicast receiver handling, not VSX peer synchronization. IGMP membership information lets switches constrain Layer 2 multicast distribution instead of flooding traffic indiscriminately. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

That result—The active client session displays the correct assigned role and an explicit deny test confirms enforcement—concerns dynamic role enforcement. A RADIUS Access-Accept alone does not prove the switch or gateway applied the intended role policy to user sessions. It can be healthy even while the current VSX peer synchronization problem remains.

Separate failure detection helps peers distinguish link disruption from peer loss, reducing the risk of harmful split-brain behavior. The indicated result—an isolated link-failure exercise records the intended peer health state and avoids duplicate active forwarding—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required VSX peer synchronization outcome.

Real-time applications can fail with adequate average throughput when contention increases delay or jitter; requirement gathering must distinguish traffic classes. The indicated result—the requirements document includes per-application targets that can be checked in QoS and performance tests—checks a different mechanism and would not confirm the required inventory and dependency discovery outcome.

That result—A measured channel plan reduces adjacent-cell overlap and client retransmissions while preserving required coverage—concerns 2.4 GHz interference planning. The 2.4 GHz band has limited nonoverlapping channel choices in typical regulatory domains, so channel overlap and wide channels intensify contention. It can be healthy even while the current inventory and dependency discovery problem remains.

This would validate address pool capacity, not inventory and dependency discovery. More APs cannot solve exhaustion of the IP-address pool; usable addresses, lease duration and peak devices must be evaluated together. It is therefore insufficient acceptance evidence for the reported condition.

The alternative targets management-plane security, where management interfaces and privileged control operations need narrower access than ordinary client traffic to reduce compromise and configuration risk. It does not establish the intended low-level port map behavior described in the scenario.

An SSID name is not a security boundary; guest users need controlled authorization and routes that limit access to internal resources. Specify guest identity, addressing and policy isolation before enabling the guest WLAN. would address guest network isolation requirements, but the reported facts instead point to low-level port map. That change would leave the actual requirement unresolved.

That action—Verify platform model, software release and licensed-feature compatibility in the design—is relevant to firmware feature-support planning. Product capabilities and configuration syntax depend on supported hardware and software releases; a feature described in another model's guide may be unavailable. It does not correct the observed low-level port map condition.