JN0-364 Premium File
- 69 Questions & Answers
- Last Update: Nov 4, 2026
The on-call engineer at Silverpeak Data Networks receives this fault report: An edge advertises unapproved internal prefixes after an operator broadens a BGP export term beyond the intended customer route set. What initial check best isolates the actual failing protocol stage?
Check source route active state and `show route advertising-protocol bgp` with ordered export terms for the exact prefix. A healthy BGP session does not bypass an export filter, and a local active prefix is not necessarily advertised to every peer.
That evidence could be normal while the reported defect persists. It is aimed at: A received iBGP route is visible in inet.0 but inactive because its BGP next hop cannot be resolved through the IGP. Instead inspect: Check source route active state and `show route advertising-protocol bgp` with ordered export terms for the exact prefix.
The check diagnoses a different layer of service. Its source issue is: A neighbor's agreed selective-routing behavior fails because a community is added after the rejecting export term rather than before policy selection. The relevant initial check is: Check source route active state and `show route advertising-protocol bgp` with ordered export terms for the exact prefix.
This check may help with another root cause, for example: A BGP speaker learns a route from one iBGP peer but does not pass it to another internal peer, causing partial prefix visibility. It does not test the first failed condition; start with: Check source route active state and `show route advertising-protocol bgp` with ordered export terms for the exact prefix.
The provider operations team at Cloverbank Mobile reports: A provider receives a malformed or unauthorized customer prefix yet it enters route selection after a loose import policy. Which implementation decision best corrects the cause?
The other action is relevant when The provider expects a shorter AS path to win, but another path has a deliberately higher local preference and is selected instead. The current case instead requires: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes. The distinction is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.
That would address a separate configuration fault: A service route remains hidden after an eBGP-to-iBGP handoff; the internal router knows the prefix but not a path to its advertised next hop. This stem identifies a different cause, corrected by: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.
Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes. The case-specific reason is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active. A direct acceptance test is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.
The other action is relevant when An operator changes local preference on its own router expecting a remote AS to honor it, but the remote side never receives that attribute. The current case instead requires: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes. The distinction is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.
During a post-change check at Cloverbank Mobile, the original condition was: A provider receives a malformed or unauthorized customer prefix yet it enters route selection after a loose import policy. What evidence would validate the corrected behavior?
That check proves something else, such as: A provider changed a partner's ASN, leaving the old `peer-as` on its Junos BGP group while TCP connection attempts continue. It could pass while the stated problem remains. The targeted evidence here is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.
That check proves something else, such as: An edge advertises unapproved internal prefixes after an operator broadens a BGP export term beyond the intended customer route set. It could pass while the stated problem remains. The targeted evidence here is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.
This would be valid for another situation: The provider expects a shorter AS path to win, but another path has a deliberately higher local preference and is selected instead. It does not establish that the failing boundary in this scenario works; verify: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.
The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design. Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.
At Cloverbank Mobile, an engineer is asked to explain this case: A provider receives a malformed or unauthorized customer prefix yet it enters route selection after a loose import policy. Which underlying routing or switching principle accounts for the appropriate solution?
This explains a separate protocol behavior: A carrier tags customer routes with a standard BGP community to drive downstream policy, but the tag never appears beyond the ingress edge. In the current facts, the controlling mechanism is: Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward.
The statement can be true when An edge advertises unapproved internal prefixes after an operator broadens a BGP export term beyond the intended customer route set. But it does not explain the reported failure. Here: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.
Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward. The key distinction is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active. Accordingly the remedy is: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.
This explains a separate protocol behavior: An operator changes local preference on its own router expecting a remote AS to honor it, but the remote side never receives that attribute. In the current facts, the controlling mechanism is: Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward.
A risk assessment at Cloverbank Mobile identifies: A provider receives a malformed or unauthorized customer prefix yet it enters route selection after a loose import policy. Which practical consequence is most specifically tied to this failure?
The concern could occur elsewhere when An intermittent control-plane firewall blocks one BGP packet class, and operators need to separate OPEN, KEEPALIVE, UPDATE and NOTIFICATION behavior. For the stated scenario, the immediate risk is: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.
Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import. The direct mitigation is: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.
That consequence is more closely associated with another deficiency, such as: A carrier tags customer routes with a standard BGP community to drive downstream policy, but the tag never appears beyond the ingress edge. The described fault instead exposes: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.
It is a risk in another topology or protocol state: A backbone operator needs to prefer a primary egress for all internal routers without changing the external partner's AS path length. Here the most direct failure path is: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.
The on-call engineer at Cloverbank Mobile receives this fault report: A provider receives a malformed or unauthorized customer prefix yet it enters route selection after a loose import policy. What initial check best isolates the actual failing protocol stage?
The check diagnoses a different layer of service. Its source issue is: A transit customer prefix is locally active but never advertised to an approved eBGP neighbor because the export policy's final term rejects it. The relevant initial check is: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.
Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group. Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.
That evidence could be normal while the reported defect persists. It is aimed at: Two paths learned inside one AS reach the same destination; the selected exit conflicts with policy despite the chosen link having fewer AS hops. Instead inspect: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.
The check diagnoses a different layer of service. Its source issue is: An intermittent control-plane firewall blocks one BGP packet class, and operators need to separate OPEN, KEEPALIVE, UPDATE and NOTIFICATION behavior. The relevant initial check is: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.
A production change request at Redleaf Airports includes this finding: A planned customer route appears in the partner's advertisements but Junos rejects it at an early inbound policy term. What should the engineer change to address it?
This action may apply to a different problem, for example: An operator changes local preference on its own router expecting a remote AS to honor it, but the remote side never receives that attribute. It does not repair the stated failure boundary. The case-specific reason is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.
The other action is relevant when Two neighboring providers configured for eBGP have IP reachability but the BGP session remains Active because one side uses the wrong peer AS number. The current case instead requires: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes. The distinction is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.
That would address a separate configuration fault: A backbone operator needs to prefer a primary egress for all internal routers without changing the external partner's AS path length. This stem identifies a different cause, corrected by: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.
Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes. The case-specific reason is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active. A direct acceptance test is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.
After Redleaf Airports applies its proposed fix to this problem — A planned customer route appears in the partner's advertisements but Junos rejects it at an early inbound policy term. — which observation best proves the specific failure has been resolved?
The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design. Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.
The observation confirms a different component's behavior. Its source context is: The provider expects a shorter AS path to win, but another path has a deliberately higher local preference and is selected instead. In this case the success criterion is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.
That check proves something else, such as: An operator changes local preference on its own router expecting a remote AS to honor it, but the remote side never receives that attribute. It could pass while the stated problem remains. The targeted evidence here is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.
This would be valid for another situation: Two paths learned inside one AS reach the same destination; the selected exit conflicts with policy despite the chosen link having fewer AS hops. It does not establish that the failing boundary in this scenario works; verify: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.
An architecture review at Redleaf Airports examines the following symptom: A planned customer route appears in the partner's advertisements but Junos rejects it at an early inbound policy term. What Junos or protocol mechanism is most directly responsible?
That principle belongs to a different service stage: An operator changes local preference on its own router expecting a remote AS to honor it, but the remote side never receives that attribute. The directly relevant mechanism is: Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward.
This explains a separate protocol behavior: Two paths learned inside one AS reach the same destination; the selected exit conflicts with policy despite the chosen link having fewer AS hops. In the current facts, the controlling mechanism is: Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward.
The statement can be true when A router has eBGP paths with equal relevant attributes and the operations team assumes both will automatically enter the forwarding table. But it does not explain the reported failure. Here: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.
Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward. The key distinction is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active. Accordingly the remedy is: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.
The team at Redleaf Airports defers a fix for this condition: A planned customer route appears in the partner's advertisements but Junos rejects it at an early inbound policy term. What failure is most likely if no targeted control is applied?
That consequence is more closely associated with another deficiency, such as: A backbone operator needs to prefer a primary egress for all internal routers without changing the external partner's AS path length. The described fault instead exposes: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.
It is a risk in another topology or protocol state: A transit customer prefix is locally active but never advertised to an approved eBGP neighbor because the export policy's final term rejects it. Here the most direct failure path is: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.
Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import. The direct mitigation is: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.
That consequence is more closely associated with another deficiency, such as: A team assumes periodic UPDATE messages keep a quiet BGP session alive, but the route table is stable and no updates are due. The described fault instead exposes: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.
During provider troubleshooting at Redleaf Airports, this symptom is observed: A planned customer route appears in the partner's advertisements but Junos rejects it at an early inbound policy term. Which targeted inspection should precede remediation?
That evidence could be normal while the reported defect persists. It is aimed at: A router has eBGP paths with equal relevant attributes and the operations team assumes both will automatically enter the forwarding table. Instead inspect: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.
Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group. Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.
This check may help with another root cause, for example: A backbone operator needs to prefer a primary egress for all internal routers without changing the external partner's AS path length. It does not test the first failed condition; start with: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.
That evidence could be normal while the reported defect persists. It is aimed at: A team assumes periodic UPDATE messages keep a quiet BGP session alive, but the route table is stable and no updates are due. Instead inspect: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.
Please check your mailbox for a message from support@examlabs.com and follow the directions.