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Service Provider Routing and Switching, Specialist (JNCIS-SP) JN0-364 Practice Test 38

Question 370

The on-call engineer at Silverpeak Data Networks receives this fault report: An edge advertises unapproved internal prefixes after an operator broadens a BGP export term beyond the intended customer route set. What initial check best isolates the actual failing protocol stage?

  1. Check source route active state and `show route advertising-protocol bgp` with ordered export terms for the exact prefix.
  2. Inspect the received route's next-hop field and `show route <next-hop>` resolution path, then check the IGP transport route.
  3. Inspect the prefix's community list before and after import/export policy and compare route term ordering.
  4. Check peer topology and route advertisement path for a specific iBGP-learned prefix, identifying a missing full mesh or reflector role.

Correct answer: A

Explanation of each choice

A.

Check source route active state and `show route advertising-protocol bgp` with ordered export terms for the exact prefix. A healthy BGP session does not bypass an export filter, and a local active prefix is not necessarily advertised to every peer.

B.

That evidence could be normal while the reported defect persists. It is aimed at: A received iBGP route is visible in inet.0 but inactive because its BGP next hop cannot be resolved through the IGP. Instead inspect: Check source route active state and `show route advertising-protocol bgp` with ordered export terms for the exact prefix.

C.

The check diagnoses a different layer of service. Its source issue is: A neighbor's agreed selective-routing behavior fails because a community is added after the rejecting export term rather than before policy selection. The relevant initial check is: Check source route active state and `show route advertising-protocol bgp` with ordered export terms for the exact prefix.

D.

This check may help with another root cause, for example: A BGP speaker learns a route from one iBGP peer but does not pass it to another internal peer, causing partial prefix visibility. It does not test the first failed condition; start with: Check source route active state and `show route advertising-protocol bgp` with ordered export terms for the exact prefix.

Question 371

The provider operations team at Cloverbank Mobile reports: A provider receives a malformed or unauthorized customer prefix yet it enters route selection after a loose import policy. Which implementation decision best corrects the cause?

  1. Verify the applicable earlier decision attributes, then compare AS path length and apply an approved AS-path policy if a deliberate longer path is required.
  2. Restore reachability to the advertised BGP next-hop address through the correct IGP or appropriate next-hop handling, then verify route eligibility.
  3. Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.
  4. Use an appropriate externally communicated MED or an agreed inbound routing policy and verify the neighbor's comparison behavior and limitations.

Correct answer: C

Explanation of each choice

A.

The other action is relevant when The provider expects a shorter AS path to win, but another path has a deliberately higher local preference and is selected instead. The current case instead requires: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes. The distinction is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.

B.

That would address a separate configuration fault: A service route remains hidden after an eBGP-to-iBGP handoff; the internal router knows the prefix but not a path to its advertised next hop. This stem identifies a different cause, corrected by: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.

C.

Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes. The case-specific reason is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active. A direct acceptance test is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.

D.

The other action is relevant when An operator changes local preference on its own router expecting a remote AS to honor it, but the remote side never receives that attribute. The current case instead requires: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes. The distinction is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.

Question 372

During a post-change check at Cloverbank Mobile, the original condition was: A provider receives a malformed or unauthorized customer prefix yet it enters route selection after a loose import policy. What evidence would validate the corrected behavior?

  1. The BGP TCP session establishes, OPEN negotiation accepts the correct AS information and the peer reaches Established before routes are evaluated.
  2. The neighbor receives only intended active advertised routes with correct attributes; internal and reserved prefixes are not leaked.
  3. Best-path output shows the anticipated winner with equal preceding attributes and the intended AS-path length or policy influence.
  4. The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.

Correct answer: D

Explanation of each choice

A.

That check proves something else, such as: A provider changed a partner's ASN, leaving the old `peer-as` on its Junos BGP group while TCP connection attempts continue. It could pass while the stated problem remains. The targeted evidence here is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.

B.

That check proves something else, such as: An edge advertises unapproved internal prefixes after an operator broadens a BGP export term beyond the intended customer route set. It could pass while the stated problem remains. The targeted evidence here is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.

C.

This would be valid for another situation: The provider expects a shorter AS path to win, but another path has a deliberately higher local preference and is selected instead. It does not establish that the failing boundary in this scenario works; verify: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.

D.

The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design. Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.

Question 373

At Cloverbank Mobile, an engineer is asked to explain this case: A provider receives a malformed or unauthorized customer prefix yet it enters route selection after a loose import policy. Which underlying routing or switching principle accounts for the appropriate solution?

  1. BGP communities are transitive policy tags when preserved and permitted; they do not themselves impose forwarding without route-policy interpretation.
  2. Ordered Junos BGP export policies determine which eligible local routes are advertised to a BGP group or neighbor.
  3. Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward.
  4. MED suggests a preferred entry point to a neighboring AS under its own BGP selection rules; local preference is internal to an AS.

Correct answer: C

Explanation of each choice

A.

This explains a separate protocol behavior: A carrier tags customer routes with a standard BGP community to drive downstream policy, but the tag never appears beyond the ingress edge. In the current facts, the controlling mechanism is: Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward.

B.

The statement can be true when An edge advertises unapproved internal prefixes after an operator broadens a BGP export term beyond the intended customer route set. But it does not explain the reported failure. Here: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.

C.

Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward. The key distinction is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active. Accordingly the remedy is: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.

D.

This explains a separate protocol behavior: An operator changes local preference on its own router expecting a remote AS to honor it, but the remote side never receives that attribute. In the current facts, the controlling mechanism is: Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward.

Question 374

A risk assessment at Cloverbank Mobile identifies: A provider receives a malformed or unauthorized customer prefix yet it enters route selection after a loose import policy. Which practical consequence is most specifically tied to this failure?

  1. Blocking a required message class causes hold-time expiration, session resets or missing reachability updates despite an otherwise healthy link.
  2. Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.
  3. A policy tag may be lost or misapplied, causing unintended route handling or loss of a contracted service path.
  4. Traffic may exit through the wrong carrier, producing inconsistent routing or unwanted transit cost across the AS.

Correct answer: B

Explanation of each choice

A.

The concern could occur elsewhere when An intermittent control-plane firewall blocks one BGP packet class, and operators need to separate OPEN, KEEPALIVE, UPDATE and NOTIFICATION behavior. For the stated scenario, the immediate risk is: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.

B.

Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import. The direct mitigation is: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.

C.

That consequence is more closely associated with another deficiency, such as: A carrier tags customer routes with a standard BGP community to drive downstream policy, but the tag never appears beyond the ingress edge. The described fault instead exposes: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.

D.

It is a risk in another topology or protocol state: A backbone operator needs to prefer a primary egress for all internal routers without changing the external partner's AS path length. Here the most direct failure path is: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.

Question 375

The on-call engineer at Cloverbank Mobile receives this fault report: A provider receives a malformed or unauthorized customer prefix yet it enters route selection after a loose import policy. What initial check best isolates the actual failing protocol stage?

  1. Check source route active state and `show route advertising-protocol bgp` with ordered export terms for the exact prefix.
  2. Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.
  3. Compare best paths and local-preference values for the exact prefix on internal speakers and identify the import policy setting it.
  4. Inspect neighbor flap reasons, hold timers and a TCP/179 packet trace to identify which BGP message type fails.

Correct answer: B

Explanation of each choice

A.

The check diagnoses a different layer of service. Its source issue is: A transit customer prefix is locally active but never advertised to an approved eBGP neighbor because the export policy's final term rejects it. The relevant initial check is: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.

B.

Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group. Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.

C.

That evidence could be normal while the reported defect persists. It is aimed at: Two paths learned inside one AS reach the same destination; the selected exit conflicts with policy despite the chosen link having fewer AS hops. Instead inspect: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.

D.

The check diagnoses a different layer of service. Its source issue is: An intermittent control-plane firewall blocks one BGP packet class, and operators need to separate OPEN, KEEPALIVE, UPDATE and NOTIFICATION behavior. The relevant initial check is: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.

Question 376

A production change request at Redleaf Airports includes this finding: A planned customer route appears in the partner's advertisements but Junos rejects it at an early inbound policy term. What should the engineer change to address it?

  1. Use an appropriate externally communicated MED or an agreed inbound routing policy and verify the neighbor's comparison behavior and limitations.
  2. Set the correct local/peer AS relationship and neighbor addressing for the eBGP group, ensuring port 179 connectivity as required.
  3. Set a suitable higher BGP local preference on the desired imported egress route and propagate it consistently inside the AS.
  4. Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.

Correct answer: D

Explanation of each choice

A.

This action may apply to a different problem, for example: An operator changes local preference on its own router expecting a remote AS to honor it, but the remote side never receives that attribute. It does not repair the stated failure boundary. The case-specific reason is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.

B.

The other action is relevant when Two neighboring providers configured for eBGP have IP reachability but the BGP session remains Active because one side uses the wrong peer AS number. The current case instead requires: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes. The distinction is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.

C.

That would address a separate configuration fault: A backbone operator needs to prefer a primary egress for all internal routers without changing the external partner's AS path length. This stem identifies a different cause, corrected by: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.

D.

Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes. The case-specific reason is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active. A direct acceptance test is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.

Question 377

After Redleaf Airports applies its proposed fix to this problem — A planned customer route appears in the partner's advertisements but Junos rejects it at an early inbound policy term. — which observation best proves the specific failure has been resolved?

  1. The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.
  2. Best-path output shows the anticipated winner with equal preceding attributes and the intended AS-path length or policy influence.
  3. The neighboring AS receives the intended MED values where applicable and its selected ingress matches the mutually understood path policy.
  4. Internal routers choose the policy-preferred egress based on higher local preference before comparing later path-selection attributes.

Correct answer: A

Explanation of each choice

A.

The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design. Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.

B.

The observation confirms a different component's behavior. Its source context is: The provider expects a shorter AS path to win, but another path has a deliberately higher local preference and is selected instead. In this case the success criterion is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.

C.

That check proves something else, such as: An operator changes local preference on its own router expecting a remote AS to honor it, but the remote side never receives that attribute. It could pass while the stated problem remains. The targeted evidence here is: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.

D.

This would be valid for another situation: Two paths learned inside one AS reach the same destination; the selected exit conflicts with policy despite the chosen link having fewer AS hops. It does not establish that the failing boundary in this scenario works; verify: The intended prefix appears as an eligible received route while blocked prefixes remain rejected, with policy counters matching the design.

Question 378

An architecture review at Redleaf Airports examines the following symptom: A planned customer route appears in the partner's advertisements but Junos rejects it at an early inbound policy term. What Junos or protocol mechanism is most directly responsible?

  1. MED suggests a preferred entry point to a neighboring AS under its own BGP selection rules; local preference is internal to an AS.
  2. BGP local preference is carried within an autonomous system and favors larger values for route selection; it is not advertised to external eBGP peers.
  3. BGP multipath allows multiple sufficiently equal eligible BGP paths to contribute forwarding next hops, subject to routing-policy and hardware constraints.
  4. Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward.

Correct answer: D

Explanation of each choice

A.

That principle belongs to a different service stage: An operator changes local preference on its own router expecting a remote AS to honor it, but the remote side never receives that attribute. The directly relevant mechanism is: Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward.

B.

This explains a separate protocol behavior: Two paths learned inside one AS reach the same destination; the selected exit conflicts with policy despite the chosen link having fewer AS hops. In the current facts, the controlling mechanism is: Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward.

C.

The statement can be true when A router has eBGP paths with equal relevant attributes and the operations team assumes both will automatically enter the forwarding table. But it does not explain the reported failure. Here: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.

D.

Junos BGP import policy screens and modifies routes as they enter BGP route consideration rather than controlling what the local router advertises outward. The key distinction is: Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active. Accordingly the remedy is: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.

Question 379

The team at Redleaf Airports defers a fix for this condition: A planned customer route appears in the partner's advertisements but Junos rejects it at an early inbound policy term. What failure is most likely if no targeted control is applied?

  1. Traffic may exit through the wrong carrier, producing inconsistent routing or unwanted transit cost across the AS.
  2. Overly broad export leaks internal routing information or turns the edge into unwanted transit; overly narrow policy withholds customers.
  3. Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.
  4. Blocking a required message class causes hold-time expiration, session resets or missing reachability updates despite an otherwise healthy link.

Correct answer: C

Explanation of each choice

A.

That consequence is more closely associated with another deficiency, such as: A backbone operator needs to prefer a primary egress for all internal routers without changing the external partner's AS path length. The described fault instead exposes: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.

B.

It is a risk in another topology or protocol state: A transit customer prefix is locally active but never advertised to an approved eBGP neighbor because the export policy's final term rejects it. Here the most direct failure path is: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.

C.

Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import. The direct mitigation is: Adjust the neighbor's ordered BGP import policy to accept only authorized prefixes and expected attributes, then validate the received and accepted routes.

D.

That consequence is more closely associated with another deficiency, such as: A team assumes periodic UPDATE messages keep a quiet BGP session alive, but the route table is stable and no updates are due. The described fault instead exposes: Unwanted prefixes can become active, or intended reachability can be lost if a legitimate route is rejected at import.

Question 380

During provider troubleshooting at Redleaf Airports, this symptom is observed: A planned customer route appears in the partner's advertisements but Junos rejects it at an early inbound policy term. Which targeted inspection should precede remediation?

  1. Inspect best-path and alternate path attributes, multipath configuration and the forwarding next-hop group for the exact destination.
  2. Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.
  3. Compare best paths and local-preference values for the exact prefix on internal speakers and identify the import policy setting it.
  4. Inspect neighbor flap reasons, hold timers and a TCP/179 packet trace to identify which BGP message type fails.

Correct answer: B

Explanation of each choice

A.

That evidence could be normal while the reported defect persists. It is aimed at: A router has eBGP paths with equal relevant attributes and the operations team assumes both will automatically enter the forwarding table. Instead inspect: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.

B.

Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group. Import filters inbound information; editing outbound export alone cannot make a rejected incoming path active.

C.

This check may help with another root cause, for example: A backbone operator needs to prefer a primary egress for all internal routers without changing the external partner's AS path length. It does not test the first failed condition; start with: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.

D.

That evidence could be normal while the reported defect persists. It is aimed at: A team assumes periodic UPDATE messages keep a quiet BGP session alive, but the route table is stable and no updates are due. Instead inspect: Inspect received advertised routes, route-hidden reasons and the exact ordered import policy attached to the BGP group.

Service Provider Routing and Switching, Specialist (JNCIS-SP) (JN0-364) Practice Tests

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