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Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) JN0-650 Practice Test 22

Question 210

A new BGP policy changes outbound community values, but previously advertised routes still display old metadata at the downstream peer. The proposed correction is: Trigger and verify an appropriate policy refresh or update mechanism supported by the BGP peers. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?

  1. The intended extended-community values appear on the received route and relevant policies match them.
  2. The downstream advertised route shows the updated community without unplanned neighbor disruption.
  3. The unreachable candidate is rejected and an eligible alternative becomes active when reachable.
  4. The Open exchange succeeds and neighbor state reaches Established for the intended ASN.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The downstream advertised route shows the updated community without unplanned neighbor disruption. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: A new BGP policy changes outbound community values, but previously advertised routes still display old metadata at the downstream peer. The mechanism being validated is: BGP advertisements reflect routing policy and may require controlled re-evaluation after changes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The intended extended-community values appear on the received route and relevant policies match them. That would validate a different condition: Two routers share BGP routes but their intended extended-community values are absent at a downstream policy boundary. The decisive check for the current issue is: The downstream advertised route shows the updated community without unplanned neighbor disruption.

C:

The unreachable candidate is rejected and an eligible alternative becomes active when reachable. That would validate a different condition: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. The decisive check for the current issue is: The downstream advertised route shows the updated community without unplanned neighbor disruption.

D:

The Open exchange succeeds and neighbor state reaches Established for the intended ASN. That would validate a different condition: BGP session establishment fails after one side is configured for the wrong remote autonomous system number. The decisive check for the current issue is: The downstream advertised route shows the updated community without unplanned neighbor disruption.

Question 211

A Junos engineer proposes this response: Trigger and verify an appropriate policy refresh or update mechanism supported by the BGP peers. The situation is: A new BGP policy changes outbound community values, but previously advertised routes still display old metadata at the downstream peer. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?

  1. Extended communities provide structured BGP route metadata for supported applications and policies.
  2. BGP next-hop resolution depends on current reachability supplied by the routing table.
  3. BGP advertisements reflect routing policy and may require controlled re-evaluation after changes.
  4. BGP OPEN messages validate negotiated peer AS identity as part of session setup.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

BGP advertisements reflect routing policy and may require controlled re-evaluation after changes. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: A new BGP policy changes outbound community values, but previously advertised routes still display old metadata at the downstream peer. It predicts the acceptance result: The downstream advertised route shows the updated community without unplanned neighbor disruption.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Extended communities provide structured BGP route metadata for supported applications and policies. This principle explains a separate situation: Two routers share BGP routes but their intended extended-community values are absent at a downstream policy boundary. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: BGP advertisements reflect routing policy and may require controlled re-evaluation after changes.

B:

BGP next-hop resolution depends on current reachability supplied by the routing table. This principle explains a separate situation: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: BGP advertisements reflect routing policy and may require controlled re-evaluation after changes.

D:

BGP OPEN messages validate negotiated peer AS identity as part of session setup. This principle explains a separate situation: BGP session establishment fails after one side is configured for the wrong remote autonomous system number. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: BGP advertisements reflect routing policy and may require controlled re-evaluation after changes.

Question 212

A new BGP policy changes outbound community values, but previously advertised routes still display old metadata at the downstream peer. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Trigger and verify an appropriate policy refresh or update mechanism supported by the BGP peers.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?

  1. Losing required extended-community metadata can break downstream tagging or route-target policy.
  2. Keeping an invalid recursive next hop can create a control-plane route without usable forwarding.
  3. A wrong remote AS expectation causes BGP session resets despite basic TCP reachability.
  4. Assuming a locally changed policy is already reflected remotely can conceal stale announcements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Assuming a locally changed policy is already reflected remotely can conceal stale announcements. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: A new BGP policy changes outbound community values, but previously advertised routes still display old metadata at the downstream peer. It is prevented by: Trigger and verify an appropriate policy refresh or update mechanism supported by the BGP peers. The underlying reason is: BGP advertisements reflect routing policy and may require controlled re-evaluation after changes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Losing required extended-community metadata can break downstream tagging or route-target policy. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: Two routers share BGP routes but their intended extended-community values are absent at a downstream policy boundary. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Assuming a locally changed policy is already reflected remotely can conceal stale announcements. The appropriate mitigation is: Trigger and verify an appropriate policy refresh or update mechanism supported by the BGP peers.

B:

Keeping an invalid recursive next hop can create a control-plane route without usable forwarding. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Assuming a locally changed policy is already reflected remotely can conceal stale announcements. The appropriate mitigation is: Trigger and verify an appropriate policy refresh or update mechanism supported by the BGP peers.

C:

A wrong remote AS expectation causes BGP session resets despite basic TCP reachability. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: BGP session establishment fails after one side is configured for the wrong remote autonomous system number. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Assuming a locally changed policy is already reflected remotely can conceal stale announcements. The appropriate mitigation is: Trigger and verify an appropriate policy refresh or update mechanism supported by the BGP peers.

Question 213

A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. Which targeted engineering change is MOST directly justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Apply a BGP import policy rejecting 0.0.0.0/0 and accepting only the planned application prefixes.
  2. Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop.
  3. Confirm the appropriate family and community propagation settings on the BGP peering path.
  4. Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop. This change specifically addresses the reported evidence: A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. The relevant protocol mechanism is: Communities signal policy intent; forwarding behavior requires an explicit local action. A decisive acceptance test would be: The targeted route is installed with a discard treatment, while unrelated routes are unaffected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Apply a BGP import policy rejecting 0.0.0.0/0 and accepting only the planned application prefixes. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A Junos border router receives a default from a supplier, but company policy requires rejecting that default while accepting partner application networks. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. The required targeted change is: Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop.

C:

Confirm the appropriate family and community propagation settings on the BGP peering path. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: Two routers share BGP routes but their intended extended-community values are absent at a downstream policy boundary. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. The required targeted change is: Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop.

D:

Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. The required targeted change is: Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop.

Question 214

A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. The proposed correction is: Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?

  1. The default is absent from eligible BGP routes while specified partner prefixes remain available.
  2. Community-tagged routes are processed according to policy while other routes take the default rejection.
  3. The targeted route is installed with a discard treatment, while unrelated routes are unaffected.
  4. The affected prefix becomes eligible under a correct policy or displays an intentional reject reason.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The targeted route is installed with a discard treatment, while unrelated routes are unaffected. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. The mechanism being validated is: Communities signal policy intent; forwarding behavior requires an explicit local action.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The default is absent from eligible BGP routes while specified partner prefixes remain available. That would validate a different condition: A Junos border router receives a default from a supplier, but company policy requires rejecting that default while accepting partner application networks. The decisive check for the current issue is: The targeted route is installed with a discard treatment, while unrelated routes are unaffected.

B:

Community-tagged routes are processed according to policy while other routes take the default rejection. That would validate a different condition: A BGP policy marks customer prefixes with a specific community, but the receiving policy has no match and permits unrestricted redistribution. The decisive check for the current issue is: The targeted route is installed with a discard treatment, while unrelated routes are unaffected.

D:

The affected prefix becomes eligible under a correct policy or displays an intentional reject reason. That would validate a different condition: After an import policy change, a received BGP route remains visible as hidden instead of installed even though the session is Established. The decisive check for the current issue is: The targeted route is installed with a discard treatment, while unrelated routes are unaffected.

Question 215

A Junos engineer proposes this response: Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop. The situation is: A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?

  1. Junos BGP import policies filter and modify routes entering the local BGP RIB.
  2. BGP communities are attachable route tags used by configured routing policies.
  3. A BGP Established session does not guarantee all received routes are eligible for active routing.
  4. Communities signal policy intent; forwarding behavior requires an explicit local action.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Communities signal policy intent; forwarding behavior requires an explicit local action. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. It predicts the acceptance result: The targeted route is installed with a discard treatment, while unrelated routes are unaffected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Junos BGP import policies filter and modify routes entering the local BGP RIB. This principle explains a separate situation: A Junos border router receives a default from a supplier, but company policy requires rejecting that default while accepting partner application networks. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: Communities signal policy intent; forwarding behavior requires an explicit local action.

B:

BGP communities are attachable route tags used by configured routing policies. This principle explains a separate situation: A BGP policy marks customer prefixes with a specific community, but the receiving policy has no match and permits unrestricted redistribution. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: Communities signal policy intent; forwarding behavior requires an explicit local action.

C:

A BGP Established session does not guarantee all received routes are eligible for active routing. This principle explains a separate situation: After an import policy change, a received BGP route remains visible as hidden instead of installed even though the session is Established. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: Communities signal policy intent; forwarding behavior requires an explicit local action.

Question 216

A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?

  1. Treating a community value as a universal automatic security filter leaves unwanted traffic permitted.
  2. An overly broad accept can introduce an unplanned external default route and divert all traffic.
  3. A community alone does not enforce traffic policy until a receiver applies a matching action.
  4. Restarting an otherwise healthy peering cannot fix a deterministic routing policy rejection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Treating a community value as a universal automatic security filter leaves unwanted traffic permitted. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: A border router receives a route tagged with an expected blackhole community, but no downstream filter implements the associated traffic-handling action. It is prevented by: Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop. The underlying reason is: Communities signal policy intent; forwarding behavior requires an explicit local action.

Incorrect Answers

B:

An overly broad accept can introduce an unplanned external default route and divert all traffic. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A Junos border router receives a default from a supplier, but company policy requires rejecting that default while accepting partner application networks. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Treating a community value as a universal automatic security filter leaves unwanted traffic permitted. The appropriate mitigation is: Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop.

C:

A community alone does not enforce traffic policy until a receiver applies a matching action. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A BGP policy marks customer prefixes with a specific community, but the receiving policy has no match and permits unrestricted redistribution. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Treating a community value as a universal automatic security filter leaves unwanted traffic permitted. The appropriate mitigation is: Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop.

D:

Restarting an otherwise healthy peering cannot fix a deterministic routing policy rejection. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: After an import policy change, a received BGP route remains visible as hidden instead of installed even though the session is Established. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Treating a community value as a universal automatic security filter leaves unwanted traffic permitted. The appropriate mitigation is: Create a carefully scoped policy that matches the authorized community and applies the intended discard next hop.

Question 217

After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. Which targeted engineering change is MOST directly justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Check Junos BGP selection order and the IGP cost to each reachable next hop.
  2. Trigger and verify an appropriate policy refresh or update mechanism supported by the BGP peers.
  3. Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes.
  4. Allow authenticated, narrowly scoped TCP/179 between the intended EBGP endpoints and verify session parameters.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes. This change specifically addresses the reported evidence: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. The relevant protocol mechanism is: BGP next-hop resolution depends on current reachability supplied by the routing table. A decisive acceptance test would be: The unreachable candidate is rejected and an eligible alternative becomes active when reachable.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Check Junos BGP selection order and the IGP cost to each reachable next hop. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: The enterprise wants to steer traffic toward the upstream with lower IGP cost only after local preference and AS-path checks tie. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. The required targeted change is: Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes.

B:

Trigger and verify an appropriate policy refresh or update mechanism supported by the BGP peers. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A new BGP policy changes outbound community values, but previously advertised routes still display old metadata at the downstream peer. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. The required targeted change is: Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes.

D:

Allow authenticated, narrowly scoped TCP/179 between the intended EBGP endpoints and verify session parameters. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A new BGP neighbor is stuck in Active despite a valid static route to its IP address, and TCP port 179 is blocked on the transit firewall. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. The required targeted change is: Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes.

Question 218

After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. The proposed correction is: Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?

  1. The chosen best path follows the correct egress-cost tie-break once earlier attributes tie.
  2. The downstream advertised route shows the updated community without unplanned neighbor disruption.
  3. The peer establishes its TCP session and enters Established with received NLRI.
  4. The unreachable candidate is rejected and an eligible alternative becomes active when reachable.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The unreachable candidate is rejected and an eligible alternative becomes active when reachable. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. The mechanism being validated is: BGP next-hop resolution depends on current reachability supplied by the routing table.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The chosen best path follows the correct egress-cost tie-break once earlier attributes tie. That would validate a different condition: The enterprise wants to steer traffic toward the upstream with lower IGP cost only after local preference and AS-path checks tie. The decisive check for the current issue is: The unreachable candidate is rejected and an eligible alternative becomes active when reachable.

B:

The downstream advertised route shows the updated community without unplanned neighbor disruption. That would validate a different condition: A new BGP policy changes outbound community values, but previously advertised routes still display old metadata at the downstream peer. The decisive check for the current issue is: The unreachable candidate is rejected and an eligible alternative becomes active when reachable.

C:

The peer establishes its TCP session and enters Established with received NLRI. That would validate a different condition: A new BGP neighbor is stuck in Active despite a valid static route to its IP address, and TCP port 179 is blocked on the transit firewall. The decisive check for the current issue is: The unreachable candidate is rejected and an eligible alternative becomes active when reachable.

Question 219

A Junos engineer proposes this response: Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes. The situation is: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?

  1. BGP next-hop resolution depends on current reachability supplied by the routing table.
  2. BGP path selection considers interior cost only after higher-priority BGP attribute comparisons.
  3. BGP advertisements reflect routing policy and may require controlled re-evaluation after changes.
  4. BGP establishes a reliable TCP transport session before exchanging routing updates.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

BGP next-hop resolution depends on current reachability supplied by the routing table. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. It predicts the acceptance result: The unreachable candidate is rejected and an eligible alternative becomes active when reachable.

Incorrect Answers

B:

BGP path selection considers interior cost only after higher-priority BGP attribute comparisons. This principle explains a separate situation: The enterprise wants to steer traffic toward the upstream with lower IGP cost only after local preference and AS-path checks tie. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: BGP next-hop resolution depends on current reachability supplied by the routing table.

C:

BGP advertisements reflect routing policy and may require controlled re-evaluation after changes. This principle explains a separate situation: A new BGP policy changes outbound community values, but previously advertised routes still display old metadata at the downstream peer. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: BGP next-hop resolution depends on current reachability supplied by the routing table.

D:

BGP establishes a reliable TCP transport session before exchanging routing updates. This principle explains a separate situation: A new BGP neighbor is stuck in Active despite a valid static route to its IP address, and TCP port 179 is blocked on the transit firewall. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: BGP next-hop resolution depends on current reachability supplied by the routing table.

Question 220

After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?

  1. Tuning IGP cost when local preference differs will not change the selected BGP path.
  2. Keeping an invalid recursive next hop can create a control-plane route without usable forwarding.
  3. Failing to account for hop count and source address can prevent the intended multihop BGP session.
  4. Losing required extended-community metadata can break downstream tagging or route-target policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Keeping an invalid recursive next hop can create a control-plane route without usable forwarding. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: After a redundancy event, BGP still prefers an old path whose underlying transport next hop stopped resolving in the new IGP topology. It is prevented by: Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes. The underlying reason is: BGP next-hop resolution depends on current reachability supplied by the routing table.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Tuning IGP cost when local preference differs will not change the selected BGP path. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: The enterprise wants to steer traffic toward the upstream with lower IGP cost only after local preference and AS-path checks tie. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Keeping an invalid recursive next hop can create a control-plane route without usable forwarding. The appropriate mitigation is: Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes.

C:

Failing to account for hop count and source address can prevent the intended multihop BGP session. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: An EBGP neighbor has a reachable loopback address two IP hops away, but a default one-hop peering design cannot establish the session. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Keeping an invalid recursive next hop can create a control-plane route without usable forwarding. The appropriate mitigation is: Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes.

D:

Losing required extended-community metadata can break downstream tagging or route-target policy. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: Two routers share BGP routes but their intended extended-community values are absent at a downstream policy boundary. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Keeping an invalid recursive next hop can create a control-plane route without usable forwarding. The appropriate mitigation is: Inspect next-hop recursive resolution and refresh the relevant IGP reachability before tuning BGP attributes.

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