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Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) JN0-650 Practice Test 3

Question 20

An OSPFv2 area is designed as stub but one internal router still treats it as a normal area, preventing stable neighbor operation. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Make the stub-area configuration consistent across every router attached to that area.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?

  1. Looking only for IPv6 prefixes in OSPFv3 router LSAs can hide the actual prefix propagation problem.
  2. Allowing uncontrolled OSPF neighbors on a user LAN broadens the routing-control-plane attack surface.
  3. Restarting healthy neighbors cannot correct a routing policy that rejects desired learned routes.
  4. A mismatched area capability or external LSA leakage prevents intended stub operation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A mismatched area capability or external LSA leakage prevents intended stub operation. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: An OSPFv2 area is designed as stub but one internal router still treats it as a normal area, preventing stable neighbor operation. It is prevented by: Make the stub-area configuration consistent across every router attached to that area. The underlying reason is: The OSPF stub capability must agree among routers in the same area.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Looking only for IPv6 prefixes in OSPFv3 router LSAs can hide the actual prefix propagation problem. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: OSPFv3 has a stable neighbor but IPv6 destination prefixes learned from another area never appear in routing output. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: A mismatched area capability or external LSA leakage prevents intended stub operation. The appropriate mitigation is: Make the stub-area configuration consistent across every router attached to that area.

B:

Allowing uncontrolled OSPF neighbors on a user LAN broadens the routing-control-plane attack surface. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A branch requires OSPF reachability to its attached access LAN but must not form router adjacencies with random hosts on that LAN. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: A mismatched area capability or external LSA leakage prevents intended stub operation. The appropriate mitigation is: Make the stub-area configuration consistent across every router attached to that area.

C:

Restarting healthy neighbors cannot correct a routing policy that rejects desired learned routes. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: After a maintenance change, OSPFv2 routes vanish from inet.0 but the protocol neighbor remains Full and LSAs are present. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: A mismatched area capability or external LSA leakage prevents intended stub operation. The appropriate mitigation is: Make the stub-area configuration consistent across every router attached to that area.

Question 21

A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. Which targeted engineering change is MOST directly justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Check the external metric type and the internal cost to each ASBR in the OSPF route selection trace.
  2. Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there.
  3. Make the stub-area configuration consistent across every router attached to that area.
  4. Set matching OSPF area membership for both sides of that transit adjacency.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there. This change specifically addresses the reported evidence: A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. The relevant protocol mechanism is: NSSA supports controlled external route origination using type-7 LSAs in a stub-like area. A decisive acceptance test would be: The NSSA advertises its approved type-7 externals and ABR translation behaves as designed.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Check the external metric type and the internal cost to each ASBR in the OSPF route selection trace. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: An OSPF external type-2 prefix selects an unexpected egress even though two ASBRs announce the same external metric. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. The required targeted change is: Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there.

C:

Make the stub-area configuration consistent across every router attached to that area. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: An OSPFv2 area is designed as stub but one internal router still treats it as a normal area, preventing stable neighbor operation. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. The required targeted change is: Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there.

D:

Set matching OSPF area membership for both sides of that transit adjacency. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: Two OSPF area 0 routers reach bidirectional Hello state, yet one sees a unique area identifier in the other router's received Hello. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. The required targeted change is: Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there.

Question 22

A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. The proposed correction is: Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?

  1. The selected external path reflects the defined E2 comparison and tie-break behavior.
  2. Neighbor adjacencies are Full and the stub area avoids the prohibited external LSA advertisements.
  3. The NSSA advertises its approved type-7 externals and ABR translation behaves as designed.
  4. Neighbor detail reports the intended common area and the area LSDB becomes consistent.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The NSSA advertises its approved type-7 externals and ABR translation behaves as designed. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. The mechanism being validated is: NSSA supports controlled external route origination using type-7 LSAs in a stub-like area.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The selected external path reflects the defined E2 comparison and tie-break behavior. That would validate a different condition: An OSPF external type-2 prefix selects an unexpected egress even though two ASBRs announce the same external metric. The decisive check for the current issue is: The NSSA advertises its approved type-7 externals and ABR translation behaves as designed.

B:

Neighbor adjacencies are Full and the stub area avoids the prohibited external LSA advertisements. That would validate a different condition: An OSPFv2 area is designed as stub but one internal router still treats it as a normal area, preventing stable neighbor operation. The decisive check for the current issue is: The NSSA advertises its approved type-7 externals and ABR translation behaves as designed.

D:

Neighbor detail reports the intended common area and the area LSDB becomes consistent. That would validate a different condition: Two OSPF area 0 routers reach bidirectional Hello state, yet one sees a unique area identifier in the other router's received Hello. The decisive check for the current issue is: The NSSA advertises its approved type-7 externals and ABR translation behaves as designed.

Question 23

A Junos engineer proposes this response: Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there. The situation is: A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?

  1. OSPF E2 external routes primarily consider the external metric with internal cost relevant to ties.
  2. The OSPF stub capability must agree among routers in the same area.
  3. OSPF adjacency requires compatible area identity at both ends of an interface.
  4. NSSA supports controlled external route origination using type-7 LSAs in a stub-like area.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

NSSA supports controlled external route origination using type-7 LSAs in a stub-like area. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. It predicts the acceptance result: The NSSA advertises its approved type-7 externals and ABR translation behaves as designed.

Incorrect Answers

A:

OSPF E2 external routes primarily consider the external metric with internal cost relevant to ties. This principle explains a separate situation: An OSPF external type-2 prefix selects an unexpected egress even though two ASBRs announce the same external metric. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: NSSA supports controlled external route origination using type-7 LSAs in a stub-like area.

B:

The OSPF stub capability must agree among routers in the same area. This principle explains a separate situation: An OSPFv2 area is designed as stub but one internal router still treats it as a normal area, preventing stable neighbor operation. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: NSSA supports controlled external route origination using type-7 LSAs in a stub-like area.

C:

OSPF adjacency requires compatible area identity at both ends of an interface. This principle explains a separate situation: Two OSPF area 0 routers reach bidirectional Hello state, yet one sees a unique area identifier in the other router's received Hello. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: NSSA supports controlled external route origination using type-7 LSAs in a stub-like area.

Question 24

A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?

  1. Leaving the branch as a regular stub area prevents its ASBR distributing external routes as intended.
  2. Misreading E2 selection as pure internal cost can send remediation to the wrong part of the topology.
  3. A mismatched area capability or external LSA leakage prevents intended stub operation.
  4. Mismatched area membership blocks successful link-state adjacency despite IP connectivity.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Leaving the branch as a regular stub area prevents its ASBR distributing external routes as intended. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: A branch OSPF stub area must import selected external routes from its local ASBR without carrying all external type-5 LSAs. It is prevented by: Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there. The underlying reason is: NSSA supports controlled external route origination using type-7 LSAs in a stub-like area.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Misreading E2 selection as pure internal cost can send remediation to the wrong part of the topology. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: An OSPF external type-2 prefix selects an unexpected egress even though two ASBRs announce the same external metric. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Leaving the branch as a regular stub area prevents its ASBR distributing external routes as intended. The appropriate mitigation is: Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there.

C:

A mismatched area capability or external LSA leakage prevents intended stub operation. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: An OSPFv2 area is designed as stub but one internal router still treats it as a normal area, preventing stable neighbor operation. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Leaving the branch as a regular stub area prevents its ASBR distributing external routes as intended. The appropriate mitigation is: Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there.

D:

Mismatched area membership blocks successful link-state adjacency despite IP connectivity. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: Two OSPF area 0 routers reach bidirectional Hello state, yet one sees a unique area identifier in the other router's received Hello. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: Leaving the branch as a regular stub area prevents its ASBR distributing external routes as intended. The appropriate mitigation is: Change the topology design to a compatible NSSA and originate permitted external routes there.

Question 25

A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. Which targeted engineering change is MOST directly justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Set matching OSPF area membership for both sides of that transit adjacency.
  2. Synchronize the supported OSPF authentication type, key identifier, and shared secret on both sides.
  3. Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence.
  4. Keep the access-facing OSPF interface passive while advertising its connected subnet through the area.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence. This change specifically addresses the reported evidence: A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. The relevant protocol mechanism is: OSPF virtual links can logically connect an area to the backbone through a qualifying transit area. A decisive acceptance test would be: The remote area has a logical backbone adjacency through the intended transit area after validation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Set matching OSPF area membership for both sides of that transit adjacency. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: Two OSPF area 0 routers reach bidirectional Hello state, yet one sees a unique area identifier in the other router's received Hello. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. The required targeted change is: Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence.

B:

Synchronize the supported OSPF authentication type, key identifier, and shared secret on both sides. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A secure OSPFv2 transit link stops accepting neighbor packets after a key-roll event; captures show incompatible configured authentication secrets. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. The required targeted change is: Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence.

D:

Keep the access-facing OSPF interface passive while advertising its connected subnet through the area. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A branch requires OSPF reachability to its attached access LAN but must not form router adjacencies with random hosts on that LAN. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. The required targeted change is: Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence.

Question 26

A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. The proposed correction is: Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?

  1. Neighbor detail reports the intended common area and the area LSDB becomes consistent.
  2. Authenticated OSPF Hellos are accepted and the peer database reaches Full.
  3. The access subnet appears in the LSDB and no OSPF neighbors form on the edge-facing LAN.
  4. The remote area has a logical backbone adjacency through the intended transit area after validation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The remote area has a logical backbone adjacency through the intended transit area after validation. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. The mechanism being validated is: OSPF virtual links can logically connect an area to the backbone through a qualifying transit area.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Neighbor detail reports the intended common area and the area LSDB becomes consistent. That would validate a different condition: Two OSPF area 0 routers reach bidirectional Hello state, yet one sees a unique area identifier in the other router's received Hello. The decisive check for the current issue is: The remote area has a logical backbone adjacency through the intended transit area after validation.

B:

Authenticated OSPF Hellos are accepted and the peer database reaches Full. That would validate a different condition: A secure OSPFv2 transit link stops accepting neighbor packets after a key-roll event; captures show incompatible configured authentication secrets. The decisive check for the current issue is: The remote area has a logical backbone adjacency through the intended transit area after validation.

C:

The access subnet appears in the LSDB and no OSPF neighbors form on the edge-facing LAN. That would validate a different condition: A branch requires OSPF reachability to its attached access LAN but must not form router adjacencies with random hosts on that LAN. The decisive check for the current issue is: The remote area has a logical backbone adjacency through the intended transit area after validation.

Question 27

A Junos engineer proposes this response: Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence. The situation is: A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. Which technical principle BEST justifies the response?

  1. OSPF virtual links can logically connect an area to the backbone through a qualifying transit area.
  2. OSPF adjacency requires compatible area identity at both ends of an interface.
  3. OSPFv2 authenticated adjacencies validate received packet authentication before using them.
  4. Passive-interface design advertises an attached network without initiating OSPF adjacency on that interface.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

OSPF virtual links can logically connect an area to the backbone through a qualifying transit area. This is the controlling mechanism in the specific case: A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. It predicts the acceptance result: The remote area has a logical backbone adjacency through the intended transit area after validation.

Incorrect Answers

B:

OSPF adjacency requires compatible area identity at both ends of an interface. This principle explains a separate situation: Two OSPF area 0 routers reach bidirectional Hello state, yet one sees a unique area identifier in the other router's received Hello. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: OSPF virtual links can logically connect an area to the backbone through a qualifying transit area.

C:

OSPFv2 authenticated adjacencies validate received packet authentication before using them. This principle explains a separate situation: A secure OSPFv2 transit link stops accepting neighbor packets after a key-roll event; captures show incompatible configured authentication secrets. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: OSPF virtual links can logically connect an area to the backbone through a qualifying transit area.

D:

Passive-interface design advertises an attached network without initiating OSPF adjacency on that interface. This principle explains a separate situation: A branch requires OSPF reachability to its attached access LAN but must not form router adjacencies with random hosts on that LAN. For this issue the relevant mechanism is: OSPF virtual links can logically connect an area to the backbone through a qualifying transit area.

Question 28

A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. If the team bypasses or fails to implement the targeted correction (Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence.), which direct operational risk or residual exposure is MOST relevant?

  1. Mismatched area membership blocks successful link-state adjacency despite IP connectivity.
  2. A virtual link through a stub transit area or an unavailable transit path cannot restore the backbone connection.
  3. Changing interface metrics does not repair authentication failures and can leave routing disconnected.
  4. Allowing uncontrolled OSPF neighbors on a user LAN broadens the routing-control-plane attack surface.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A virtual link through a stub transit area or an unavailable transit path cannot restore the backbone connection. This is the consequence linked to the observed situation: A remote OSPF area has no physical connection to backbone area 0, and a permitted common transit area exists between its ABR and a backbone ABR. It is prevented by: Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence. The underlying reason is: OSPF virtual links can logically connect an area to the backbone through a qualifying transit area.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Mismatched area membership blocks successful link-state adjacency despite IP connectivity. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: Two OSPF area 0 routers reach bidirectional Hello state, yet one sees a unique area identifier in the other router's received Hello. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: A virtual link through a stub transit area or an unavailable transit path cannot restore the backbone connection. The appropriate mitigation is: Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence.

C:

Changing interface metrics does not repair authentication failures and can leave routing disconnected. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A secure OSPFv2 transit link stops accepting neighbor packets after a key-roll event; captures show incompatible configured authentication secrets. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: A virtual link through a stub transit area or an unavailable transit path cannot restore the backbone connection. The appropriate mitigation is: Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence.

D:

Allowing uncontrolled OSPF neighbors on a user LAN broadens the routing-control-plane attack surface. This risk belongs to a different operational problem: A branch requires OSPF reachability to its attached access LAN but must not form router adjacencies with random hosts on that LAN. The stated condition instead exposes this direct risk: A virtual link through a stub transit area or an unavailable transit path cannot restore the backbone connection. The appropriate mitigation is: Design a supported OSPF virtual link over the common nonstub transit area and document its operational dependence.

Question 29

OSPFv3 interfaces advertise IPv6 prefixes, but the operator checks only IPv4 OSPFv2 state while the IPv6 neighbor never appears. Which targeted engineering change is MOST directly justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Verify OSPFv3 activation and permitted IPv6 link-local multicast signaling on that link.
  2. Assign unique stable 32-bit OSPF router IDs to the two participating devices.
  3. Build a term-based export policy matching those exact prefix filters and add a rejecting terminal term.
  4. Verify OSPFv3 protocol and interface participation using IPv6-aware neighbor and route output.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Verify OSPFv3 protocol and interface participation using IPv6-aware neighbor and route output. This change specifically addresses the reported evidence: OSPFv3 interfaces advertise IPv6 prefixes, but the operator checks only IPv4 OSPFv2 state while the IPv6 neighbor never appears. The relevant protocol mechanism is: OSPFv3 exchanges neighbors using IPv6 link-local signaling and advertises IPv6 reachability. A decisive acceptance test would be: The expected OSPFv3 peer and learned IPv6 routes appear on the intended interface.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Verify OSPFv3 activation and permitted IPv6 link-local multicast signaling on that link. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: An OSPFv3 edge interface has a valid global IPv6 address but no exchange of OSPFv3 Hellos is observed. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: OSPFv3 interfaces advertise IPv6 prefixes, but the operator checks only IPv4 OSPFv2 state while the IPv6 neighbor never appears. The required targeted change is: Verify OSPFv3 protocol and interface participation using IPv6-aware neighbor and route output.

B:

Assign unique stable 32-bit OSPF router IDs to the two participating devices. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: Two OSPFv3 peers have valid routed IPv6 connectivity but advertise duplicate router IDs during adjacency startup. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: OSPFv3 interfaces advertise IPv6 prefixes, but the operator checks only IPv4 OSPFv2 state while the IPv6 neighbor never appears. The required targeted change is: Verify OSPFv3 protocol and interface participation using IPv6-aware neighbor and route output.

C:

Build a term-based export policy matching those exact prefix filters and add a rejecting terminal term. This is a valid solution to a different Junos situation: A routing engineer wants to export exactly two loopback prefixes from static routes into OSPF, not the entire static route table. It does not directly correct the specific failure evidence here: OSPFv3 interfaces advertise IPv6 prefixes, but the operator checks only IPv4 OSPFv2 state while the IPv6 neighbor never appears. The required targeted change is: Verify OSPFv3 protocol and interface participation using IPv6-aware neighbor and route output.

Question 30

OSPFv3 interfaces advertise IPv6 prefixes, but the operator checks only IPv4 OSPFv2 state while the IPv6 neighbor never appears. The proposed correction is: Verify OSPFv3 protocol and interface participation using IPv6-aware neighbor and route output. Which observation MOST directly confirms this fault is resolved?

  1. The expected OSPFv3 peer and learned IPv6 routes appear on the intended interface.
  2. Each peer appears under a distinct router ID and its link-state advertisements remain unambiguous.
  3. Adjacent areas learn the expected aggregate while specific routes remain visible inside the originating area.
  4. The partner sees an aggregate covering precisely the intended networks, with valid contributors.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The expected OSPFv3 peer and learned IPv6 routes appear on the intended interface. This is the direct acceptance evidence for the observed failure: OSPFv3 interfaces advertise IPv6 prefixes, but the operator checks only IPv4 OSPFv2 state while the IPv6 neighbor never appears. The mechanism being validated is: OSPFv3 exchanges neighbors using IPv6 link-local signaling and advertises IPv6 reachability.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Each peer appears under a distinct router ID and its link-state advertisements remain unambiguous. That would validate a different condition: Two OSPFv3 peers have valid routed IPv6 connectivity but advertise duplicate router IDs during adjacency startup. The decisive check for the current issue is: The expected OSPFv3 peer and learned IPv6 routes appear on the intended interface.

C:

Adjacent areas learn the expected aggregate while specific routes remain visible inside the originating area. That would validate a different condition: An enterprise intends to carry summarized inter-area OSPF reachability rather than thousands of individual branch loopback routes. The decisive check for the current issue is: The expected OSPFv3 peer and learned IPv6 routes appear on the intended interface.

D:

The partner sees an aggregate covering precisely the intended networks, with valid contributors. That would validate a different condition: An OSPFv2 adjacency to an external partner remains Full, but the partner expects a summarized route that the ABR is not advertising. The decisive check for the current issue is: The expected OSPFv3 peer and learned IPv6 routes appear on the intended interface.

Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) (JN0-650) Practice Tests

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